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B  3  Taa  ST? 

The  Art  of  Transition  in  Plato 


A  DISSERTATION 

SUBMITTED  TO  THE  FACULTY  OF  THE  GRADUATE  SCHOOL  OF 
AKD  LITERATURE  IN  CANDIDACY  FOR  THE  DEGREE 
OF  DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

DEPARTMENT  OF    GREEK 


GRACE  HADLEY  BILLINGS 


A  x-iivate  Edition,  Distributed  By 

THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  LIBRARIES 

CHICAGO,  ILLINOIS 

1920 


(Ulfp  IttloprBttg  nf  CUtjirago 


The  Art  of  Transition  in  Plato 


A  DISSERTATION 


SUBMITTED  TO  THE  FACULTY  OF  THE  GRADUATE  SCHOOL  OF  ARTS 

AND  LITERATURE  IN  CANDIDACY  FOR  THE  DEGREE 

OF  DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

DEPARTMENT  OF   GREEK 


BY. 

GRACE  HADLEY  BILLINGS 


A  Private  Edition,  Distributed  By 

THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  LIBRARIES 

CHICAGO,  ILLINOIS 

1920 


ult{r  (SoU?giatr  Prpaa 
GEORGE   BANTA  PUBLISHING   COMPANY 

Menasha,  Wisconsin 


i^CH,?  ?ir, 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Page 

Introduction 1 

Chapter 

I.     Main  Transitions 4 

The  dramatic  introduction — Transition  from  the  in- 
troduction to  the  main  body  of  the  dialogue — The  dra- 
matic conclusion — Transition  from  the  main  body  of  the 
dialogue  to  the  conclusion — Transitions  between  larger 
subdivisions  in  the  main  body  of  the  dialogue;  brief  analy- 
sis in  case  of  the  Laches,  Gorgias,  Phaedrus,  Meno;  de- 
tailed analysis  of  Phaedo,  Theaetetus,  Philebus,  Republic, 
Laws. 

II.     Minor  Conventional  Forms  of  Transition 53 

Transition  by  explicit  reference  to  the  plan  and 
course  of  the  argument — Cross  reference — Dismissive  in- 
troductive  forms — Formulas  of  omission  or  postponement 
— Dismissive  and  summarizing  transitions — Transition 
by  assumption — Dichotomy  in  transition — Transition 
by  new  suggestion — Introduction  of  new  terms — 
Transition  by  definition — Transition  by  criticism  or 
correction — The  shift  from  general  to  particular  and  vice 
versa — Applied  analogous  illustrations — Enumerations — 
Inferential  particles — Interrogative  formulas — Transi- 
tional adverb  and  prepositional  phrases — Connective 
particles — Narrative  formulas. 

III.     The  Literary  Art  of  Transition 71 

Introductory — Examples  of  artistic  transitions — 
Plato's  transitional  usage  of  proverbs,  quotations,  images, 
continued  metaphor,  leit  motif — Word  transitions — 
Various  literary  methods  of  advancing  the  argument — 
Playing  with  the  order  of  the  subject — Blending  of 
literary  devices  with  real  argument — Digressions — Paro- 
dies. 

Appendix 102 

433078 


PREFACE 

The  following  study  of  Plato's  methods  of  transition  was  under- 
taken at  the  suggestion  of  Professor  Paul  Shorey  of  the  University  of 
Chicago.  My  warm  thanks  are  due  to  him  for  his  invaluable  help  and 
criticism  during  the  progress  of  the  work.  Former  members  of  his 
seminar  on  Plato  will  find  my  indebtedness  to  Professor  Shorey  espe- 
cially evident  in  the  section  on  the  Republic.  I  am  sorry  that  his  long- 
promised  edition  of  the  Republic  is  not  yet  in  print  so  that  my 
acknowledgment  might  be  more  definite.  I  wish  also  to  express  here 
my  thanks  to  Dr.  Thomas  H.  Billings  of  Carleton  College  and 
Miss  Frances  W.  Hadley  who  have  generously  borne  the  entire 
burden  of  the  proof-reading. 

Grace  Hadley  Billings. 

Northfield,  Minnesota, 
August,  1920. 


THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

Introduction 

The  subject  of  the  methods  of  transition  used  by  Greek  and  Latin 
writers  has  by  no  means  received  the  attention  it  deserves.^  The 
value  of  such  a  study  for  the  understanding  and  appreciation  of  an 
author's  style  is  readily  apparent.  Nor  is  the  investigation  so  simple 
as  it  might  at  first  sight  appear.  The  elusiveness  of  the  subject  and 
its  difficulties  will  be  illustrated  in  the  following  paper.  The  inquiry 
has  been  confined  to  the  Platonic  dialogues.^  Our  first  problem  is 
one  of  method.  Platonic  thought  seems  to  follow  whither  the  wind 
blows;3  in  reality  it  is  guided  by  a  subtle  art.  A  study  of  the  process 
might  develop  into  a  treatise  on  Platonic  dialectic,  on  the  logic  of 
Plato's  style.  This  would  necessitate  a  complete  analysis  of  the 
argument  of  every  dialogue,  showing  Plato's  logical  methods  of 
thought-transition.  Moreover,  in  the  dialogues,  while  the  stream 
of  thought  is  continuous,  yet  it  runs  from  point  to  point.  Every 
sentence  is  connected,  explicitly  or  impHcitly,  with  what  precedes 
and  follows.  A  study  of  transitions  might  become  an  attempt  to 
classify  all  the  forms  of  sentence  connection.^  This  latter  interpreta- 
tion of  the  subject  involves  another.  Its  constant  use  of  particles  is 
a  prominent  idiomatic  characteristic  of  the  Greek  language.  Many 
particles  are  distinctly  particles  of  connection,  and  most  of  them  have 

1  Two  recent  Yale  dissertations— A.  R.  Brubacher,  Sentence  Connection  in 
Herodotus,  New  Haven,  1902,  and  C.  W.  Mendell,  Sentence  Connection  in  Tacitus, 
New  Haven,  1901,  approach  the  subject  from  the  standpoint  of  historical  syntax. 
Dr.  Mendell  has  since  published  Latin  Sentence  Connection,  New  Haven,  1917, 
in  which  he  continues  his  investigations  in  a  wider  field.  There  are  also  several 
German  dissertations  dealing  with  the  mechanical  formulas  and  phrases  of 
transition  used  by  the  Greek  orators.     (Cf.  p.  53,  n.  1.) 

-  For  a  detailed  survey  of  transitional  usage  in  another  special  field,  see  R.  D. 
Elliott,  Transition  in  the  Attic  Orators,  Menasha,  Wis.,  1919. 

3  Rep.  394d;  Theaet.  172d;  Laws  667a.  Jowett  and  Campbell,  Republic  of 
Plato,  Oxford,  1894,  Vol.  II,  p.  10;  Shorey,  Unity  of  Plato's  Thought,  Chicago, 
1903,  p.  5. 

*  Dr.  Mendell  finds  three  fundamental  principles  underlying  all  sentence 
connection: — repetition,  change  and  incompleteness. 

1 


2  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

some  transitional  usages.  Thus  it  becomes  possible  to  regard  an 
account  of  Plato's  methods  of  transition  as  practically  equivalent  to 
a  treatise  on  Platonic  particles. 

The  versatility  of  Plato's  genius  is  responsible  for  a  further  com- 
plication of  the  subject.  Plato's  style  has  been  aptly  called  pan- 
harmonic.  He  passes  at  will  from  simplicity  to  complexity,  from  the 
commonplace  to  impassioned  eloquence  without  disturbing  the  har- 
mony of  the  whole.  CampbelP  has  distinguished  five  varieties  of 
Platonic  manner — simple  statement  or  narration,  ornate  narration, 
passages  of  moral  elevation,  question  and  answer,  continuous 
dialectic.  Such  a  stylistic  classification  might  be  adopted  as  the  frame- 
work for  a  discussion  of  transitions,  for  different  methods  are  neces- 
sarily characteristic  of  each  style. 

The  method  followed  in  the  present  paper  is  one  of  compromise. 
Without  attempting  an  exhaustive  study  of  the  process  of  Platonic 
dialectic,  of  Plato's  methods  of  sentence  connection,  or  his  use  of 
particles,  it  is  the  purpose  of  this  discussion  to  present  from  the 
Platonic  dialogues  adequate  material  for  the  illustration  of  all  these 
methods  of  approach  to  the  study  of  transitions.  The  stylistic  basis 
of  arrangement  has  not  been  adopted,  but  changes  in  transitional 
method  due  to  differences  in  style  have  been  noted.  The  first  chapter 
contains  analyses  of  a  number  of  representative  dialogues.  In  these 
analyses  only  so  much  of  the  philosophic  content  of  the  argument  is 
given  as  is  necessary  to  make  intelHgible  the  outline  of  the  logical 
and  artistic  framework  of  the  dialogue.  The  chief  emphasis  is  placed 
on  the  indication  and  description  of  the  main  points  of  transition  in 
the  argument.  The  two  succeeding  chapters  are  devoted  to  a  more 
minute  study  of  Plato's  methods  of  transition.  The  second  chapter 
deals  with  his  usage  of  conventional  transitional  formulas  and 
includes  a  brief,  incomplete  account  of  Platonic  transitional  particles. 
Under  the  heading  'Plato's  literary  art  of  transition'  more  unusual 
and  artistic  means  of  connection  have  been  discussed.  Little  or  no 
attempt  at  formal  classification  has  been  made.  Similar  transitional 
devices  are  grouped  together  for  purposes  of  description.  The  fre- 
quent union  of  several  transitional  elements  in  one  passage  and  the 
difficulty  of  fixing  hard  and  fast  boundaries  between  different  types 
of  transition  make  any  rigid  classification  impossible  as  well  as  useless. 

6  Jowett  and  Campbell,  Republic  of  Plato,  Oxford,  1894,  Vol.  II,  p.  166  ff. 


INTRODUCTION  6 

The  present  paper,  therefore,  disregards  most  of  the  commonly  sug- 
gested lines  of  division,  such  as  the  separation  of  transitions  into 
personal  and  impersonal,  explicit  and  disguised,  natural  and  manu- 
factured. Even  the  important  distinction  between  an  external  form 
of  connection  by  formula,  phrase,  particle,  or  repeated  word  and  an 
inner  thought-transition  by  means  of  summary,  generalization,  dis- 
missal, criticism,  or  description  of  plan,  has  been  rejected  as  a  basis 
of  classification.  Most  transitions  indeed  contain  both  an  external 
and  internal  element.  This  discussion  is  occupied  with  the  recogni- 
tion and  description  of  these  as  they  appear  in  different  combinations, 
rather  than  with  any  attempt  to  decide  in  individual  passages  upon 
which  transitional  element  the  balance  of  emphasis  rests. 


CHAPTER  I 
Main  Transitions 

Plato  has  no  special  methods  which  he  reserves  for  main  transi- 
tions. The  device  which  opens  a  whole  discussion  may  appear  later 
on  in  a  very  minor  subdivision.  Generalizations  as  to  the  intrinsic 
importance  of  this  or  that  transitional  device  are  practically  worth- 
less. But  a  careful  analysis  of  the  main  transitions  in  individual 
dialogues  is  by  no  means  barren  of  result.  It  is  possible  to  penetrate, 
if  ever  so  little,  the  secret  of  that  wonderful  smooth  style^  where 
thought  follows  thought  in  a  sequence  so  genuine  that  it  is  often  hard 
to  put  one's  finger  on  any  line  of  division; — so  completely  is  the 
whole  discourse  a  unit. 

To  connect  the  main  body  of  thought  successfully  with  the  intro- 
duction, so  as  not  to  leave  the  transition  abrupt  or  arbitrary,  is 
recognized  by  rhetoricians^  as  one  of  the  hardest  of  the  writer's  tasks. 
In  dealing  with  this  difficult  transitional  problem  Plato  is  pre- 
eminently successful.  His  introductions  are  varied  and  interesting. 
We  miss  the  stereotyped  personal  proemium  common  in  the  orators.^ 
An  approach  to  the  formal  prothetic  introduction  is  found  in  some 
of  the  later  dialogues,  but  even  there  the  semblance  of  a  dramatic 
setting  is  often  preserved.  The  Cratylus  affords  a  good  example  of 
this  type.  It  opens  with  the  invitation  to  Socrates  to  join  in  the 
discussion  whose  theme  Hermogenes  briefly  explains.  With  the 
usuaH  protest  of  ignorance  from  Socrates  and  of  his  willingness  to 
investigate  the  subject  in  company  with  the  others  (384c),  the  argu- 
ment begins.     The  Sophist  is  nearly  as  abrupt.     After  the  bare  men- 

^  Olympiodorus  in  his  scholia  to  Plato's  Phaedo  has  noted  this  smoothness 
of  transition.  Finckh,  Olympiodorus,  Scholia  in  Platonis  Phaedonem,  Heilbronn, 
1847,  p.  13 — a\l/o<pr)Tl  TTJs  ixtTa^aaews  yevon'tv-qs  blKT)v  kXalov  pkovTos'  oh  yap 
\oyoypa(piK6p  to  diaipeLv  els  irpCiTov  koI  devrepov  Ke<pa\aLOP.  The  figure  of  the  stream 
of  oil  is  Platonic.    Cp.  Theaet.  144  B. 

2  Genung,  Practical  Rhetoric,  p.  283. 

3Isoc.  XII,  VI;  Lysias  III,  XII,  XVI  et  al.;  Andocides  I;  Aeschines  II; 
Ant.  V. 

^Laches  186  c,  Theaet.  145  e,  157  cd,  Meno  71b,  80  d,  Rep.  331  e,  354 
c,  450  e-451  ab,  Lysis  212  a,  Gorg.  506  a. 

4 


MAIN  TRANSITIONS  5 

tion  of  the  appointed  meeting  and  a  half-playful  reference  to  the 
god-like  character  of  the  philosopher  stranger,  Socrates  propounds  the 
question  for  investigation.  A  few  details  of  procedure  are  arranged 
and  the  discussion  begins  with  the  application  of  the  chosen  method  to 
a  simple  subject.  In  several  other  dialogues,  notably  the  Philebus, 
Parmenides,  Politicus  and  Meno'^  the  discussion  begins  abruptly  with 
no  dramatic  preface. 

Abruptness  of  beginning  is  characteristic  also  of  the  spurious 
dialogues.^  The  subject  of  discussion  may  be  introduced  entirely 
without  prelude  as  in  the  De  Justo  which  begins,  "Can  you  tell  us 
what  justice  is?"  (372a)  Where  there  is  any  attempt  at  a  dramatic 
introduction  it  is  purely  conventional.  The  Theages  will  serve  as  a 
good  example  of  this  type.^  After  a  few  stereotyped  details  of  place 
and  occasion  Demodocus  reveals  his  reason  for  consulting  Socrates; — 
he  is  worried  about  the  education  of  his  son.  The  transition  to  the 
following  discourse  is  brought  about  through  the  common^  Socratic 
principle  of  the  need  of  agreement  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  subject 
under  discussion.     (122b-e) 

In  the  majority  of  the  genuine  dialogues  a  dramatic  introduction, 
often  lengthy  and  elaborate,  prepares  the  way  for  the  discussion. 
The  predominant  feature  may  be  a  vivid  description  of  the  setting, 
as   in   the  Lysis,^   or  a  piece  of  character  delineation,   as   in   the 

5  This  lack  of  dramatic  introduction  natural  enough  in  the  metaphysical 
dialogues  is  noteworthy  in  the  Meno,  which  is  a  minor  dialogue  of  search  other- 
wise rich  in  dramatic  interest  and  clever  character  portrayal. 

6  Compare  the  De  Virtute  (376a)  the  Demodocus  (380a)  and  the  Hipparchus 
(225a). 

'  The  Sisyphus,  Eryxias  and  Axiochus  are  similarly  abrupt  and  conventional 
in  their  introductions.  Grote,  Plato,  Vol.  II,  p.  94,  has  noted  that  some  of  the 
genuine  dialogues  begin  abruptly  and  bases  upon  this  argument  his  acceptance 
also  of  some  usually  regarded  as  spurious.  But  among  the  genuine  dialogues,  if 
we  except  the  Meno,  it  is  the  abstruse  metaphysical  type  which  is  lacking  in 
dramatic  introduction.  The  spurious  dialogues  are  more  akin  in  subject  matter 
to  the  minor  dialogues. 

8  See  Theaet.   154de;  Meno  75d. 

9  In  the  introduction  to  the  Lysis  Socrates  describes  how,  while  walking 
from  the  Academy  to  the  Lyceum,  he  met  and  joined  a  group  of  his  young  friends 
who  were  on  their  way  to  a  neighboring  palaestra.  In  their  conversation  on  the 
road  the  subject  of  friendship,  the  dominant  idea  of  the  dialogue,  is  readily  intro- 
duced through  the  criticism  of  Hippothales  for  the  fooHsh  and  extravagant  manner 
in  which  he  addresses  his  friend  Lysis.     Socrates  convinces  Hippothales  that  he 


6  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

Euthyphro;^"  or  both  elements  may  be  equally  important,  as  in  the 
artistically  perfect  Protagoras.  In  any  case  these  opening  scenes 
strike  the  key-note  of  the  dialogue.  They  forewarn  us  of  the  tone 
and  character  of  the  discussion  which  they  introduce. 

The  dramatic  introduction  in  the  Laches  is  particularly  appro- 
priate, for  an  inquiry  into  the  nature  of  courage  is  easily  developed 
from  a  discussion  of  the  advisability  of  learning  the  art  of  fighting 
in  heavy  armor.^^  The  series  of  transitions,  leading  up  to  the  main 
inquiry  is  a  good  illustration  of  Socrates'  skill  in  guiding  a  conversa- 
tion.^^     In  the  first  half  of  the  introduction  Socrates  has  little  active 

ought  to  change  and  offers  to  advise  him  if  he  can  have  an  opportunity  to  talk 
with  Lysis.  Thus  transition  is  made  to  the  idea  of  a  discussion  (206  c).  There 
follows  a  charming  description  of  the  scene  in  the  palaestra.  Lysis  and  his 
friend  Menexenus  come  over  and  sit  down  by  Socrates  and  he  begins  to  talk 
with  them  (207b). 

The  introduction  to  the   Charmides  is  equally  rich  in  descriptive  detail. 

1°  There  is  very  little  description  of  the  setting  in  the  Euthyphro.  Socrates 
and  Euthyphro  meet  in  the  porch  of  the  King  Archon.  Both  are  involved  in 
law-suits.  Socrates  has  been  charged  with  impiety.  Euthyphro  is  engaged  in 
the  prosecution  of  his  own  father  for  the  murder  of  a  hired  laborer.  In  the  course 
of  their  conversation  the  question  of  the  piety  of  Euthyphro's  act  naturally 
arises  (4e).  Socrates  is  eager  to  learn  from  Euthyphro  what  piety  is  in  order  that 
he  may  defend  himself  against  Meletus.  Thus  the  idea  of  a  discussion  is  intro- 
duced (5c).  The  formal  request  for  a  definition  of  piety  (5d)  serves  as  the  final 
transition  to  the  main  discourse.  It  is  in  keeping  with  the  ironical  tone  which 
pervades  the  whole  dialogue  that  the  great  moral  teacher  Socrates  should  be 
represented  as  anxious  to  become  the  pupil  of  the  wrong-headed  bigot  Euthyphro. 

"  Equally  appropriate  is  the  choice  of  the  two  brave  generals  as  Socrates' 
respondents  in  this  discussion.  Artistic  selection  of  the  characters  to  fit  the  dis- 
course is  typical  of  the  minor  dialogues.  Lysis  and  Menexenus  are  an  example 
of  friendship.  The  youth  Charmides  is  an  embodiment  of  the  virtue  temperance. 
So  too  in  the  Theaet.  which  in  many  details  resembles  the  minor  dialogues  the 
characters  are  adapted  to  their  theme. 

1^  The  subject  of  the  discussion  is  frequently  introduced  through  Socrates' 
clever  manipulation  of  the  conversation.  So  in  the  Phaedo,  where  the  final 
transition  to  the  theme  of  the  discourse,  the  true  philosopher's  willingness  to  die, 
is  made  through  explanation  of  Socrates'  intentionally  paradoxical  reply  to  a 
question  of  Cebes,  61  B,  "Tell  this,  then,  to  Evenus,  Cebes,  and  bid  him  if  he 
be  wise  to  follow  me  as  quickly  as  possible."  In  the  Symposium,  although  the 
narrative  introduction  is  occupied  mainly  with  the  personality  of  Socrates,  his 
lively  conversation  with  Aristodemus  on  the  road,  his  characteristic  lapse  into  a 
brown  study,  his  rall>'ing  reply  to  the  playful  admiration  of  Agathon's  welcome, 
it  is  through  the  proposal  of  Eryximachus,  176  e  f.,  that  the  subject  of  discourse 
is  introduced.     Socrates,  however,  sanctions  the  plan.     177  de. 


MAIN  TRANSITIONS  7 

part.  He  excuses  himself  modestly  on  the  ground  that  he  is  younger 
and  less  experienced  than  the  two  generals.  The  long  set  speeches 
of  Nicias  and  Laches  for  and  against  the  practice  under  discussion 
form  an  interesting  contrast  to  the  Socratic  dialogue  which  follows, 
to  which  transition  is  made  by  the  call  upon  Socrates  to  cast  the 
deciding  vote  (184d).  The  familiar^^  Socratic  doctrine  of  the  neces- 
sity of  dependence  not  upon  the  opinion  of  the  majority,  but  of  the 
'one  wise  man'  forms  the  next  onward  step  in  transition  (184e). 
The  attempt  to  answer  the  question  'wise  in  what?' — to  define  the 
main  point  at  issue — leads  to  the  generalized  distinction  between 
means  and  end  (185d),  and  by  application  of  this  distinction  Socrates 
makes  the  important  transition  from  body  to  souP*  (185e).  There 
now  follows  a  discussion  of  the  two  tests  of  the  claim  to  knowledge, 
ability  to  name  one's  teachers  or  to  show  some  practical  results  of 
one's  teaching  of  others.  Socrates  as  often^^  professes  ignorance 
(186c)  in  order  to  bring  on  a  discussion.  Lysimachus  asks  Nicias 
and  Laches  whether  they  are  willing  to  submit  to  examination.  The 
following  passage,  187c-189b,  with  its  comment  upon  the  character 
of  Socrates  may  seem  like  a  digression,  but  it  is  important  for  the 
appreciation  of  the  dialogue  that  Socrates  be  recognized  as  a  moral 
teacher  with  more  than  a  mere  intellectual  interest  in  the  discussion.^® 
Furthermore,  the  figure  of  the  Doric  harmony  here  introduced  appears 
later  on  (193e),  with  unifying  effect. ^^  The  excuse  of  forgetfulness 
by  Lysimachus  (189c)  makes  Socrates  the  leader  of  the  discussion. 
But  Socrates,  when  thus  in  control  of  the  situation,  makes  a  sudden 


"  Theaet.  144e;  Crito  44cd. 

1^  Compare  Protag.  352ab;  Theaet.  145ab.  In  Char.  154de  the  transition 
from  body  to  soul  is  very  cleverly  managed.  Socrates  picks  up  the  word  &-!ro5vvai 
which  liad  been  used  in  comment  on  the  physical  beauty  of  Charmides  and  applies 
it  to  the  investigation  of  his  soul,  thus  giving  a  moral  turn  to  the  discourse. 

"  See  above,  p.  4,  note  4. 

'«  Similar  in  purpose  is  the  passage  in  Char.  156a-157a,  where  the  pretext  of 
giving  Charmides  a  remedy  for  the  headache  is  used  by  Socrates  as  the  occasion 
for  a  short  discourse  on  the  art  of  medicine  and  the  relation  between  soul  and 
body.  The  ethical  application  of  these  remarks  leads  to  the  question  whether 
Charmides  possesses  the  virtue  of  temperance  and  the  lad's  modesty  necessitates 
the  usual  Socratic  conclusion — we  must  investigate  together. 

"  Similarly  in  the  Euthyphro  the  impending  trial  of  Socrates,  which  is 
brought  into  prominence  in  the  introduction,  appears  as  a  leit-motif  throughout 
the  dialogue.    See  below  pp.  80  and  85. 


8  THE  ART  or  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

shift  of  the  plan  of  inquiry  to  one  based  rather  on  first  principles 
and  introduces  the  doctrine  of  Tapovaia^^  (189e)  which  he  explains  by 
a  concrete  illustration.  This  is  a  question  of  the  Tapovaia  of  virtue. 
Transition  to  discussion  is  made  through  the  assumption  that  what 
we  know,  we  must  be  able  to  express.^^  Inquiry  into  the  nature  of 
virtue  is  evaded  here  by  the  assumption  that  virtue  is  a  whole  with 
parts  and  the  final  narrowing  of  the  question  to  the  investigation 
'what  is  courage?'  is  made  by  reference  back  to  the  art  of  fighting 
in  heavy  armor,  the  practice  of  which  is  supposed  to  produce 
courage.^" 

There  may  be  debate  about  the  extent  of  the  dramatic  introduc- 
tion in  the  Crito.  If  it  is  regarded  as  including  only  the  brief  pre- 
liminary conversation,  Socrates'  vision  with  its  beautiful  and  pathetic 
adaptation  of  the  Homeric  quotation,  "On  the  third  day  thou  shalt 
go  to  fertile  Phthia"  (44b),  supplies  the  link  of  transition  to  Crito's 
plea  that  Socrates  will  allow  his  friends  to  plan  his  escape.  If  on 
the  other  hand,  the  main  theme  of  the  dialogue  is  not  the  plea  for 
escape,  but  the  consideration  of  the  question  whether  escape  is  right, 
then  Crito's  arguments  for  the  escape  and  the  preliminary  discussion 
of  the  value  of  the  opinion  of  the  many  are  to  be  included  in  the 
introduction,  from  which  transition  is  made  through  the  application 
of  general  principles  to  the  particular  question,  and  the  common^^ 
Socratic  formula,  'We  must  consider  together.' 

i«  napovtria,  presence,  is  one  of  the  terms  used  by  Plato  to  express  the  relation 
of  the  idea  to  the  particular  object.  Socrates'  use  of  the  term  in  this  passage  is 
rather  logical  than  metaphysical.     Compare  also  Char.  158e-159a. 

>'  A  similar  combination  of  ideas  is  used  in  Char.  158e-159a.  Here  it  is  a 
question  of  the  irapovcria  of  temperance.  The  assumption  that  if  Charmides 
possesses  the  virtue  he  can  give  an  account  of  it  introduces  the  demand  for  a 
definition  of  temperance  and  the  beginning  of  the  discussion. 

2"  The  introduction  of  the  Laches  has  been  criticized  as  disproportionate  in 
length  to  the  main  discussion.  Bonitz  (Platonische  Studien,  Berlin,  1886,  p.  226), 
defends  Plato  by  the  argument  that  it  is  no  longer  in  our  power  to  discover  what 
special  purpose  he  may  have  had  in  any  chosen  mode  of  expression.  This  seems 
an  adequate  defense.  Why  should  not  the  raising  of  the  question  of  the  profit  of 
professional  training  and  the  resulting  typical  speeches  of  Nicias  and  Laches  be 
accepted  as  important  to  Plato's  design  in  the  Laches  as  well  as  the  lessons  in 
logic  and  ethics  which  are  dramatically  taught  in  the  later  discussion? 

"  Meno  80d,  81e,  86c;  Theaet.  145d,  151e;  Char.  158d;  Crat.  384c;  Laches 
201a. 


MAIN  TRANSITIONS  V 

The  introduction  to  the  Phaedrus  is  rich  both  in  descriptive  detail 
and  character  delineation.  Socrates  meets  the  young  Phaedrus,  an 
enthusiastic  lover  of  discourse,  on  his  way  for  a  walk  outside  the  walls. 
He  has  just  come  from  a  visit  with  Lysias  where  he  has  heard  a 
discourse  on  love  which  urged  favoring  the  non-lover  rather  than  the 
lover.  Socrates  begs  him  to  repeat  it.  After  considerable  protest 
and  feigned  reluctance  on  the  part  of  Phaedrus,  Socrates'  playful 
insistence  is  rewarded.  Phaedrus  admits  the  possession  of  the 
manuscript  and  suggests  (228de)  that  they  sit  down  and  read  it. 
The  following  account  of  their  walk  along  the  Ilissus,  the  interesting 
mythological  digression  suggested  by  the  place,  and  the  description 
of  the  fair  retreat  beneath  the  lofty  plane  tree  are  deservedly  famous. 
Finally  with  some  jesting  by-play  on  Socrates'  fondness  for  the  city 
and  the  manner  of  his  allurement  to  this  unaccustomed  distance  from 
it,  return  is  made  to  the  manuscript.  A  resumptive  5'  ovu  dismisses 
the  by-play  and  with  a  simple  aKove  5?)  the  speech  of  Lysias  is  intro- 
duced. 

The  dialogues  just  discussed  are  of  the  direct  dramatic  type.^^ 
Their  introductions  are  generally  short,^^  noteworthy  for  character 
portrayal  rather  than  scenic  elaboration.-^  In  the  narrated  dia- 
logues^^  the  introduction  may  include  in  dramatic  form  the  request 
for  the  narrative  and  some  preliminary  conversation  as  well  as  the 

'^  So  also  the  Gorgias,  Euthyphro,  Laws,  Ion,  Menexenus,  Hippias  II  and 
the  doubtful  Hippias  I  and  Ale.  I  and  II. 

^'  The  Laches  is  a  notable  exception. 

"*  In  the  Gorgias  the  setting  is  not  even  mentioned,  merely  implied.  The 
rhetorician  Gorgias  has  just  been  giving  an  exhibition,  apparently  in  a  pubHc  hall, 
for  which  Socrates  and  his  pupil  Chaerophon  have  arrived  too  late.  But  what 
Socrates  really  wants  is  a  chance  to  talk  with  Gorgias  and  at  his  request  Chaere- 
phon  is  on  the  point  of  asking  the  rhetorician  to  define  his  profession  (447b)  when 
Polus,  Gorgias'  pupil,  interrupts  and  offers  himself  as  respondent  with  the  excuse 
that  his  master  is  tired.  In  the  following  conversation  Chaerephon  and  Polus 
illustrate  very  amusingly  the  characteristic  and  contrasting  styles  of  their  respec- 
tive masters.  Socrates  interrupts  to  correct  Polus  and  draw  the  distinction 
between  praise  and  definition.  Through  this  lesson  in  elementary  logic  transition 
is  made  (448e)  to  the  discussion  with  Gorgias,  from  whom  Socrates  now  demands 
(449a),  "But  rather,  Gorgias,  do  you  tell  us  yourself  what  we  ought  to  call  you, 
and  what  is  the  art  in  which  you  are  skilled. " 

'^  These  include  the  Lysis,  Charm.,  Protag.,  Phaedo,  Symp.,  Theaet., 
Enthydemus,   Republic. 


10  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

narrative  introduction  to  the  discussion,  or,  as  in  the  Lysis  and 
Charmides,  the  request  may  be  presupposed^^  and  the  narrative 
introduction  begin  at  once. 

The  brilliant  and  complicated  Protagoras  is  a  narrated  dialogue 
within  a  dialogue  and  has  therefore  a  double  introduction.  In  the 
brief  preliminary  conversation  between  Socrates  and  an  unnamed 
friend,  the  character  of  Alcibiades  serves  as  the  connecting  link  which 
binds  this  introduction  to  the  main  dialogue.  Socrates  turns  the 
reference  to  his  favorite  to  introduce  the  name  of  the  stranger  from 
Abdera  by  whose  wonderful  wisdom  he  has  been  so  charmed  that  he 
even  forgot  the  presence  of  Alcibiades  the  Fair.  Thence  the  request 
for  an  account  of  his  conversation  with  Protagoras  follows  as  a  matter 
of  course  (310a). 

In  the  narrative  itself  our  decision  as  to  the  limit  of  the  dramatic 
introduction  depends  upon  our  decision  as  to  the  main  purpose  of 
the  dialogue.  If  that  is  the  discussion  of  the  question  whether  virtue 
is  one  or  many  then  the  dramatic  introduction  extends  through  the 
myth  of  Protagoras.  The  method  of  transition  at  this  point  is  a 
familiar  one.'^  Socrates  expresses  great  admiration  for  the  words  of 
the  Sophist.  He  will  feel  quite  satisfied  if  only  Protagoras  can  clear 
up  one  little  difficulty.  Is  virtue  one  and  are  justice,  temperance 
and  piety  parts  of  it,  or  are  these  all  names  of  the  same  thing  which 
is  one?  (328e-329c) 

Since  however  this  discussion  really  occupies  a  comparatively 
small  part  of  the  dialogue  it  seems  more  reasonable  to  adopt  the  view 
that  the  main  aim  of  the  Protagoras  is  more  general,  the  dramatic 
illustration  of  the  contrast  between  Socratic  and  Sophistic  methods 
and  the  superiority  of  dialectic.     It  is  easy  to  see  how  the  myth  of 

2«  In  the  Lysis,  Charmides  and  Republic,  Socrates  is  the  narrator;  his  auditor 
is  not  even  mentioned.  In  the  Symposium,  the  request  of  the  auditor,  an 
unnamed  friend,  for  an  account  of  the  discourse  on  Love  at  Agathon's  banquet  is 
presupposed.  But  since  the  narrative  is  preceded  by  a  brief  conversation  between 
the  auditor  and  narrator  this  dialogue  should  be  classed  with  the  Protagoras, 
rather  than  with  the  Lysis. 

"Theaet.  145d,  161c,  202d;  Laches  180b;  Euthyph.  12e-13a,  7a;  Protag. 
319a,  b.  Cp.  also  below  pp.  89  ft.  In  Char.  154de  this  common  transitional  device— 
the  expression  of  satisfaction  with  his  own  or  another's  conclusions  or  ideas  if  only 
one  slight  addition  or  correction  be  made — is  used,  together  with  the  transition  from 
body  to  soul,  to  introduce  the  idea  of  conversation  with  Charmides. 


MAIN  TRANSITIONS  11 

Protagoras,  Socrates'  clever  ironical  parody  of  current  methods  of 
literary  interpretation,  the  long  dramatic  interlude  in  which  Prodicus, 
Hippias  and  the  other  personages  of  the  dialogue  play  characteristic 
parts,  and  the  several  passages  of  actual  dialectic  all  contribute  to 
this  general  aim  and  unite  into  a  complete  artistic  whole.  Upon 
this  view,  the  dramatic  introduction  extends  to  the  myth  of  Pro- 
tagoras which  is  then  the  first  main  division^*  of  the  dialogue  to  which 
transition  is  made  through  Socrates'  request  for  clearer  proof  of  the 
possibility  of  virtue  being  taught. ^^ 

The  Euthydemus,  like  the  Protagoras,  is  a  narrated  dialogue, 
but  the  enclosing  frame  is,  in  this  case,  a  much  more  integral  part 
of  the  structure,  for  Crito,  who  appears  in  the  introduction  begging 
Socrates  for  a  description  of  his  encounter  with  the  two  strangers 
(271a),  enters  also  into  the  discussion  in  the  midst  of  the  narrative 
(290e-293a),  and  the  dialogue  closes  with  the  consideration  of  the 
criticism  of  the  Sophists  and  of  Socrates  which  Crito  has  heard  from 
a  bystander,  a  clever  writer  of  speeches  for  the  courts  (304c,  d).  His 
character  then  is  a  much  more  important  unifying  element  than  that 
of  Alcibiades  in  the  Protagoras.^°  In  the  preliminary  conversation 
with  Crito  and  in  the  narrative  introduction  the  keynote  of  the  whole 
dialogue  is  struck  in  the  extravagant  ironical  praise  which  Socrates 
showers  upon  the  two  Sophists.  The  main  purpose  of  the  dialogue — 
the  caricature  and  exposure  of  eristic  methods — is  clearly  indicated. 
As  in  the  Protagoras  the  question  of  the  education  and  improvement 
of  an  intelligent  youth  furnishes  the  excuse  for  the  ensuing  discussion. 
Socrates  urges  the  Sophists  (275a)  to  postpone  until  another  time 
their  display  of  other  matters,  but  for  the  present  to  persuade  Cleinias 
that  he  ought  to  study  philosophy  and  practise  virtue.     This  they 

2*  For  description  of  the  transitions  between  the  other  four  important  sub- 
divisions of  the  dialogue  see  below  p.  17,  notes  50  and  51  and  p.  58,  n.  33. 

2'  Or  the  introduction  may  be  considered  as  extending  only  to  318a  where, 
after  the  decision  for  a  public  discussion  and  the  description  of  the  grouping  of 
the  audience,  Socrates  puts  for  a  second  time  the  question,  '  What  will  happen  to 
the  youth  Hippocrates  if  he  associates  with  Protagoras?' 

'"  Similarly  in  the  Phaedo  Echecrates  is  more  than  a  mere  deus  ex  machina 
whose  formal  request  is  the  occasion  of  the  narrative.  Twice  during  the  dialogue 
(88c  and  102a)  some  comment  of  his  to  Phaedo  upon  the  narrative  marks  a  crisis 
in  the  argument  and  his  name  appears  also  at  the  very  end.  He  is  a  real,  sympa- 
thetic auditor  of  whose  presence  we  are  kept  conscious  throughout. 


12  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

agree  to  do  if  the  youth  will  only  answer.  He  is  used  to  that,  says 
Socrates;  and  so  the  fun  begins. 

Although  the  Theaetetus  is  a  dialogue  within  a  dialogue  it  differs 
from  the  others  of  that  class.  TLj  discussion  is  not  narrated,  but 
is  presented  as  a  written  manuscript  giving  in  true  dialogue  form  the 
exact  words  of  each  speaker,^^  and  thus  avoiding  the  constant  repeti- 
tion of  "said  he"  and  "said  I."  The  recollection  and  mention  of  the 
discussion  is  occasioned  very  naturally  by  the  fact  that  Euclides  has 
just  been  escorting  the  sick  and  wounded  Theaetetus  on  his  way  from 
Corinth  to  Athens.  The  usuaP-  request  to  hear  the  tale  follows. 
The  reading  of  the  manuscript  is  prefaced  by  explanation  of  its 
form  (143c).  The  dramatic  introduction  to  the  dialogue  proper  is 
developed  quite  in  the  style  of  the  minor  dialogues. ^^  Socrates  uses 
the  remark  of  Theodorus  as  to  the  personal  resemblance  between 
Theaetetus  and  himself  (144e)  to  introduce  the  idea  of  the  authority 
of  the  specialist.  But  while  Theodorus  is  not  to  be  trusted  as  to 
physical  resemblance  his  praise  of  Theaetetus  for  virtue  of  Soul 
constrains  the  lad  to  submit  to  examination.  Having  thus,  by  means 
of  the  familiar  transition  from  body  to  souP^  (145b),  introduced 
the  idea  of  a  discussion,  Socrates  begins  to  question  Theaetetus 
about  his  studies.  The  transitioa  thence  to  the  main  topic  of  the 
dialogue  is  easy.  Socrates  is  himself  a  learner,  but  he  has  "one  little 
difficulty'"'^  (145de),  which  he  hopes  Theaetetus  and  the  rest  will  help 
him  to  solve — "what  is  knowledge?"  Theodorus  excuses  himself  on 
the  ground  that  he  is  inexperienced  in  dialectic  and  Theaetetus 
becomes  the  respondent  (146b). 

There  is  less  variety  in  Plato's  conclusions  than  in  his  introduc- 
tions.    Some  endings  hke  that  of  the  Repubhc  are  carefully  planned 

31  This  plan  may  have  been  adopted  for  the  sake  of  greater  verisimilitude 
since  the  accurate  repetition  of  such  a  long  and  complicated  argument  would  be 
an  improbable  feat.  So  in  the  Symposium  (178a)  Plato  represents  Apollodorus 
as  warning  his  friend  just  before  he  proceeds  to  recount  the  speech  of  Phaedrus 
that  he  does  not  himself  remember  exactly  everything  that  Aristodemus  told 
him,  nor  did  Aristodemus  remember  exactly  all  that  each  one  said.  That  in 
reality  Plato  cared  little  for  verisimilitude  in  such  details  is  evident  from  his  dis- 
regard of  time  probabihties  in  the  Repubhc.    See  p.  40,  n.  132. 

32Protag.  310a;  Phaedo  57a;  Euthyd.  27la. 

33  See  above  p.  5  f.  and  also  p.  7,  n.  16. 

3<  See  above  p.  7  and  n.  14. 

^  See  above  p.  10  and  note  27. 


MAIN  TRANSITIONS  13 

for  artistic  climactic  effect.  But  in  general  they  are  not  so  well 
managed  as  the  introductions;  they  are  more  stereotyped,  less 
effective.  The  Sophist  has  no  dramatic  conclusion;  it  ends  abruptly 
with  a  summary^^  of  the  final  definition  of  the  sophist  (268c-d)  and 
its  acceptance  by  Theaetetus.  In  the  Cratylus  the  polemic  against 
the  flowing  philosophers  closes,  in  the  style  of  the  minor  dialogues," 
with  a  Socratic  profession  of  ignorance  and  recommendation  to 
further  inquiry.^^  The  transition  to  the  conclusion  is  made  by  the 
sudden  and  perfunctory  introduction  (440e)  of  the  common^^  formula 
of  postponement,  ets  au^ts  toIuvp.  The  Meno  ends  almost  as  abruptly 
as  it  began.  After  the  statement  of  the  final  conclusion  of  the  dis- 
cussion (100b)  Socrates  makes  a  last  protest  against  their  order  of 
investigation.  The  question  what  is  virtue  should  be  settled  first. 
The  formula  of  withdrawal  vvv  8'  e/jLol  nlv  cbpa  ttoi  ievai  follows  abruptly 
and  the  dialogue  closes  with  a  significant  reference  to  the  angry 
Anytus. 

-  The  dialogues  just  considered  illustrate  abrupt  and  rather  mechan- 
ical methods  of  conclusion.  In  several  of  the  dialogues  the  closing 
scene,  though  brief,  is  developed  in  a  style  which  recalls  the  dramatic 
introduction.  In  the  Charmides  Socrates'  summary^"  of  the  results 
of  the  inquiry  (175a),  which  follows  the  rejection  of  the  sixth  defini- 

''  The  Parmenides  and  Politicus  also  end  with  summaries. 

"  The  conclusion  to  the  Theaetetus  shows  a  similar  resemblance  in  manner 
to  the  early  dialogues.  After  an  enumeration  of  the  refuted  definitions  of  knowl- 
edge (210a)  Socrates  returns  to  the  figure  of  the  midwife.  But  his  half-humorous 
moralizings  upon  his  art  and  its  effect  upon  Theaetetus  are  cut  short  by  the 
recollection  of  an  engagement  at  the  porch  of  the  King  Archon.  The  last  word 
is  the  promise  of  a  meeting  on  the  morrow  (210d). 

'*  See  above  p.  4,  n.  4  for  the  use  of  the  Socratic  profession  of  ignorance  to  pro- 
voke a  discussion.  In  the  minor  dialogues  of  search  a  repetition  of  this  protest, 
and  exhortation  to  continue  the  inquiry  usually  appear  in  the  conclusion.  Cp.  Laches 
200e-201a,  Lysis  222e-223b,  Char.  175b-176a,  Rep.  354b. 

3«  Cp.  p.  58,  n.  32.  This  same  formula  in  Euthyph.  15e  checks  Socrates 
who  is  launched  enthusiastically  upon  a  fresh  start  in  the  argument  (15cd)  and 
closes  the  discussion.  Socrates'  reproachful  reference  to  his  purpose  in  beginning 
the  inquiry  is  of  no  avail. 

"  Similarly  in  the  Lysis  at  the  close  of  the  discussion  a  brief  transitional 
paragraph  (222e)  summarizes  their  futile  attempts  to  discover  the  friend.  There 
follows  a  short  dramatic  scene  (223ab),  the  humorous  description  of  the  noisy 
invasion  of  the  half-drunken  attendants,  which  puts  a  stop  to  Socrates'  intended 
further  investigations. 


14  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

tion  of  temperance  is  full  of  characteristic  humor  and  ironical  self- 
depreciation.  A  playful  reference  ( 1 75e)  to  the  charm  of  the  Thracian 
physician  recalls  the  beginning  of  the  discussion.  Socrates'  exhorta- 
tions to  Charmides  to  persist  in  his  self-examination  and  discover 
whether  he  has  need  of  the  charm  are  cleverly  turned  by  the  youth 
(176b),  "And  I  think,  Socrates,  that  I  have  great  need  of  the  charm, 
and  for  my  part  there  is  no  reason  why  I  shouldn't  be  charmed  by 
you  every  day."  The  dialogue  ends  with  Critias  and  Charmides 
vigorously  protesting  their  unshaken  confidence  in  Socrates. 

The  dramatic  elements  in  the  conclusion  of  the  Laches  are  even 
more  prominent.  The  decision  in  199e  that  they  have  failed  to 
discover  what  courage  is  leads  naturally  to  a  bit  of  amusing  by-play 
between  the  two  generals.  Laches  cannot  resist  gloating  over 
Nicias'  failure.  Nicias  retorts  with  a  sharp  rebuke  and  affirms  his 
intention  to  continue  the  inquiry.  Laches  is  still  sceptical  and 
advises  Lysimachus  and  Melesias  to  consult  Socrates  rather  than 
Nicias  or  himself  with  regard  to  the  education  of  the  boys.  In  this 
way  a  return  is  m.ade  (200c)  to  the  topic  with  which  the  dialogue 
began.  Lysimachus  urges  Socrates  to  consent  to  advise  them,  but 
Socrates  makes  use  of  his  accustomed-^^  profession  of  ignorance  (200e- 
201a)  to  enforce  the  characteristic  moral: — since  they  are  all  equally 
at  a  loss  they  must  all  seek  out  a  teacher  and  learn.  A  m,eeting  is 
appointed  for  the  next  morning. 

From  the  final  reluctant  admission  that  completes  the  refutation 
of  Protagoras  (360e)  the  transition  to  the  concluding  summary  is 
made  easily  and  naturally  by  Socrates'  earnest  protest  against  the 
charge  of  contentiousness.  He  follows  this  up  by  a  statement  of  their 
original  positions  with  regard  to  the  issue  debated,  and  the  strange 
reversal  brought  about  by  the  argument.  Finally  by  a  literary 
reference  to  Prometheus  and  Epimetheus  (36 Id),  picking  up  the 
language  of  the  myth  told  by  Protagoras  early  in  the  dialogue,  he 
leads  up  to  the  suggestion  that  they  continue  their  investigations. 
But  Protagoras,  after  a  courteous  expression  of  praise  for  Socrates' 
zeal  and  conduct  of  the  argument,  postpones  further  discussion 
els  aWis  (361e)  and  both  withdraw. 

The  Symposium  is  largely  narrative  and  descriptive;  its  transitions 
are  therefore  of  the  type  natural  to  such  discourse.     The  closing 

*'  See  above  p,  4,  n.  4. 


MAIN  TRANSITIONS  15 

scene  is  introduced  by  one  of  the  common'*^  devices  of  narrative 
transition — reference  to  the  speaker  who  has  just  finished  (222c). 
The  scene  throughout  is  pure  narrative  flowing  smoothly.  Transi- 
tional particles**^  such  as  ovv,  jiev  ovv,  drj,  jxtv-b'e,  'yap  and  /cat  link  sen- 
tence to  sentence  in  a  natural  sequence. 

In  the  Phaedrus  278b  a  perfect  imperative  of  completion  and 
dismissal*^  ireiraiado)  is  used  in  the  transition  from  the  discussion  to  the 
closing  scene.  The  summary  of  the  results  of  the  inquiry  is  intro- 
duced under  the  guise  of  a  message  to  Lysias.  Socrates'  rather 
patronizing  encomium  on  Isocrates  the  Fair  is  called  forth  by  the 
question  of  Phaedrus,  who  is  perhaps  loath  to  have  his  friend  Lysias 
the  only  one  criticized: — "What  message  will  you  send  to  him, 
Socrates,  and  how  shall  we  describe  him?"  (278e)  Unsatisfied  in  his 
desire  Phaedrus  then  m_akes  the  suggestion,  "Let  us  depart."  The 
famous  prayer  of  Socrates  to  Pan  and  the  other  gods  of  the  place 
closes  the  dialogue  (279b). 

The  closing  scenes  of  the  Gorgias  and  Republic^^  are  structurally 
ahke  in  this  respect:  in  both  Plato  supplements  the  conclusions  of 
dialectic  by  the  religious  confirmation  of  a  myth  of  the  underworld. 
In  the  Gorgias,  the  myth  introduced  by  aKove  dri  (522e)  follows 
naturally  upon  Socrates'  eloquent  protest  that  "death  no  man  fears, 
who  is  not  altogether  senseless  and  cowardly,  but  he  does  fear  wrong- 
doing." At  the  end  of  the  myth,  527a,  a  resumptive  d'ovu  introduces 
the  final  summary  by  Socrates  of  the  important  ethical  conclusions 
of  the  dialogue  and  an  exhortation  to  his  companions  to  trust  his 
argument  rather  than  the  thesis  of  CalHcles. 

The  myth  in  the  Phaedo  is  not,  strictly  speaking,  a  part  of  the 
conclusion,  but  immediately  precedes  the  dramatic  concluding  scene 
of  the  dialogue.  In  purpose  and  relation  to  the  argument,  however, 
it  corresponds  exactly  to  the  myths  in  the  Gorgias  and  Republic. 
In  its  beginning  (107c)  the  Phaedo  myth  is  so  much  a  continuation 
of  the  argument  that  it  is  not  formally  distinguished  as  a  myth.  But 
in  110b,  the  major  portion  of  it  is  so  introduced.  In  the  transitional 
paragraph  that  hnks  the  myth  to  the  dramatic  conclusion  of  the 
dialogue  Socrates  carefully  distinguishes  myth  from  dogma  and  then, 

«  See  p.  69. 
«  See  p.  70. 
.  ^  See  p.  57. 
^  For  the  discussion  of  the  conclusion  of  the  Republic  see  pp.  44  ff. 


16  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

in  language  that  recalls  the  original  theme  of  their  discourse,  explains 
the  purpose  of  the  myth:  it  is  a  charm  to  induce  the  conviction  that 
death  has  no  terrors  for  the  philosopher,  "And  words  Hke  these  he 
ought  to  croon  over  to  himself  as  a  charm,  and  that  is  why  I  lengthen 
out  the  tale."  (114d).  The  exhortations  to  Simmias  and  Cebes  and 
reference  to  his  own  approaching  death-hour  form  a  natural  final 
step  in  the  transition  to  the  wonderful  closing  scene  of  the  dialogue. 
Strictly  speaking  the  main  divisions  of  a  dialogue  are  the  three 
fundamental  elements,  the  dramatic  introduction,  the  body  of  the 
discourse  and  the  conclusion.  However,  the  main  discussion  usually 
falls  naturally  into  a  number  of  important  and  well-defined  parts. 
The  transitions  between  these  larger  sub-divisions  of  the  subject 
may  very  properly  be  considered  as  main  transitions.  In  the  minor 
dialogues  of  search  important  divisions  in  the  argument  are  frequently 
marked  by  a  change  in  the  respondent.''*'  The  two  parts  in  the  m.ain 
discussion  in  the  Laches  are  so  indicated.  Laches'  attempts  at  defini- 
tion are  confined  to  bringing  out  the  temperamental  aspect  of  cour- 
age (190e-193e).  With  the  change  to  Nicias  as  respondent  the 
intellectual  aspect  is  introduced^^  and  the  argument  becomes  more 
subtle.     In  the  paragraph  of  transition  between  the  two  parts  of  the 

*^  See  above  p.  6,  n.  11.  The  care  with  which  Plato  suits  the  character  of  the 
respondent  to  the  tone  of  the  discourse  makes  the  change  in  respondents  a  very 
natural  and  effective  means  of  transition. 

^'  Similar  advance  from  a  simple  to  a  more  complex  treatment  is  found  in  the 
Lysis  and  Charmides.  In  the  latter  Socrates'  conversation  with  the  youth 
Charmides  (159a-162a)  deals  with  the  comparatively  simple  external  aspects  of 
temperance,  while  in  the  extremely  subtle  following  discussion  (162e-175a) 
Socrates  interrogates  the  older,  more  experienced  Critias.  The  transition  scene 
(162a-e)  is  very  amusing.  By  slily  humorous  disparaging  comments  Socrates 
cleverly  goads  Critias  into  taking  up  the  defence  of  the  definition  of  temperance 
as  "doing  one's  own  work,"  a  definition  for  which  he  is  evidently  responsible  in 
spite  of  his  denial  (161c). 

The  first  part  of  the  Lysis  (207c-210d)  is  occupied  with  an  edifying  protrep- 
tic  discourse  in  which  Socrates  and  Lysis  are  the  interlocutors.  At  its  close  (2  lOe) 
Socrates  recalls  his  purpose — to  give  the  foolish  Hippothales  a  lesson  in  addressing 
his  friend.  This  first  conversation  is  thus  closely  bound  to  the  dramatic  intro- 
duction. At  the  suggestion  of  Lysis  Menexenus  now  becomes  the  respondent 
(211a).  Socrates'  playful  protest  and  comment  on  the  eristic  disposition  of 
Menexenus  (211bc)  account  for  the  subtlety  of  the  following  discussion.  In 
213d  Lysis  again  enters  the  argument,  but  the  shift  in  respondents  is  only  one 
element  in  this  complicated  transition.     See  below  p.  72. 


MAIN  TRANSITIONS  17 

discussion  the  literary  conceit  of  the  personified  argumenf^  which 
bids  them  endure  in  the  inquiry  is  followed  by  Laches'  description 
of  the  effect  of  the  elenchus  upon  himself.  Then  with  the  figures*^ 
of  the  huntsmen  and  the  storm  Socrates  introduces  the  suggestion  of 
summoning  Nicias  to  their  assistance.  Socrates'  harping  upon  dxopta 
and  its  derivatives  adds  a  slight  unifying  touch. 

The  main  discussion  in  the  Gorgias  falls  naturally  into  three  parts, 
conversations  of  Socrates  with  Gorgias,  Polus  and  Callicles  res- 
pectively. The  transitions  are  simple  and  natural,  the  influence  of 
the  shift  of  respondents  upon  the  character  of  the  discussion  unusually 
plain.  Through  Gorgias'  unwillingness  to  deny  that  the  rhetorician 
would  teach  justice  to  a  pupil  who  needed  that  instruction  he  is  finally 
involved  in  a  contradiction  and  refuted  by  Socrates  (461a).  Polus 
intervenes  and  defends  his  master.  After  ironical  commendation  of 
Polus  and  injunctions  to  him  to  give  up  lengthy  harangues-^''  Socrates 
offers  him  his  choice  of  questioning  or  answering.  The  discussion 
continues  in  462b  with  Socrates  as  respondent,  though  he  still  guides 
the  course  of  the  argument.^^  The  transition  in  481b  is  similar.  In 
spite  of  his  scorn  at  Gorgias'  scruples  Polus  himself  is  not  entirely 
devoid  of  moral  sense.  He  admits  that  to  do  wrong  is  more  disgrace- 
ful than  to  suffer  wrong,  and  this  admission  leads  to  his  refutation. 

*^  See  below,  p.  79. 

43  See  below,  p.  78. 

«»  A  further  example  of  Socratic  hostility  to  lengthy  speaking  is  seen  in  Prot. 
335.  In  the  preceding  debate  whether  the  virtues  are  one  or  many  Protagoras 
seeing  himself  refuted  delivers  a  long  speech  (334a-c)  on  the  relativity  of  the 
notion  of  good.  With  an  ironical  plea  of  forgetfulness  Socrates  protests  his 
inability  to  continue  the  discussion  unless  Protagoras  will  cut  his  answers  short, 
which  the  sophist  refuses  to  do.  This  disagreement  between  the  disputants, 
which  results  in  a  deadlock  in  the  argument,  serves  as  the  transition  to  a  dramatic 
interlude  in  which  the  other  personages  of  the  dialogue,  anxious  for  the  continua- 
tion of  the  discussion,  urge  various  schemes  of  compromise  and  reconciliation. 

"  Compare  Prot.  338de  where  for  the  sake  of  enabling  the  argument  to 
proceed  Socrates  suggests  that  Protagoras  assume  the  role  of  questioner  for  a 
time  and  later  submit  again  to  interrogation.  Through  this  suggestion  and  its 
reluctant  acceptance  by  Protagoras  transition  is  made  to  one  of  the  main  divisions 
of  the  dialogue  (339a-347a)— Socrates'  interpretation  of  a  poem  of  Simonides  in 
which  he  cleverly  parodies  current  methods  of  literary  criticism.  Again  in  347b 
Alcibiades  checks  Hippias  who  is  eager  to  make  a  display  speech,  with  a  reminder 
of  the  agreement  (338d)  that  Protagoras  should  in  turn  submit  again  to  the 
elenchus.  This  reference  is  an  important  link  in  the  series  of  transitions  which 
leads  to  the  final  discussion. 


18  IRE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

Callicles  now  interrupts  with  the  amazed  query  whether  Socrates  is 
really  in  earnest  or  joking.  Chaerephon  replies,  "He  seems  to  me, 
Callicles,  to  be  terribly  in  earnest,  but  there's  nothing  like  asking  him." 
With  the  utterly  unscrupulous  and  cynical  CalHcles  as  respondent 
the  character  of  the  discussion  changes.  Socrates  redoubles  his  irony 
and  becomes  uncompromising  in  his  severity. 

The  analysis  just  given  follows  the  external  artistic  frame-work 
of  the  dialogue.  In  the  consideration  of  the  main  transitions  of  the 
Gorgias  another  important  question  arises,  how  is  the  connection 
made  between  the  two  parts  of  its  double  theme?  Rhetoric  is  the 
ostensible  topic  of  discussion;  in  reahty  ethics  occupies  as  prominent 
a  place.  The  transition  from  rhetoric  to  ethics  is  managed  very 
skilfully.  In  455d  Socrates  leads  Gorgias  on  to  make  immoral  claims 
for  rhetoric.  Under  the  influence  of  ironical  praise  from  him  the 
unsuspecting  sophist  displays  an  immoral  complacency  at  the  idea 
of  the  rhetorician's  power  over  the  expert  craftsman  (456a,  b).  After 
these  admissions  Socrates  is  able  by  the  introduction  of  the  famihar^^ 
analogy  of  the  arts  and  virtue  to  pass  easily  to  the  question  of  the 
attitude  of  rhetoric  toward  justice  and  injustice  (459d),  thus  giving  an 
ethical  turn  to  the  subject. 

The  Phaedrus  is  another  dialogue  with  a  double  theme,  in  this 
case  rhetoric  and  love.  The  first  part  of  the  dialogue,  including  the 
speech  of  Lysias,^'  230e-234d,  in  praise  of  the  non-lover,  the  rivaling 
speech  of  Socrates,  237b-241d,  and  the  myth,  243e-257b,  which  is 
Socrates'  palinode  or  recantation,^*  is  occupied  with  love.  By  the 
literary  criticism  of  the  speech  of  Lysias,  already  suggested  (234e, 
235a,  236a)  in  the  dramatic  interlude  connecting  his  speech  with  that 
of  Socrates  and  taken  up  again  in  258d,  transition  is  made  to  the  topic 
of  rhetoric  and  the  two  parts  of  the  dialogue  are  connected. 

Like  the  Gorgias,  the  Meno  is  divisible  into  three  parts  and 
contains  conversations  of  Socrates  with  three  different  persons.  The 
main  transitions,  however,  are  not  marked  by  the  change  in 
respondents.  The  first  part  of  the  dialogue  (70a-80b),  the  attempt 
to  define  virtue,  ends  with  Meno's  complete  puzzlement.  He  vividly 
describes  the  effect  of  the  Socratic  elenchus  upon  himself  by  the  image 

«2  Meno  90b;  Laches  194e;  195b,  198d,e;  Rep.  332c  et  al. 
S3  See  below,  pp.  99  and  101. 
s"  See  below  pp.  70  f . 


MAIN  TRANSITIONS  19 

of  the  torpedo-fish.  After  some  bantering  comment,  the  usual  protest 
of  ignorance  from  Socrates  and  the  consequent  suggestion  that  they 
conduct  the  inquiry  together,*^  Meno  introduces  the  sophistic  quibble 
(80d)  of  the  impossibility  of  inquiring  into  what  one  does  not  know. 
This  passage  serves  as  the  transition  to  the  second  division  of  the 
dialogue.  Instead  of  answering  Meno's  query  directly  Socrates  has 
recourse  to  a  myth*^  (81a)  setting  forth  the  doctrine  that  all  learning 
is  recollection.  The  myth  answers  Meno's  objection. and  Socrates 
accordingly  returns  (81e)  to  his  previous  offer  of  joining  Meno  in  an 
investigation  of  the  nature  of  virtue.  But  Meno  dem_ands  proof  of 
the  theory  of  recollection  and  this  demand  forms  the  transition  to  the 
dialogue  with  Meno's  slave  by  which  Socrates  establishes  the  doctrine 
(82b-85b).  These  two  subjects,  the  theory  of  recollection  and  its 
proof,  occupy  the  second  main  division  of  the  dialogue.  Socrates 
follows  up  the  conversation  with  the  slave  boy  by  some  remarks  on 
its  significance,  closing  with  an  emphatic  reaffirmation  of  his  belief 
in  the  value  of  inquiry  (86b).  This  rejection  of  the  sophistic  dictum 
that  all  investigation  is  fruitless  serves  as  a  natural  transition  to 
further  discussion,  and  Socrates  again  (86c)  suggests  their  joint  inquiry 
into  the  nature  of  virtue.  But  Meno  prefers  to  return  to  the  original 
question  of  debate,  whether  virtue  can  be  taught.  The  discussion 
with  Anytus  as  to  the  existence  of  teachers  of  virtue  occupies  the  cen- 
tral part  of  this  third  division  of  the  dialogue. 

In  the  following  pages  a  more  detailed  outline  of  three  of  the  longer 
and  more  complex  dialogues  is  presented.  An  analysis  of  the  Phaedo 
supports  the  comment  of  Archer-Hind  that  "every  important  issue 
turns  upon  some  pertinent  remark  of  Cebes.  "^^  The  discussion 
begins  (61c)  with  Socrates'  qualification  of  his  thesis  that  any  philoso- 
pher worthy  the  name  will  be  willing  to  die  by  the  statement  that  he 
will  not  perhaps  effect  his  own  death,  "for  men  say  that  is  not  lawful." 
At  the  end  of  Socrates'  explanation  of  the  theory  that  suicide  is  wrong 
Cebes  raises  the  question  (62c-e)  how  then  the  philosopher  can  desire 
to  die  and  leave  such  good  masters  as  the  gods.  The  transition  to  the 
first  general  exposition  of  the  reasons  why  the  philosopher  will  wel- 
come death  is  made  by  the  figure  of  the  defence  (63b).  Simmias 
suggests  that  Cebes  meant  to  make  his  objection  personal.     How  can 

"^^  See  above,  p.  8,  and  note  21. 

'« See  p.  93. 

"  Archer-Hind,  Phaedo,  London  (MacMillan),  1883,  p.  41. 


20  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

Socrates  bear  so  easily  to  leave  his  friends  and  those  good  rulers,the 
gods?  Socrates  feels  bound  to  explain  his  attitude  toward  death. 
He  must  make  his  defence  as  in  a  court-room.  He  will  try  to  speak 
more  convincingly  to  them  than  he  did  to  the  dicasts. 

This  figure  of  the  defence  recurs  again.^^  It  is  picked  up  by 
Simmias  after  Socrates'  first  earnest  statement  of  his  faith  that  in  the 
other  world  he  will  find  gods  wise  and  good.  Again  after  the  brief 
dramatic  interlude  of  63d-e  it  introduces  renewed  discussion.  So- 
crates now  states  his  thesis  in  even  more  vivid  paradoxical  form 
(64a) ,  the  true  philosopher  spends  all  his  life  practising  death.  Having 
defined  death  as  the  separation  of  the  soul  from  the  body,  he  brings 
forward  several  points''^  in  support  of  his  thesis.  After  considerable 
elaboration  and  expansion  of  these  arguments,  Socrates  concludes 
in  69d-e  with  a  recurrence  to  the  figure  of  the  defence. 

At  this  juncture  Cebes  brings  forward  the  objection  that  Socrates 
is  assuming  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  a  point  that  needs  proof. 
The  transition  (69e-70a)  is  of  the  dismissive-introductive  type,^^  com- 
bining a  simple  narrative  formula^^  for  marking  a  change  in  speakers 
with  the  common  dismissive-introductive  form  with  /xiv  and  5^,  which 
marks  a  change  in  subject.  Cebes  desires  proof  (1)  that  the  soul 
exists  when  the  man  dies,  and  (2)  that  it  has  power  and  intelligence. 
With  the  suggestion  ' '  Let  us  consider  the  question  somewhat  in  this 
way"  (70c),  Socrates  introduces  an  argument  based  on  the  old 
tradition  that  the  souls  of  the  dead  exist  in  Hades  and  are  born  again 
on  earth  in  new  forms.  Following  the  development  and  confirmation 
of  this  theory  Cebes  again  (72e)  interrupts  to  suggest^^  ^h^t  the 
doctrine  of  recollection  also  implies  the  previous  existence  of  the  soul. 
In  77b  Simmias  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  while  the  theory  of 
recollection  seems  to  establish  the  certainty  of  the  preexistence  of  the 
soul  and  its  intelligence  in  that  former  state,  this  proof  fails  to  settle 
the  question  raised  by  Cebes  (70a)  whether  the  soul  exists  after 
death.    As  Cebes  remarks  (77c)  the  soul's  immortality  has  only  been 

68  Cf.  p.  81,  n.  37. 

*^  These  points  are  introduced  by  regular  minor  conventional  phrases  of 
transition, — CKt^paL  Sij  .  .  .  iav  apa  /cat  aol  crwSoK^  direp  knol.  (64c)  tL  bk  Sr)  (65a) 
tL  di  Srj  t6.  TOLaSe  65d.   See  below  pp.  53  ff.,  68. 

*°  See  below  pp.  56  ff. 

"  P.  69  below. 

82  Kal  UTiv  marks  this  suggestion  as  a  transition  to  a  new  point.      See  below,  p.  69. 


MAIN  TRANSITIONS  21 

half  proved.  Even  after  the  assurance  of  Socrates  that  the  combina- 
tion of  the  two  arguments  given  establishes  also  the  soul's  existence 
after  death,  Simmias  and  Cebes  still  hesitate  (77e).  Their  dissatis- 
faction, vividly  described  by  Cebes'  picture  of  the  child  within  us 
that  fears  death  as  some  goblin,  serves  as  the  transition''^  to  the 
discussion  of  indissolubihty  in  general  and  the  conclusions  to  be  drawn 
from  the  soul's  evident  affinity  to  the  indissoluble.  With  this  argu- 
ment from  probablity  the  first  main  division  of  the  Phaedo  ends  (84b). 
The  second  section  of  the  dialogue  contains  the  objections  of 
Simmias  and  Cebes  to  the  preceding  conclusions.  Transition  is 
made  through  a  brief  dramatic  interlude  (84c-85d)  describing  the 
effect  of  the  previous  discourse  on  the  company.  Simmias  and  Cebes 
are  not  satisfied,  but  hesitate  to  disturb  Socrates  with  further  ques- 
tions. But  Socrates  by  a  pathetic  comparison  of  himself  to  the  swan 
who  sings  before  his  death  persuades  them  that  they  ought  to  talk 
and  ask  him  whatever  they  wish  as  long  as  the  'Eleven'  allow.  The 
objection  of  Simmias  (85e-86d)  is  based  on  the  Pythagorean  theory 
that  the  soul  may  be  a  harmony  dependent  for  its  existence  upon  the 
framework  of  the  body.  The  objection  of  Cebes  continues  his  former 
protest  (77c)  that  the  existence  of  the  soul  after  death  has  not  yet 
been  fully  proved.  The  previous  arguments  have  established  the 
superior  strength  of  the  soul.  It  may  probably  exist  after  the  body 
and  may  survive  many  bodies,  but  that  it  is  altogether  immortal  and 
indestructible  has  not  yet  been  proved.  Cebes  illustrates  his  position 
by  the  figure  of  the  weaver  who  wears  out  many  cloaks,  but  is  out- 
lived by  the  last  which  he  weaves.  Here  another  dramatic  scene  is 
interposed  (88c-91c).  By  the  vivid  description  of  the  despair  of  the 
company  and  the  courageous  protest  of  Socrates  against  misology 
Plato  marks  the  importance  of  this  crisis  in  the  discussion.  The 
Phaedo  is  a  good  illustration  of  one  of  Plato's  favorite®^  methods  of 
developing  a  theme.  A  partial  or  superficial  view  of  the  subject  is 
first  presented,  only  to  be  superseded  or  supplemented  by  further 
discussion.*'^    His  methods  of  transition  to  the  more  complete  presen- 

"  The  final  step  in  the  transition  is  found  in  the  dismissive  formula  78a  b 
in  which  Socrates  returns  to  the  argument  oOev  8k  airtKlTroyitv. 

"  The  Republic,  Phaedrus,  Symposium  and  Theaetetus  are  other  notable 
examples  of  this  method.     See  Jowett-Campbell,  Republic,  Vol.  II,  p.  10. 

^^  Hirzel,  Der  Dialog,  Vol.  I,  p.  230 — commenting  on  the  development  of  the 
argument  in  the  Phaedo^compares  it  to  "  a  row  of  circles  which  touch  one  another, 
but  yet  each  of  them  is  complete  in  itself." 


22  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

tation  are  varied.  Sometimes,  as  at  the  end  of  Bk.  I  of  the  RepubHc, 
it  is  Socrates  who  is  dissatisfied  with  his  own  conclusions.  Here  the 
suggestion  of  difficulties  by  the  disciples  provokes  further  discussion. 
In  91c-d  Socrates  continues  the  argument  with  a  resumptive  summary 
of  the  objections  of  Simmias  and  Cebes,  which  he  proceeds  to  ansv/er 
in  turn.  That  of  Simmias  is  less  important  and  easily  disposed  of 
(91e-94e).  The  transition  to  the  objection  of  Cebes  is  affected  by 
the  jesting  personification  of  the  argument  (95a),  incorporated  in  a 
dismissive-introductive  formula.  Theban  Harmonia  has  been  pro- 
pitiated. We  must  now  deal  with  Cadmus.  In  95b-e  Socrates  again 
recapitulates  the  objection  of  Cebes  which  is  fundamental  and  in- 
volves no  slight  matter  (95e),  the  complete  investigation  of  the  cause 
of  generation  and  destruction.  There  follows  what  may  be  an  account 
of  Plato's  own  philosophical  experienced^®  in  the  search  for  a  final 
cause;  at  any  rate  it  culminates  in  an  exposition  of  the  theory  of  Ideas 
as  a  working  hypothesis.  The  im^portance  of  this  conclusion  for  the 
argument  is  m^arked  by  a  very  brief  dramatic  interlude  (102a)  in 
which  Echecrates  expresses  his  approval  of  the  acceptance  of  the 
theory.  Resuming  his  narrative  of  the  discussion  Phaedo  dismisses 
the  question  of  the  acceptance  of  the  Ideas  and  proceeds  (102b)  with 
a  continuative  formula  to  drj  /jLera  ravra  to  discuss  their  bearing  upon 
the  problem  of  change.  The  following  final  proof  of  the  immortality 
of  the  soul  depends  upon  a  subtly  fallacious  application  of  the  princi- 
ple that  opposite  ideas  are  mutually  exclusive. 

In  the  Theaetetus  "much  of  the  argument  is  purely  dramatic, 
directed  only  against  the  cruder  forms  of  the  theory  com.bated.'"" 
A  study  of  the  main  transitions  in  the  dialogue  is  of  value  in  the 
distinction  between  serious  argument  and  mere  eristic  and  persiflage. 
In  his  first  attempt  at  defining  knowledge,  146c,  Theaetetus  falls  into 
the  error  of  confusing  definition  with  enumeration.  As  in  the  Meno 
(72a-c)  Socrates  corrects  him,  illustrating  his  meaning  by  a  sample 
definition  (147a).  Theaetetus  shows  his  comprehension  of  the 
method  indicated  by  volunteering  a  definition  of  some  mathematical 
terms.  But  he  m.odestly  protests  his  inability  to  define  knowledge. 
His  description  of  his  previous  efi"orts  and  failure  leads  Socrates  to 
introduce  the  figure  of  the  mid- wife  (148e).     This  metaphor,  which 

"=  Burnet  {Phaedo,  Oxford,  1911,  Introd.  p.  38  S.  and  note  on  p.  95)  believes 
this  to  be  a  description  of  Socrates'  intellectual  experience. 
"  Shorey,  Unity  of  Plato's  Thought,  p.  67. 


MAIN  TRANSITIONS  23 

plays  an  important  part  in  the  structure  of  the  dialogue/^  is  developed 
through  several  pages.  The  return  (151d)  from  this  digression  is 
made  by  a  resumptive  phrase^^  and  reiteration  of  the  demand  for  a 
definition  of  knowledge.  The  transition  to  discussion  of  Theaetetus' 
second  definition,  that  knowledge  is  perception,  is  made  by  the 
common  exhortation  to  joint  investigation, ^"^  coupled  with  a  reference 
to  the  metaphor  of  the  midwife  (151e).  With  this  definition  of 
knowledge  as  perception  Socrates  identifies  the  Protagorean  dictum 
that  man  is  the  measure  of  all  things.  The  result  seems  so  paradoxi- 
cal that  he  hazards  the  statement  (152c)  that  Protagoras  spoke  in  a 
riddle  to  the  mob,  while  to  his  disciples  in  secret  he  told  the  truth. 
This  playful  remark,  with  its  punning  reference  to  the  'AXrideia  of 
Protagoras,  draws  from  Theaetetus  the  request  for  an  explanation 
(152d)  which  serves  as  the  transition  to  an  interpretation  of  Prota- 
goras with  whose  doctrine  of  relativity  Socrates  connects  also  the 
flowing  philosophy  of  Heraclitus.'^  In  160d  he  reaches  the  conclusion 
that  Theaetetus'  definition  of  knowledge  as  perception  is  a  very  fine 
one,  inasmuch  as  it  agrees  with  these  important  teachings  of  Prota- 
goras and  Heraclitus.  The  image  of  the  midwife  now  appears  (160e) 
in  combination  with  the  further  image  of  the  dyu(^t5p6/iia  in  transition 
to  the  criticism  of  Protagoras.  A  variation  of  the  familiar^^  tran- 
sitional formula  of  'one  little  difficulty'  forms  the  final  step  in  the 
transition  (161c).  Socrates  first  overwhelms  the  doctrine  with  ridi- 
cule. In  162d  Protagoras  or  some  one  of  his  defenders  is  represented 
as  objecting  to  the  methods  used  against  him.  The  formula"  aXXrj 
5i7  (TKeTVTeov  (163a)  marks  a  fresh  start  in  the  argument.  In  the 
following  pages  163-165  Socrates  employs  arguments  which  he  him- 
self admits  to  be  eristic  (164c-165a,  b),  justifiable  in  that  they  are 
directed  against  a  crude,  literal  indentification  of  knowledge  and 
perception.  In  164e  the  literary  conceit^"*  of  the  personified  argument 
is  developed  quite  at  length  to  introduce  the  defence  of  Protagoras. 
Socrates'  promise  to  come  to  the  aid  of  the  orphaned  argument  (165a) 

^^  See  below,  pp.  82  f. 

^^  See  below,  p.  54,  pp.  97-99;  TrdXt;'  617  olv  «$  apx'js- 

■"•See  above,  p.  8,  n.  21. 

"  The  half  serious  tone  of  156-157  is  s'gnificant.. 

"  See  p.  10,  n.  27. 

^^  See  below,  p.  54. 

^^  See  below,  p.  79. 


24  THE -ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

is  picked  up,  after  intervening  persiflage,  in  165e  as  the  final  step  in 
transition  to  the  defence.  An  interlude  of  by-play  (168c-169c) 
results  in  establishing  Theodorus  as  the  respondent.  In  169d  the 
argument  is  resumed  with  a  brief  summary  of  the  present  position. 
It  concludes  in  171c  with  a  TcepLTpoTrrf''" — the  "truth"  of  Protagoras 
does  not  seem  true  to  most  people  and  must  therefore  be  admitted  by 
him  to  be  false  oftener  than  true.  But  here  Socrates  silences  the  pro- 
test of  Theodorus  by  the  assurance  that  he  does  not  intend  to  rely 
upon  this  argument.  The  transition  is  made  by  a  play  on  words. ^^ 
By  the  distinction  between  sense  impressions  and  the  knowledge  of 
what  is  healthful  or  advantageous  Socrates  passes  to  a  more  serious 
line  of  attack.  At  this  point,  however,  the  argument  is  interrupted 
(172b)  by  an  eloquent  digression,  which  Socrates  himself  recognizes 
as  such  (177b),  in  which  he  contrasts  the  life  of  the  philosopher  with 
that  of  the  clever  unscrupulous  lawyer.  The  transition  to  this 
digression  is  very  skilfully  managed.  By  the  mention  of  persons 
who  are  unwilHng  to  accept  the  doctrine  of  extreme  relativity  when 
there  is  a  question  of  the  recognition  of  the  advantageous  in  conduct, 
Socrates  is  led  to  speak  of  what  such  people  consider  wisdom.  Here 
he  pauses  (172b),  struck  by  the  length  of  the  digression  into  which 
he  is  being  led.  The  protest  of  Theodorus  that  they  have  plenty  of 
leisure  picked  up  by  Socrates  (172d)  makes  a  very  clever  and  artistic 
transition"  to  the  description  of  the  life  of  philosophic  leisure  con- 
trasted with  the  illiberal  limited  existence  of  the  lawyer.  In  177c 
Socrates  dismisses  the  digression  and  returns  to  the  previous  argu- 
ment. He  now  proceeds  to  serious  criticism^*  of  the  doctrine  of 
relativity  and  in  183b, c,  the  definition  of  knowledge  as  perception  is 
defeated  in  so  far  as  it  "depends  upon  extreme  Protagorean  relativity 
or  Heracliteanism,  which  makes  all  thought  and  speech  impossible."'* 
Theaetetus  suggests  (183d)  that  the  definition  should  now  be  con- 
sidered in  relation  to  the  theory  of  Parmenides  and  the  philosophy 
of  rest.     Socrates,  however,  rightly  rejects  this  suggestion,  on  the 

"  Note  the  invidious  harping  on  a.\i)deLa. 

■6  See  p.  79,  n.  32. 

"  See  p.  97  f . 

"  See  above  p.  21.  In  the  Theaetetus  it  is  the  protests  of  the  defenders  of 
Protagoras,  cleverly  introduced  in  various  ways  by  Plato  in  162d,  164e  and  171c, 
that  bring  about  the  advance  to  really  serious  argument  superseding  the  captious 
and  eristic  treatment  of  the  earlier  pages. 

"  Shorey,  Unity,  n.  523. 


MAIN  TRANSITIONS  25 

ground  that  it  will  involve  them  in  too  great  difficulties.  Through 
the  figure  of  the  midwife  (184ab)  he  returns  to  Theaetetus  as  respon- 
dent and  advances  to  a  renewed  discussion  of  his  definition  of  know- 
ledge from  the  point  of  view  of  physiological  psychology.  This 
interlude  in  which  he  plays  with  the  order  of  the  subject  forms  a 
very  interesting  variation  in  transition.^"  In  186d  the  conclusion  is 
reached  that  truth  is  not  in  our  sensations,  but  in  the  generalizations 
about  them,  so  that  knowledge  is  obviously  something  different 
from  perception  (186e).  In  187a,  b,  as  in  151d  a  resumptive  formula 
and  the  demand  for  a  new  definition  of  knowledge  mark  a  fresh  start 
in  the  argument.  Theaetetus  suggests  that  knowledge  may  be  true 
opinion.  The  question  at  once  arises  (188a),  'How  can  false  opinion 
be  explained?'  Plato  is  careful  to  warn  us  by  his  leaving  out  of 
consideration  learning  and  forgetting,  that  he  is  not  serious  in  his 
apparent  acceptance  of  the  ixi]  6v  fallacy  (189b).  The  following 
attempts  to  explain  false  opinion  as  "heterodoxy"  (189bc)  or  to 
account  for  its  existence  by  reference  to  the  material  images  of  the 
wax  tablet  (191c)  and  the  aviary  (197c)  all  prove  futile.  In  200  c,d, 
after  a  last  reductio  ad  absurdum  Socrates  concludes  that  the  attempt 
to  discover  the  nature  of  false  opinion  is  doomed  to  failure  until  they 
shall  have  determined  the  nature  of  knowledge.  The  transition  here 
is  enlivened  by  the  conceit  of  the  personified  argument^^  which  re- 
bukes them  for  their  desertion  of  her.  A  resumptive  formula  (200d) 
introduces  the  re-statement  and  further  examination  of  the  definition 
of  knowledge  as  true  opinion.  It  is  easy  to  find  a  practical  instance 
drawn  from  the  experience  of  the  law  courts  in  which  true  opinion 
imparted  by  persuasion  is  not  knowledge.  The  definition  accordingly 
does  not  hold.  In  201c, d,  Theaetetus  makes  a  third  and  final  attempt 
and,  recalling  words  that  he  has  heard  but  forgetten  till  now, 
defines  knowledge  as  right  opinion  with  'Koyos.^^  It  is  interesting  to 
note  the  parallelism  between  Socrates'  treatment  of  this  and  the  ear- 
lier definition  of  knowledge  as  perception.  In  152a-e  he  preceded  to 
explanation  and  testing  of  the  definition  by  connecting  it  with  the 
doctrines  of  Protagoras  and  Heraclitus.  So  here  (201d)  in  the  inter- 
pretation of  this  definition  he  introduces  a  theory  of  elements  and 
compounds  for  which  he  himself  disclaims  responsibility.      As  in  the 

80  Cf.  p.  94,  n.  76. 

81  Cf.  p.  79. 

82  See  p.  92  for  this  literary  device  of  the  'unexpected  recollection.' 


26  THE  AKT  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

case  of  the  earlier  definition  (cf  160d),  the  interpretation  in  terms  of 
the  theory  seems  at  first  entirely  satisfactory  (202cd).  But  as  in  161c 
Socrates  makes  the  transition  to  the  criticism  of  Protagoras  by  ex- 
pressing his  wonder  at  one  point,  so  now  (202d)  one  of  the  state- 
ments they  have  just  made  fails  to  suit  him.  He  beheves  that  letters 
and  syllables  must  be  equally  known.  But  perhaps  the  syllable  is  a 
whole  different  from  the  elements  which  compose  it.  The  trans- 
itional phrase  crKeirTeov  Kal  oh  TcpoboTtov,  which  introduces  the  discussion 
whether  "whole"  and  "all"  are  the  same,  should  be  compared  with 
the  formula  aXXrj  5?)  aKewreov  in  163a  which  introduces  a  fresh  start 
in  the  argument.  "Whole"  and  "all"  are  proved  to  be  the  same 
(205a).  The  general  conclusion  follows  (205b),  that  whether  the 
syllable  is  made  up  of  elements  or  is  indivisible,  syllable  and  elements 
are  equally  inteUigible.  This  theory  then  like  that  of  Protagorean 
relativity  has  proved  an  unstable  basis  for  a  definition  of  knowledge. 
In  206c  he  dismisses  further  consideration  of  the  theory  and  turns  to 
the  discussion  of  three  definitions  of  \6yos.  None  of  these  prove 
satisfactory;  the  definition  of  knowledge  as  right  opinion  with  \6yos 
is  therefore  rejected  (210a).  An  enumeration  of  the  refuted  defini- 
tions of  knowledge  introduces  the  brief  dramatic  conclusion. 

That  ancient  scholars  appreciated  the  structural  difficulties  of 
the  Philebus  is  shown  by  the  title  of  Galen's  lost  treatise,  "Concerning 
the  Transitions  in  the  Philebus. "^^  The  following  analysis  of  the 
logical  framework  of  the  dialogue  does  not  claim  to  compensate  for 
the  loss  of  Galen's  work;  much  less  does  it  make  any  pretence  to  be  an 
exhaustive  outline  of  the  philosophic  content  of  the  Philebus.^* 

The  main  divisions  in  the  Philebus  are  not  so  clearly  marked  as  in 
dialogues  of  less  complexity.  Frequent  resumes  of  the  argument^^ 
and  restatements  of  the  issue^''  attest  Plato's  realization  of  the  diffi- 
culty of  following  the  intricacies  of  the  reasoning.  Many  slight 
passages  of  by-play^'  relieve  the  strain  of  argument  and  preserve 

*'  Poste,  Philebus,  Oxford,  1860,  p.  105,  n.  4,  for  no  apparent  reason  translates 
this  'On  the  abrupt  transitions  of  the  Philebus.' 

^*  The  unity  of  the  Philebus  has  been  questioned  by  Poste  and  others.  Bury, 
in  his  edition  (Cambridge  University  Press,  1897),  maintains  the  logical  coherence 
of  the  dialogue.  In  this  he  follows  Trendelenburg,  De  Platonis  Philebi  Consilio, 
Beriin,  1837. 

^  19c,  d,  22b,  c,  26b,  27b,  31a,  41b,  50b,  c,  60a,  b. 

««  14b,  19c,  d,  22c,  d,  27c,  50e,  55c,  60a,  61a. 

8'  12b,  15c,  15e,  22c,  23b,  27e,  34d. 


MAIN  TRANSITIONS  27 

through  the  rather  artificial  framework  the  semblance  of  natural 
dialogue  form.  The  dialogue  begins  abruptly  without  dramatic  intro- 
duction. It  is  apparently  the  continuation  by  Socrates  and  Protarchus 
of  a  previous  conversation  of  Socrates  and  Philebus.  With  the  ques- 
tion (lib),  "Shall  we  sum  up  the  two  views?"  Socrates  introduces 
an  explicit  statement  of  the  question  at  issue,  What  is  the  good? 
Philebus  contends  that  it  is  pleasure  and  enjoyment,  Socrates  that 
it  is  thought,  memory,  right  opinion.  In  lid  Socrates  makes  the 
transition,  by  a  similar  formula  of  exhortation,^^  to  a  more  precise 
re-statement  of  the  problem,  Which  state  or  disposition  of  the  soul 
is  able  to  make  hfe  happy  for  all  men?  The  phrase  rt  8'  (lie)  intro- 
duces the  possibility  of  a  third  claimant  for  first  place.  After  this 
preliminary  agreement  as  to  the  issue  and  the  withdrawal  of  Philebus 
from  the  argument,  the  discussion  is  introduced  (12b)  by  a  transi- 
tional formula  of  exhortation.^^  Socrates  begins  with  a  playful  adap- 
tation of  a  familiar  religious  formula  and  reference  to  Philebus' 
identification  of  pleasure  with  Aphrodite.  But  in  12c  he  dismisses 
this  Httle  by-play  and  advances  (with  8e)  to  the  important  point  that 
pleasure  is  an  equivocal  term.  He  enumerates  four  unhke  kinds  of 
pleasure.  Protarchus  meets  this  point  by  the  distinction  that  al- 
though these  arise  out  of  opposites  they  are  not  therefore  themselves 
opposite.  But  Socrates  rejects  this  distinction  and  demands  a  defini- 
tion of  pleasure  as  necessary  for  the  argument  (13b).  Here  Pro- 
tarchus protests  that  pleasure  qua  pleasure  is  never  bad.  Socrates' 
criticism  of  Protarchus  (13c-d)  for  thus  blocking  the  argument  and 
exposing  them  to  ridicule  as  inexperienced  in  dialectic  opens  the  way 
for  the  discussion  of  method  which  occupies  the  second  sub-division 
of  the  dialogue.  Before  this  is  taken  up,  however,  Socrates  estab- 
lishes the  fact  that  knowledge  also  has  many  species  and  must  be 
defined  (13e-14b).  This  brief  prehminary  section  of  the  dialogue 
closes  with  a  re-statement  of  the  issue  (146). 

A  transitional  formula  of  exhortation  (14c)  introduces  the  general 
question  of  proper  dialectic  method.  This  is  really,  Socrates  claims, 
only  the  old  and  troublesome  problem  of  the  one  and  many.  Protar- 
chus' failure  to  understand  this  statement^^  leads  to  explanation  and 
illustration  from  Socrates.     Finally  in  16c  he  sets  forth  the  method  of 

**  See  p.  54. 
83  See  p.  88. 


28  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

synthesis  and  diaeresis  as  the  practical  solution  of  their  difficulties, 
whose  use  makes  the  difference  between  true  dialectic  and  mere  eris- 
tic. Demand  for  further  explanation  (17a)  is  followed  as  usual  by- 
elaboration  and  illustration.  In  18d  Socrates  takes  up  the  question, 
raised  by  Philebus  (18a),  of  the  bearing  of  this  method  upon  the 
present  discussion:  it  must  be  used  in  the  enumeration  and  definition 
of  the  many  species  of  pleasure  and  knowledge  (19a).  Protarchus 
delegates  the  task^°  to  Socrates  (19c),  adjuring  him  to  choose  what 
method  he  will,  so  long  as  he  solves  their  problem.  With  this  re- 
currence to  the  issue  and  a  warning  that  this  is  to  be  no  mere  result- 
less  dialogue  of  search  the  section  on  method  concludes  (20a). 

Before  attempting  the  investigation  of  the  species  of  pleasure  and 
knowledge,  Socrates  returns  (20b),  by  the  literary  device  of  the  "un- 
expected recollection,"^^  to  the  suggestion  already  glanced  at  in 
lid: — the  good  may  be  neither  pleasure  nor  knowledge,  but  some 
third  thing.  He  proposes,  and  Protarchus  accepts,  three  criteria 
by  which  to  test  the  good:  it  will  be  perfect,  sufficient  and  desired 
above  all  things.  An  ordinary  formula  of  exhortation  (20e)  intro- 
duces the  application  of  these  tests  to  pleasure  and  knowledge.  Both 
fail  and  the  true  answer  that  the  life  to  be  preferred  is  a  mixture  of 
pleasure  and  wisdom  is  introduced  (22a)  as  a  suggestion  by  Socrates. ^^ 
The  question,  "Do  we  understand?"  prefaces  a  concluding  sum- 
mary (22b-c)  which  reverts  in  playful  manner  to  the  terms  of  12b-c. 

Transition  to  the  modified  form  of  the  problem  which  now  con- 
fronts them  is  made  through  the  image  of  the  second  prize,  introduced 
in  a  dismissive-introductive  formula  with  /xh  ovv  and  bk  hi]  (22c). ^' 
Is  pleasure  or  knowledge  rather  the  cause  of  the  excellence  of  the 
mixed  life?  Here  the  direct  division  of  pleasure  and  knowledge  into 
species  is  again  postponed,  by  their  inclusion  in  a  larger  classification 
of  ovra.  The  first  two  classes,  the  aireipov  and  the  wepas,  are  reached 
by  a  reference  (23c)  back  to  the  discussion  on  method  (16c).  The 
third  class  is  a  mixture  of  these.  Socrates  introduces  the  fourth  class, 
the  cause  of  the  union,  by  a  playful  jibe  at  his  own  stupidity  (23d). 
The  next  step  is  the  application  of  the  method  of  synthesis  and  diaere- 

»"  See  below,  p.  76,  for  description  of  the  literary  elements  in  the  transition  to  this 
demand. 

"  See  p.  92. 

92  See  pp.  61  f. 

93  See  pp.  56  f. 


MAIN  TRANSITIONS  29 

sis  to  these  classes.  The  aTreipov  is  treated  first  (23e-24e).  By  an- 
tithesis transition  is  made  (25a)  to  the  wepas,  consideration  of  which 
had  been  postponed  in  24a.  The  discussion  of  this  class  is  brief,  a 
mere  enumeration  of  its  main  characteristics.  A  transitional  eUv 
introduces  the  third  class^^  (25b),  in  the  treatment  of  which  both 
aTreipov  and  irepas  are  further  discussed.  A  reference  back  to  23d 
introduces  the  fourth  class  (26e).  The  argument  is  led  on  by  a  series 
of  suggestions  from  Socrates  and  ends  with  a  brief  recapitulation  of 
the  four  classes  (27b).  A  restatement  of  the  question  at  issue  (27c) 
serves  as  the  transition  to  the  next  point  for  discussion: — the  assign- 
ment to  its  proper  class  of  each  of  the  three  lives  under  consideration. 
To  facilitate  discussion  the  mixed  life  of  pleasure  and  knowledge  is 
identified,  without  dispute,  with  the  third  class,  the  ixlktov.  The  satis- 
factory dismissal  of  this  subject  and  advance  to  the  consideration  of 
pleasure  is  marked  by  a  transitional  eUv  (27e).  A  change  of  interlo- 
cutors adds  further  emphasis.  Pleasure,  and  pain  too,  since  they 
admit  of  degree  are  easily  assigned  to  the  aweLpov.  The  question  as 
to  knowledge  is  now  (28a)  introduced  with  playful  solemnity  by 
Socrates.  Philebus  here  gives  way  again  to  Protarchus,  but  he  too 
declares  himself  at  a  loss.  Socrates  accordingly  takes  up  the  ques- 
tion himself  (28c)  and,  with  a  glance  at  Philebus'  charge  that  he  is 
unduly  exalting  his  god,  knowledge,  launches  into  an  eloquent  digres- 
sion on  the  theme  that  mind  is  the  king  of  heaven  and  earth.  At  its 
close  (30e)  Protarchus,  though  slightly  bewildered,  is  content  to 
admit  that  mind  belongs  to  the  fourth  or  causal  class.  Socrates 
frankly  confesses  his  remarks  to  have  been  intended  as  a  respite  from 
their  serious  argument. 

Transition  to  the  next  section  of  the  dialogue  is  made  through  a 
formal  resume  of  the  conclusions  just  reached  about  pleasure  and 
knowledge  (31a)  and  a  statement  by  Socrates  of  the  next  point  for 
investigation — the  origin  of  pleasures  and  pains.  A  series  of  sug- 
gestions from  Socrates  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  they  arise  in  the 
mixed  class^^  through  dissolution  and  restoration  of  the  harmony  be- 

^*  The  following  invocation  to  God  is  intended,  Bury  thinks  (p.  42),  to  draw 
attention  to  the  "combined  difficulty  and  importance  of  what  is  to  follow." 
Perhaps  rather  it  is  a  fanciful  way  of  leading  up  to  the  criticism  (25d)  that  the 
-TTtpas  has  not  yet  been  adequately  treated — a  somewhat  captious  criticism,  for 
the  enumeration  of  25ab,  though  brief,  is  practically  sufficient. 

*^  The  class  in  which  they  arise  must  not  be  confused  with  the  class  to  which 
they  belong. 


30  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

tween  the  aireipov  and  thcTrepas.  With  the  discussion  of  examples  of 
this  process  the  analysis  of  the  species  of  pleasure  has  at  last  begun, 
as  is  recognized  in  32b,  In  32d  the  discussion  is  advanced  by  an 
announcement  of  plan;  in  the  investigation  of  the  second  species  of 
pleasure,  the  pure  pleasures  of  the  mind,  it  maybe  possible  to  discover 
whether  the  whole  class  of  pleasure  is  always  desirable.  But  before 
proceeding  with  this  analysis,  Socrates  calls  attention,  with  a  formula 
of  exhortation,  to  the  neutral  state  which  may,  after  all,  be  the  most 
god-like.  This  subject,  however,  is  postponed  (33c)  ets  ovBls,  and  by 
a  recurrence  to  the  image  of  the  second  prize,  return  is  made  to  the 
discussion  of  the  purely  mental  pleasures.  This  is  found  to  involve 
some  preliminary  investigations,  1)  of  sensation  and  memory  (33c- 
34c)  and  2)  of  the  nature  and  origin  of  desire  (34d-35c).  The 
renewed  discussion  of  the  states  of  pleasure  and  pain  brings  Socrates 
to  a  new  question,  (36c),  should  the  terms  true  and  false  be  used  of 
pleasure?  A  warning  of  the  importance  of  the  subject  and  the 
necessity  of  being  assured  of  its  relevancy,  ending  with  the  famihar 
conclusion,  "we  must  consider, "^^  forms  the  transition  to  actual  dis- 
cussion (36e).  Considerable  space  is  given  to  this  problem  for  ethical 
reasons,  Plato  realizes  the  moral  effect  of  the  estabhshment  of  the 
appHcability  of  the  epithets  true  and  false  to  pleasures.  Socrates 
begins  the  argum.ent  with  a  more  precise  definition  of  the  point  at 
issue  (37a)  and  a  strong  statement^^  of  the  view  which  he  intends  to 
oppose  (37b).  It  soon  appears  that  a  discussion  of  true  and  false 
opinion  is  involved  (37e).  The  ordinary  transition-formulas  of  ar- 
gument are  varied  here  by  the  introduction  of  a  reported  imaginary 
conversation  of  a  man  with  himself  (38c,  d),  and  the  development  of 
the  comparison  of  the  soul  to  a  book  (38e-39b).  The  existence  of 
false  opinion,  and  consequently  of  false  pleasures  and  pains,  and  the 
similar  illusory  character  of  both  are  finally  established  (39c-40e). 
Socrates  now  proceeds,  with  tI  be;  to  a  further  analogy  between  false 
opinions  and  false  pleasures;  in  both  falsity  is  synonymious  with  bad- 
ness (40e).  But  Protarchus  objects  and  Socrates  accordingly  post- 
pones dealing  with  this  point,  until  he  has  brought  forward  further 
proofs  of  the  existence  of  false  pleasures.  The  image  of  the  wrestlers 
(41b)  introduces  the  new  attempt.     A  recapitulation  of  former  ad- 

9«  Cf.  p.  54. 

"  Cf.  Rep.  357-367  and  Theaet.  166-168. 


MATN  TRANSITIONS  31 

missions  regarding  the  nature  of  desire  (34b)  and  of  pleasure  (27e) 
leads  to  the  conclusion  that  pleasures  in  themselves  may  be  false  and 
illusory,  without  reference  to  false  opinion  (42b).  A  transitional 
t^rjs  byphixeQa  (42c)  introduces  yet  another  proof  which  Socrates  seeks 
in  a  further  consideration  of  the  fact  that  pleasures  and  pains  arise 
out  of  changes  in  the  bodily  state.  In  42d  he  makes  an  abrupt  and 
seemingly  irrelevant  reference  to  the  interval  when  the  body  exper- 
iences no  change,  or  rather  when  its  motions  are  too  slight  to  rise 
above  the  threshold  of  consciousness  and  produce  either  pleasure  or 
pain.  Through  this  renewed  discussion''^  of  the  neutral  life  the  doc- 
trine that  pleasure  is  mere  freedom  from  pain  is  disproved  (43c). 
Protarchus  is  convinced  (43e)  by  the  argument  and  illustrations  of 
Socrates.  The  latter,  however,  seizes  the  opportunity  to  discuss 
the  theory  as  upheld  by  certain  philosophers.  The  transition  is 
made  (44a,  b)  by  the  common  device  of  the  interlocutor's  failure  to 
understand  and  the  consequent  need  of  explanation.^^  A  statement 
of  plan  follows  (44d-e).  By  this  introduction  of  ''the  enemies  of 
Philebus"  the  analysis  of  the  nature  and  kinds  of  pleasure  is  con- 
tinued with  fresh  interest.  As  the  nature  of  anything  is  best  seen 
from  extreme  cases,  they  now  proceed  (45e-46a)  at  the  suggestion  of 
Socrates  to  examine  typical  examples  of  the  in  tensest  pleasures  which 
are  really  mixtures  of  pleasure  and  pain.  This  analysis  of  mixed 
pleasures  ends  (50b)  with  a  general  conclusion  and  summary.  A 
paragraph  of  transition  follows  (50c-e)  in  which  discussion  of  further 
instances  of  mixed  pleasures  is  postponed.  For  the  sake  of  the  origi- 
nal question  at  issue  the  unmixed  pleasures  must  next  be  analyzed. 
Socrates  begins  (51a)  with  a  reference  to  the  aforementioned  (44b) 
physicists  who  deny  the  existence  of  true  pleasures.  His  assertion 
of  disagreement  with  them  serves  to  introduce  the  following  enumera- 
tion; while  Protarchus'  failure  to  understand  leads  at  once  to  a  fuller 
description  of  these  pleasures  (51b-52b).  Now  that  the  distinction 
between  pure  and  impure  pleasures  has  been  adequately  estabhshed 
(52c),  Socrates  proceeds  to  some  further  comparison  of  the  two  spe- 
cies; the  pure  pleasures  belong  to  the  class  of  measure,  the  ir'tpas,  the 
impure  or  mixed  pleasures  to  the  aireLpov;  the  pure  pleasures  are  true, 
the  impure  are  false  (52d-53b).      Some  further  considerations  as  to 

*'  Postponed  in  33bc. 
59  Sec  below,  p.  88. 


32  THE  ART  or  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

the  nature  of  pleasure  are  now  introduced  to  lead  up  to  the  formal 
rejection  of  the  view  that  pleasure  is  the  good.  The  transition  is 
very  abrupt.  The  conventional  phrase  tL  de  to  ToiovSe;  (53c)  forms 
the  only  preface  to  Socrates'  question  whether  pleasure  is  not  akin 
to  generation  rather  than  to  essence.  But  as  if  to  compensate  for 
this  lack  of  emphasis,  in  the  immediately  following  discussion  of  the 
terms  relative  and  absolute,  the  idea  of  the  final  cause  is  introduced 
(53e)  in  a  playful  over-elaborate  style  which  draws  instant  attention 
to  its  im.portance  in  the  argument.  The  conclusion  (54c-d)  is  stated 
in  the  form  of  a  syllogism:  (1)  pleasure  is  a  generation  coming  into 
being  for  the  sake  of  some  essence  and  therefore  not  a  final  cause; 
(2)  the  final  cause  must  be  a  good;  (3)  pleasure  must  belong  to  some 
category  other  than  the  good.  This  section  of  the  dialogue  closes 
with  a  further  confirmation,  a  somewhat  rhetorical  argument,  the 
absurdity  of  measuring  moral  qualities  by  the  standard  of  pleasure 
(55a-b).ioo 

The  examination  of  the  species  of  pleasure  is  now  finished  and  by  a 
sort  of  argument um  e  contrario  and  figurative  reminder  of  the  issue 
Socrates  passes  to  the  examination  of  the  species  of  knowledge.  The 
analysis  follows  the  method  of  dichotomy  outhned  in  16c,  and  is  far 
less  intricate  than  the  discussion  of  pleasure.  In  58a,  in  answer  to 
Socrates'  question  whether  dialectic  is  not  the  truest  of  the  sciences, 
Protarchus  introduces  a  slightly  irrelevant  point,  the  claims  of  Gor- 
gias  for  rhetoric  as  the  greatest  of  the  arts.  Socrates  points  out  the 
irrelevancy  (58bc)  and  proves  the  superior  clearness  and  exactness 
of  dialectic.  In  59b  he  dismisses  (with  /xev  drj)  all  such  personal  dis- 
putes and  returns  (with  5e)  to  the  point  in  question  before  the  digres- 
sion. The  object  of  this  highest  science,  dialectic,  is  true  being. 
But  the  fairest  things  should  have  the  fairest  names.  This  contem- 
plation of  true  being  must  therefore  be  called  mind  and  wisdom,  the 
very  terms  which  Socrates  has  defended  as  rivals  of  pleasure  (59d). 
With  the  completion  of  this  analysis  the  m^ain  point  at  issue,  the  com- 

1°°  Poste,  E.  {Philehus,  Oxford,  1860,  p.  105,  n.  4)  argues  that  the  Philcbus 
is  "a  composition  of  two  distinct  fragments  forming  a  well-proportioned  whole, 
but  rather  carelessly  soldered  together  in  respect  of  some  of  the  minuter  touches. " 
He  considers  the  words  ■koKKt]  .  .  .  aXoychrara  an  interpolation  added  to  effect 
this  joining.  But  there  seems  to  be  nothing  in  this  particular  passage  to  support 
such  a  view;  and  the  logical  connection  of  the  analysis  of  the  species  of  knowledge 
with  the  theme  of  the  dialogue  is  unmistakably  clear. 


MAIN  TRANSITIONS  33 

parative  claims  of  pleasure  and  knowledge,  is  really  settled.  Socrates' 
conclusion,  triumphantly  stated  in  65a,  is  here  implicitly  estab- 
lished. The  last  pages^"^  of  the  dialogue  are  a  subtle  blending  of  real 
argument  with  figurative  and  rhetorical  elaboration. 

The  philosophic  and  structural  unity  of  the  Republic,  attacked 
by  Hermann,  Krohn,  Pfleiderer,  Rohde,  and  other  German  scholars 
has  been  established  beyond  a  doubt  by  the  arguments  of  Hirmer, 
Zeller,  and  Campbell. ^"^  A  detailed  study  of  the  main  transitions  of 
the  dialogue  only  adds  a  further  confirmation  of  their  results.  Ac- 
cording to  Hirmer's  and  Campbell's  analyses  the  Republic  readily 
falls  into  five  main  divisions,  marked  with  careful  transitions.  The 
controversy  begins  over  Book  I,  the  introduction.  Regarded  by  it- 
self it  seems  a  complete  well  rounded  whole.^"^  Hermann  declares 
it  to  be  an  independent  minor  dialogue.^"-*  But  though  Book  I  may 
conceivably  have  been  published  earher  than  the  rest  of  the  Republic^'^^ 

i"!  For  a  detailed  analysis  of  these  pages  see  below  pp.  95  f. 

"=  Hirmer,  J.,  Entslehung  u.  Komposilion  d.  plat.  Pol.,  Leipzig,  1897,  J.  P, 
Vol.  23.  Zeller,  Phil.  d.  Griech.  2,  1,  558  ff.  Campbell,  Republic,  Vol.  II,  pp. 
1-66;  see  also  Shorey,  Unity  of  Plato's  Thought,  pp.  78-82. 

'"^  Pohlenz,  Aus  Platos  Werdezeit,  Berlin,  1913,  p.  209,  n.  1,  accepts  the 
verdict  of  Sprachstatistik  for  the  earlier  composition  of  Book  I,  but  argues  that 
it  could  never  have  been  independent.  He  bases  his  conclusion  on  the  extent 
and  tone  of  the  introduction  scene  and  on  "die  ganze  Richtung  nach  der  die 
Gerechtigkeit  erortert  wird. "  Von  Arnim,  Platos  Jugenddialogc  u.  d.  Ent- 
stehitngzeii  des  Phaidros,  Leipzig,  Teubner,  1914,  p.  71  f.,  contests  this  view. 

1"  See  Hermann,  Gcschichte  u.  System  d.  plat.  Phil.,  Heidelberg,  1839,  p.  537. 
Nusser,  Phil.,  vol.  53,  1894,  p.  27,  regards  Book  I  as  inorganically  joined  to  the  rest 
and  is  inclined  to  doubt  its  authenticity.  Cp.  Hirmer,  p.  606  f.,  for  a  detailed 
refutation  of  these  views.  He  enumerates  the  passages  in  Book  I  which  contain 
anticipatory  hints  of  the  later  discussion.     See  also  Campbell,  op.  cil.,  pp.  2-5. 

i°*  Von  Arnim,  op.  cit.,  pp.  71-109,  bases  his  conviction  of  the  earlier  and 
independent  publication  of  Book  I  in  part  on  the  result  of  his  statistical  stylistic 
investigations  which  establish  its  affinity  with  the  Laches  and  Lysis.  But 
granted  that  the  method  of  Sprachstatistik  does  prove  earlier  composition  we  may 
still  adhere  to  the  view  that  even  at  that  date  Plato  had  in  mind  the  plan  of  the 
whole  Republic.  Von  Arnim  finds  further  confirmation  of  his  opinion  in  the 
fact  that  the  development  of  ideas  in  Book  I  seems  to  place  it  earlier  than  the 
Gorgias  and  Lysis  and  later  than  the  Laches  and  Protagoras.  But  as  he  seems 
fully  aware  (Vorwort,  pp.  III-VII)  of  the  difficulties  that  beset  such  a  line  of 
reasoning  and  of  the  fallacies  to  be  avoided  (See  Shorey,  Unity,  pp.  4,  19,  and 
note  109)  he  would  no  doubt  himself  admit  that  at  most  it  could  establish  only  a 
strong  probability.  See  Shorey's  review  of  Von  Arnim's  book.  Class.  Phil., 
Vol.  10,  p.  334  f. 


34        "       THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

its  complete  suitability  as  an  introduction  to  the  whole  work  makes 
such  a  presumption  unnecessary.^"^  The  chief  feature  of  the  brief 
descriptive  narrative  of  the  setting  is  the  charming  portrait  of  the 
aged  Cephalus,  artistically  significant  in  that  he  is  himself  the  perfect 
embodiment  of  that  justice  which  is  to  be  the  theme  of  discourse. 
In  the  prehminary  conversation  of  Socrates  and  Cephalus  (328c- 
331b)  the  external  connection  between  points  seems  slight;  but 
throughout  the  passage  one  feels  below  the  surface  an  inner  connect- 
ing link,  a  unifying  force,  the  aim  of  Socrates  and  Plato  to  guide  the 
discussion  into  an  edifying  channel.^"^  This  determination  finally 
culminates  in  331c  where  Socrates  abruptly  generalizes  the  words  of 
Cephalus  into  a  definition  of  justice,  which  he  proceeds  to  test  by 
negative  instances.  In  this  way  the  subject  of  justice  is  introduced 
for  consideration.  In  the  course  of  the  following  discussion^"^  the 
ethical  problem  as  to  the  nature  of  justice  and  its  rewards  which  is 
the  real  theme  of  the  Republic  is  clearly  indicated. ^°^  The  most 
important  subdivisions  in  Book  I  are  marked  by  a  change  of  interlo- 
cutors. In  his  conversation  with  Cephalus  and  Polemarchus  Socrates 
is  opposing  popular  opinions.  After  the  interruption  of  the  bully- 
ing Thrasymachus  (336b)  he  turns  to  an  attack  on  sophistic  views  of 
justice.  The  purely  dialectical  treatment  of  Bk.  I  sets  the  subject 
forth  dramatically.  But  although  by  a  train  of  subtle,  sophistical 
reasoning  Socrates  succeeds  in  establishing  against  the  sophist 
Thrasymachus  his  thesis  that  the  just  life  is  the  happiest  and  that 
the  Hfe  of  injustice  is  altogether  wretched,  he  concludes  (354b,  c)  as  in 
the  minor  dialogues  with  an  avowal  of  "Socratic  ignorance."  The 
figure  of  the  "feast  of  reason"  used  sarcastically  by  Thrasymachus 

i""  In  the  beginning  of  Book  II  (357a)  Plato  refers  to  Book  I  as  a  proemium. 
Pohlenz,  op.  cit.,  p.  209,  note  1,  thinks  that  while  Plato  designed  Book  I  as  an 
introduction  he  naust  himself  have  felt  the  lack  of  harmony  between  it  and  the 
following  books.  He  regards  it  as  possible  that  the  Clitophon  is  an  unfinished 
attempt  to  replace  Book  I  with  a  more  satisfactory  introduction. 

^"  Note  the  characteristic  moral  turn  in  330d. 

"8  See  especially  344a,  c,  e;  347d,  e;  352d. 

""'  Hirmero/>.  cit.  (p.  602)  says  that  justice  is  only  the  nominal  theme  of  the 
dialogue,  that  the  state  is  the  actual  theme.  Rather  is  it  true  that  to  the  Greek 
mind  the  ethical  ideal  of  justice  is  ine\dtably  connected  \\'ith  political  theory.  Or 
one  may  say  that  the  RepubHc  like  the  Phaedrus  and  Gorgias  has  a  double  theme. 


MAIN  TRANSITIONS  35 

earlier  in  the  discourse  (352b)  is  introduced  again  in  a  dismissive 
forniula^i"  at  the  close  of  his  refutation  by  Socrates  (354a)  and  is 
picked  up  by  the  latter  (354b)  in  transition  to  a  concluding  expression 
of  dissatisfaction  with  the  result  of  the  argument.  By  this  dissatis- 
faction of  Socrates  and  his  criticism  of  his  own  method  of  procedure 
in  passing  on  to  questions  about  justice  before  defining  its  nature, 
transition  is  made  to  the  second  main  division  of  the  Republic  which 
comprises  Books  II,  III  and  IV.  The  first  few  sentences  in  Bk.  II 
continue  the  transition  with  Glaucon's  protest  against  the  inade- 
quacy of  the  previous  discussion  and  his  appeal  to  Socrates  to  attempt 
a  more  scientific  investigation  (358b).  The  question  is  now  resumed 
with  the  strongest  possible  statement  of  the  case  for  injustice,  put 
in  the  mouth  not  of  Thrasymachus,^^^  but  of  Glaucon  and  Adeiman- 
tus,  who  do  not  themselves  beheve  it  (358b-367e).^^^  The  brothers 
demand  of  Socrates  (367e)  proof  of  the  value  of  justice  per  se.  Thus 
the  discussion  is  lifted  to  a  much  higher  plane  than  that  of  Bk.  I,  and 
the  fuller  investigation  that  follows  is  amply  justified.  By  the  found- 
ing of  the  ideal  state  and  the  elaboration  of  the  analogy  between  the 
state  and  the  individual"^  the  insufficient  dialectical  treatment  of 
Bk.  I  is  supplemented"^  by  sociological  and  psychological  arguments. 

'""Let  this  then  ...  be  your  entertainment  at  the  feast  of  Bendis." 
k(TTiacr9o:  the  perfect  imperative  of  completion  and  dismissal  is  used.  The  phrase 
h  Tols  ^evdi5ioLs  recalls  the  dramatic  setting,  and  thus  has  a  unifying  effect. 

"1  The  change  of  interlocutors  at  the  beginning  of  Bk.  II  cannot  fairly  be 
used  as  an  argument  for  its  independence  of  Bk.  I.  The  logical  and  artistic 
reasons  for  the  change  are  sufiScient  to  explain  it.  Glaucon  and  Adeimantus, 
who  are  in  sympathy  with  Socrates,  are  the  natural  and  fitting  respondents  in 
the  serious  exposition  that  follows.  There  is  similar  artistic  motivation  in  the 
change  of  interlocutors  within  Bk.  I  and  in  the  minor  dialogues  of  search.  See 
above  p.  6,  n.  11. 

"=  Windelband  {Gesch.  d.  ant.  Pliilos.  p.  225)  maintains  that  Bk.  I  and  Bk.  II 
to  367e  form  an  independent  whole.  He  cuts  off  Socrates'  answer  in  368b  making 
it  thus  a  resultless  dialogue  on  justice.  Afterwards  he  revised  his  position, 
regarding  357-367  as  a  later  inserted  appendix  to  Bk.  I.  Cf.  Hirmer,  op.  cit.  pp. 
595-6,  609-10  for  discussion  and  refutation  of  Windelband's  views.  The  higher 
tone  of  357-367  separates  it  naturally  fromBk.  I;  nor  does  its  character  seem  that 
of  an  appendix,  but  rather  transitional  and  introductory.  Dreinhofer  {Plaios 
Schrijt  liber  d.  Staat,  p.  1-5)  also  groups  the  first  ten  pages  of  Bk.  II  with  Bk.  I. 

"3  See  below  p.  82,  n.  39. 

^"  See  above  p.  21. 


36  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITIONS  IN  PLATO 

The  transition  to  the  founding  of  the  state,  the  first  important 
subdivision  of  this  section  of  the  Republic,  is  made  by  an  image,  the 
analogy  of  the  large  and  small  letters.  The  state  is  larger  than  the 
individual:  therefore  the  nature  of  justice  may  be  more  easily  dis- 
covered in  the  state  (368e).  The  first  sketch  (369b-372a)  describes 
the  simple  nature-state,  whose  growth  is  controlled  by  the  principles  of 
specialization  and  the  division  of  labor.  In  such  a  city  justice  would 
appear,  so  Adeimantus  suggests  (372a),  in  the  dealings  of  the  citizens 
with  one  another.  But  Plato  is  aware  that  this  simplest  type  of 
city-state  affords  no  scope  for  the  development  of  his  poHtical  and 
ethical  theories;  accordingly  he  passes  on  (372e)  to  the  description 
of  a  more  luxurious  city.  The  transition  is  made  by  a  half-serious, 
half-comic  interlude  (372a-d),  in  which  Glaucon  protests  against  the 
swinish  character  of  the  life  of  the  simple  city.  The  problems  of  life 
in  the  more  comphcated  city  demand  the  addition  of  a  new  class 
of  citizens,  the  warriors  or  guardians  (373e).  Discussion  of  the  na- 
ture, education  and  method  of  selection  of  these  guardians  occupies 
the  remainder  of  Bk.  II  and  the  greater  part  of  Bk.  III.  The  transi- 
tion to  the  first  of  these  topics  is  very  skilful.  In  the  longe  contrario 
sentence  (374c-d)  which  establishes  the  necessity  of  a  warrior  class, 
the  development  and  illustration  of  the  argument  based  on  the  divi- 
sion of  labor  introduces  the  ideas  of  /jLeXerTj  and  eTrto-rij/zTj ;  (pvais,  the 
third  member  of  the  triad  is  at  once  suggested  to  the  mind.^i^  A 
dismissive-introductive  formula,  with  ixeu  8r]  balanced  by  Be  8r],^^'^ 
marks  the  advance  from  the  subject  of  the  guardians'  natural 
endowment  to  that  of  their  education^^^  (376c).  Socrates  describes 
the  kind  of  Hterature  to  be  avoided  (376d-378e)  and  lays  down  the 
principles  which  are  to  guide  writers  of  tales  in  their  city  (378e-383c). 
The  attack  on  Homer  and  the  poets  here  begun  is  further  developed 
in  Bk.  Ill  which  continues  the  description  of  the  purified  education. 
The  transition  is  made  by  a  sentence  summarizing  and  dismissing, 
with  nev  8r],  the  closing  subject  of  Bk.  II  and  introducing,  with  the 
phrase  H  be  hi] ;  the  next  topic. 

After  discussing  in  detail  both  subject-matter  and  style  of  the 
Hterature  and  music  suitable  for  the  training  of  the  guardians,  Soc- 
rates passes  to  the  subject  of  gymnastic.     Again  the  transition  is  of 

"^  These  are  the  three  necessary  prerequisites  for  a  perfect  ayuivKJTfis. 

'i^Cf.  pp.  56  f. 

"^  Notice  also  that  the  emphatic  position  of  dp't^povron  aids  in  the  transition. 


MAIN  TRANSITIONS  37 

the  dismissive-introductive  type  (403c).  In  412b,  waiving  further 
•discussion  of  details,  he  dismisses,  with  jdep  8ri,  this  exposition  of  the 
main  outHnes  of  the  education  of  the  guardians, ^^^  and  advances,  with 
the  transitional  phrase  to  Si]  fxera  tovto,  to  the  question  which  of  these 
warriors  or  guardians  shall  be  our  rulers.  The  following  description 
(412c-414b)  of  the  principles  and  tests  which  shall  govern  their  selec- 
tion is  very  brief.^^^  The  subject  of  the  estabUshment  of  these  regu- 
lations is  now  introduced  (414b-c)  rather  abruptly  by  reference 
back  to  a  previous  (389b-c)  discussion  of  the  necessary  lie.  The 
allegory  of  the  earth-born  children,  whose  substance  God  mingled 
with  different  metals,  gives  a  fanciful,  semi-religious  guarantee  for 
the  permanence  of  the  ideal  city  (414c-415d).  The  book  closes  with 
a  description  of  the  manner  of  life  which  is  to  be  required  of  the 
rulers  to  secure  their  disinterested  patriotism  (416d-4l7b). 

The  opening  pages  of  Bk.  IV  (419a-427c)  are  occupied  with  a 
semi-digression  or  interlude  in  which  various  objections  are  answered. 
The  connection  with  Bk.  Ill  is  made  through  the  first  objection,  that 
the  guardians  (or  rulers)  will  not  be  happy.  The  points  brought  for- 
ward by  Adeimantus  and  Socrates  in  support  of  this  accusation 
repeat,  with  derogatory  tone,  the  details  of  the  eloquent  summary  at 
the  end  of  Bk.  III.  With  427ci2o  begins  the  transition  to  the  second 
important  sub-division  of  the  argument  in  Bks.  I-IV,  the  establish- 
ment of  justice  in  the  state  and,  by  analogy,  in  the  soul  of  the  indivi- 
dual. Here  also  as  in  368e,  figurative  language^^^  inaugurates  the 
transition,  which  is  further  marked  by  the  summoning  of  Polemar- 
chus  and  the  others  to  a  share  in  the  conversation  and  by  a  re- 
statement of  the  main  points  at  issue.     The  ideal  state  has  now  been 

11*  The  passing  reference  in  412a  to  the  need  of  an  everabiding  tTnariiT-qs  or 
presiding  genius,  if  the  state  is  to  be  preserved,  should  be  noted  as  an  important 
anticipatory  hint  of  Bks.  V-VII,  the  higher  education  and  the  rule  of  the 
philosopher-king.     (Cf.  497c.) 

"' Hirmer  (pp.  610-11)  notes  that  this  chapter  on  the  rulers  is  strikingly 
short  and  superficial,  merely  an  appendix  to  the  fuller  treatment  of  the  nature 
and  education  of  the  guardians.  This  incompleteness  he  considers  a  conclusive 
disproof  of  the  independent  existence  of  Bks.  I-IV. 

120  Schleiermacher  {Platans  Werke  III  Th.,  I  Bd.,  Berlin,  1828,  p.  20)  makes 
this  the  end  of  the  second  main  division  of  the  Republic.  This  seems  wholly 
illogical.  The  program  outlined  in  369a  has  not  yet  been  completed,  as  Glaucon 
reminds  Socrates  in  427d.     Compare  also  Hirmer's  statements,  p.  587,  note  1. 

1=1  See  p.  79. 


38  THE  ART  or  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

founded.  By  the  assumptions-^  j-jjat^  rightly  organized  means  ethical- 
ly good,  Socrates  introduces  the  subject  of  the  four  cardinal  virtues 
(427e).  Instead,  however,  of  proceeding  at  once  to  the  discussion 
of  justice,^-^  he  first  defines  the  other  three  virtues,  wisdom,  courage 
and  temperance  and  determines  in  what  part  of  the  state  each  v.dll  be 
found.  Finally  in  434c  he  comes  to  the  definition  of  justice  in  the 
state  as  the  performance  by  each  class  of  its  own  work.  The  next 
task  is  the  discovery  of  justice  in  the  individual,  and  to  this  Socrates 
makes  transition  (434d)  by  reference  back  to  the  analogy  of  the  large 
and  small  letters  (368d),  recalling  their  object  in  founding  the  state. 
Developing  the  analogy  between  state  and  individual  he  assumes  the 
existence  of  three  principles  in  the  soul  (435e),  appetite,  spirit  and 
reason,  which  correspond  to  the  three  classes  in  the  state,  the  traders, 
auxiharies  or  warrior  class  and  the  guardians  or  rulers.  By  a  regular 
dismissive-introductive  transition  (tovto  nev  8ri  .  .  .  rode  8e  i]8r])  Soc- 
rates now  (436a)  passes  from  the  recognition  of  these  three  types  in 
the  soul  to  the  difficult  question  whether  they  are  really  three  or 
rather  one  principle  acting  in  three  ways.  By  applying  the  law  of 
contradiction,  he  proves  the  soul  to  be  tripartite  and  estabhshes  the 
opposition  of  appetite  and  reason  (439e)  and  the  relation  of  spirit  as 
an  ally  of  reason  (440b).  The  virtues  in  the  individual  are  now 
defined,  and  the  definition  of  justice  in  the  state  is  found  verified  in 
the  individual  (442d).  As  a  further  confirmation  this  conception  of 
justice  stands  the  test  when  judged  by  the  criteria  of  popular  ideas^^^ 
of  justice  (442e-443c). 

At  the  end  of  Bk.  IV  a  provisionals^^  conclusion  is  reached.  Our 
dream  is  realized  (443b).     We  have  discovered  justice  (444a).     After 

^"  While  this  assumption  in  a  sense  begs  the  qviestion,  it  does  not  interfere 
at  all   with  the  validity  of  the  following  arguments. 

123  See  p.  94. 

•2''  See  p.  84.  This  recurrence  to  the  popular  notions  of  justice,  the  subject  of 
Socrates'  conversation  with  Cephalus  and  Polemarchus  in  the  early  part  of  Bk.  I,  is 
not  only  an  illustration  of  a  common  Platonic  trait  of  style,  but  a  confirmation  of  the 
unity  of  the  Republic  as  well. 

125  Hirmer  (p.  618)  points  out  that  the  words  dXX'  ofxcos  (445b)  continuing  the 
discussion  show  that  the  conclusion  reached  in  444a-445b  is  regarded  only  as 
provisional.  Compare  also  tv-kov  tlvo.  in  443b.  Similarly  ws  kv  rvircc  414a,  and 
OL  niv  dr)  Tviroi  412b  imply  the  incompleteness  of  the  treatment  of  education. 
However,  disregarding  these  plain  hints  does  not  affect  the  certainty  that  this 
conclusion  is  not  final.     The  seeming  completeness  and  independence   of  single 


MAIN  TRANSITIONS  39 

the  acceptance  of  the  analogy  of  health  and  disease  (445a),  the  ques- 
tion of  the  comparative  advantage  of  the  just  and  the  unjust  life  be- 
comes foolish.  Socrates  now  suggests  that  they  complete  the  picture 
by  an  investigation  of  the  forms  of  degeneracy  in  state  and  individual. 
The  familiar^^^  exhortation  not  to  grow  weary  in  the  argument  en- 
livened by  the  figurative  expressions,  "since  we  have  reached  this 
height"  and  "as  from  a  watch-tower"  marks  the  transition  (445b,  c). 
The  opening  hnes  of  Book  V  are  also  transitional — a  brief  summary  of 
the  final  conclusions  of  Bk.  IV  and  Socrates'  reiteration  of  his  inten- 
tion to  discuss  the  types  of  degeneracy.  At  this  point,  however,  the 
argument  is  interrupted  by  a  long  digression,  Bks.  V,  VI  and  VII,  in 
which  the  brief  and  inadequate  treatment  of  the  rulers^"  [-^  ^y^  jj^ 
412b-414b,  and  the  sketch^-^  of  their  education  given  in  376c-412b  are 
supplemented  by  the  complete  picture  of  the  philospher-king  and  the 
detailed  account  of  the  higher-education  and  the  Idea  of  Good. 
Very  properly  too  is  the  paradoxical  theory  of  the  "community  of 
wives,"  which  needs  careful  explanation,  postponed  to  this  section 
of  the  dialogue. ^2^  These  books,  then,  are  the  logically  necessary 
complement  of  Bks.  I-IV.^^°  Transition  to  this  third  main  division 
of  the  Repubhc  is  made  very  naturally  and  effectively  by  a  dramatic 
interlude  (449b-451b)  in  the  style  of  Phaedo  84c.  Polemarchus  and 
Adeimantus,  after  whispered  consultation,  demand  an  explanation 
of  the  proverbial  phrase  kolvo.  to.  ip'ikuv  as  applied  by  Socrates  in 

sections  of  an  argument  has  been  already  noted  (see  above,  p.  21)  as  a  common 
peculiarity  of  Platonic  composition.  Many  times  the  discussion  will  seem  at  an 
end  only  to  be  renewed  again.  In  Bk.  I,  for  example,  the  argument  might  have 
concluded  at  336a,  343a  or  347e. 

i"-«  Compare  also  Theaet.  151d,  157d;  Protag.  333b;  Crat.  411a,  428a;  Soph. 
261b,  264b;  Rep.  435d. 

'-"  See  above  p.  37,  n.  119. 

'^^  Plato  indicates  clearly  that  this  is  only  a  general  outline.  Cf.  412b  and 
414a  as  well  as  the  reference  to  "the  longer  way,"  that  is  the  higher  education, 
in  435d  which  is  picked  up  in  503a,  504b. 

For  a  general  discussion  of  this  subject  see  Jowett-Campbell,  Plato's  Republic, 
Vol.  II,  pp.  8-12. 

'=»  Compare  502d,  where  Socrates  refers  to  his  earlier  omission  of  these  topics 
as  "a  piece  of  cleverness  which  was  not  of  much  service." 

""  For  a  full  discussion  of  the  technical  and  artistic  reasons  which  determined 
the  contents  of  Bks.  V-VII  and  a  convincing  refutation  of  the  theories  of  Krohn, 
Christ,  Pfleiderer  and  Rohde  that  they  are  superfluous  or  a  later  addition  to 
Bks.  I-IV,  see  Hirmer,  pp.  612-620. 


40  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

423e-424a  to  women  and  children.  The  scene  is  enlivened  by  figura- 
tive and  proverbial  expressions  and  by  a  playful  use  of  legal  terminol- 
ogy. Socrates  prefaces  his  explanation  by  characteristic^^^  protests  of 
ignorance  and  unwillingness. ^^^  The  unforced  naturalness  of  this 
transition  scene  is  a  strong  argument  against  the  "separatists. "^^^ 
Throughout  this  section  of  the  dialogue  the  transitions  are  managed 
with  great  skill.  Especially  noteworthy  are  the  recurrent  comparison 
of  the  wave  and  the  chimerical  wish  (evxv),  external  means  by  which 
Plato  secures  a  unity  of  tone  for  the  whole. ^^^ 

The  first  part  of  Bk.  V  (451c-471c)  is  occupied  with  the  discussion 
of  the  two  paradoxes  concerning  women,  Socrates'  explanation  of 
his  application  of  the  phrase  kolvo.  to.  <p'i\wv.  The  first  paradox,  the 
community  in  education  between  the  male  and  female  guardians 
is  shown  to  be  both  possible  (451c-456c)  and  desirable  (456c-457b). 
By  the  figure  of  the  waves  of  ridicule  transition  is  made  to  the  con- 
sideration of  the  second  paradox,  the  community  in  wives  and  chil- 
dren for  the  guardians.  The  question  of  its  possibility  is  postponed 
by  Socrates'^^^  (458ab),  until  he  shall  have  established  its  desirability. 
But  when  this  has  been  accomplished,  466c,  a  digression  on  war 
affords  a  further  excuse  for  postponement.  The  transition  to  this 
digression  is  entirely  natural,  and  the  German  critics^^^  who  find  here 
an  awkward  juncture  of  two  independent  sections  seem  quite  un- 
justified. Socrates  has  mentioned  in  a  casual  way  in  his  concluding 
summary  (466c)  that  the  women  also  will  go  to  war.  It  is  quite  in 
accord  with  Plato's  manner  that  such  a  point  should  be  singled  out 
for  further  development.^"  Glaucon's  recall  of  Socrates  from  the 
digression  is  equally  natural.  He  reminds  him  that  meanwhile  the 
possibility    of    the    second    paradox    still    remains    unproved.     His 

■^'  See  p.  4,  n.  4. 

>5-  Plato  seems  to  have  forgotten  the  original  scene  (328a). 

"'  Notice  too  that  the  interlocutors  do  not  make  their  request  immediately 
after  the  provisional  conclusion  of  445b.  Socrates  first  sets  forth  his  program 
for  the  discussion  of  injustice.  Bks.  I-IV  are  thus  also  closely  bound  to  Bks. 
VIII  and  IX. 

1**  For  a  full  treatment  of  these,  see  pp.  72  and  84. 

135  See  p.  84. 

"*  For  a  discussion  of  the  question  see  Hirmer,  p.  619.  As  to  the  subject- 
matter  of  this  digression,  Hirmer  shows  that  no  more  suitable  place  in  the  Repub- 
lic could  be  found  for  this  section. 

1"  Compare  Laws  692d-693c,  655a,  b;  Phaed.  258e-259e;  Phil.  28c-30e. 


MAIN  TRANSITIONS  41 

brief  reference  to  the  results  of  the  previous  discussion  includes  men- 
tion of  the  content  of  the  digression,  which  is  thus  adequately  con- 
nected with  the  rest  of  the  argument. 

This  conversation  between  Glaucon  and  Socrates  (471c-473c) 
forms  the  introduction  to  the  second  main  division  of  this  section  of 
the  Republic  (471c-502c).  The  possibility  of  the  community  of  wives 
appears  (471e)  dependent  on  the  possibility  of  the  existence  of  a  state 
such  as  they  have  been  describing.  To  the  latter  question  Socrates 
accordingly  turns  his  attention.  A  brief  discussion  of  the  relation 
between  the  ideal  and  actual  prefaces  the  statement  in  473d  of  the 
third  and  greatest  paradox,  the  government  of  the  state  by  philosopher- 
kings.^^^  The  explanation  and  establishment  of  this  paradox 
involves  thorough  investigation  of  the  nature  of  the  true  philosopher 
and  proof  of  his  fitness  for  rule.^^^  Finally  in  501e  Socrates  and  Adei- 
mantus  agree  that  enough  has  been  said  to  satisfy  their  opponents 
and  in  502c  Socrates  declares  that  the  possibility  of  the  existence  of 
their  state  has  been  proved. 

With  a  dismissive-introductive  transition  Socrates  now  passes  to 
the  question  of  the  education  by  which  these  philosophic  guardians 
will  be  produced — a  subject  which  occupies  the  remainder  of  this 
section  of  the  dialogue.  Plato's  symbolical  expression  for  the  com- 
plete education  of  the  guardians  is  the  knowledge  of  the  Idea  of  Good 
(505a).  He  leads  up  to  the  discussion  of  this  by  a  brief  but  adequate 
resume  (502e-503e)  of  the  main  points  in  his  earlier  insufficient  treat- 
ment of  the  rulers  in  Bk.  II,  412b-414b,  and  by  reference  (504a)  to 
the  tripartite  division  of  the  soul  and  the  definitions  of  the  four  vir- 
tues established  in  Bk.  IV.  The  discussion  of  the  Idea  of  Good  is  con- 
cluded by  the  development  and  interpretation  of  the  image  of  the 
divided  line  (509d-511e)  and  the  following  allegory  of  the  cave 
(514a-519c),  an  allegory  of  "  the  ascent  of  the  soul  into  the  intellectual 
world"  (517b).  The  application  (519c-521c)  of  this  allegory  of 
education  to  the  guardians  of  the  ideal  state  introduces  in  a  natural 
way  the  discussion  of  the  details  of  their  higher  education,  the  means 

'^*  For  description  of  the  further  development  here  in  transition  of  the 
figure  of  the  wave,  see  p.  72. 

139  Windelband  (Gesch.  d.  ant.  Philos.,  p.  225)  concludes  his  second  main 
division  of  the  dialogue  with  486.  This  view  seems  unjustified  by  anything  in 
the  subject-matter  or  its  arrangement.  Hirmer  (p.  620)  believes  his  error  due 
to  a  misconception  of  the  allegory  of  the  ship  of  state  (488  f). 


42  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

by  which  they  shall  attain  to  that  necessary  knowledge  of  the  Idea 
of  Good.  Of  the  two  criteria  (52 Id)  by  which  Socrates  proposes  to 
test  his  scheme  of  education  the  first  is  the  only  one  of  real  importance, 
viz.  that  the  subject  studied  should  train  the  mind  to  think  in  abstract 
terms.  The  second  test,  that  it  should  be  useful  for  a  soldier  is  only 
a  detail  in  the  literary  frame- work  of  the  dialogue:  it  is  inserted  merely 
because  the  guardians  are  drawn  from  the  warrior  class.  Applying 
these  two  criteria,  gymnastic,  music  and  the  arts  are  rejected  (521e- 
522b)  and  mathematics,  applied  mathematics  and  dialectic  are 
selected  as  materials  for  the  higher  training  of  the  guardians  (522c- 
540c). 

At  the  close  of  Bk.  VII  the  discussion  of  the  ideal  state  and  its 
philosophic  rulers  is  declared  complete  (540d-541b).  The  fourth 
main  division  of  the  dialogue  comprises  Bks.  VIII  and  IX.  Bk.  VIII 
opens  with  a  transitional  elev  expressing  satisfaction  with  the  preced- 
ing and  introducing  a  brief  summary  (543a)  of  the  contents  of  Books 
V,  VI  and  VII.  Following,  in  543b  nal  iiriv  introduces  a  reference 
to  still  earher  conclusions— the  provisions  of  the  last  pages  of  Bk.  III. 
These  summarizing  statements  lead  naturally  to  the  return  from  the 
digression  which  is  effected  (543c-544b)  by  a  recapitulation  of  the 
program  outHned  by  Socrates  at  the  end  of  Bk.  IV  and  by  reference 
back  to  the  scene  at  the  beginning  of  Bk.  V.  The  image  of  the 
wrestler  (544b)  serves  as  the  immediate  transition  to  the  resumption 
of  the  argument  from  the  conclusion  of  Bk.  IV.""  Socrates  now 
enumerates  (544c)  the  four  degenerate  types  of  state  and  individual 
which  are  to  be  the  subject  of  their  discussion,  viz.  the  timocratic, 
oligarchical,  democratic  and  tyrannical.  He  reminds  his  hearers 
that  this  investigation  is  necessary  to  complete  their  inquiry  as  to  the 
comparative  happiness  of  the  life  of  justice  and  injustice  (544d-545a). 
By  a  reference  back  to  the  analogy  of  the  large  and  small  letters 
(368d)  he  introduces  a  brief  outhne  of  the  method  of  procedure  which 
he  proposes  to  adopt  (545b).  Finally,  in  545c,  with  a  transitional 
phrase  of  exhortation,^^^  he  turns  to  the  first  topic  of  discussion,  the 
development  of  timocracy  from  the  ideal  state.  But  here  the  general 
problem  arises,  why  should  there  be  any  degeneracy?  Plato  recog- 
nizes that  dogmatism  is  out  of  place  here.     Accordingly  he  dismisses 

»"  See  above  p.  39,  n.  126. 
1"  See  p.  54. 


MAIN  TRANSITIONS  43 

the  subject  with  the  myth  of  the  so-called  Platonic  number  (546a- 
547a).  Transition  to  the  myth  is  made  by  the  playful  adaptation  of 
a  Homeric  quotation^'-  (545d,  e)  and  in  547a  the  incorporation  in  a 
similar  manner  of  a  few  words  from  Homer^'*^  into  the  final  summariz- 
ing sentence  of  the  myth  and  the  playful  reference  to  the  language  of 
545d,  e  mark  the  return  to  the  discussion  of  the  rise  of  timocracy. 
The  sketch  of  the  origin  and  character  of  the  timocratic  state  now 
follows  (547b-548c).  With  a  dismissive  transition  waiving  further 
details  Socrates  next  passes  to  the  description  of  the  character  and 
origin  of  the  timocratic  soul.  In  550c  this  is  declared  complete  and 
he  turns  to  the  consideration  of  the  rise  of  oligarchy.  The  formula  of 
transition  here  is  varied  by  an  adapted  quotation  from  Aeschylus.  ^^'^ 
After  the  description  of  the  oligarchical  state  he  takes  up  the  nature 
and  origin  of  the  corresponding  individual  (553a-555b).  Democracy 
is  next  to  be  considered  (555b),  and  the  democratic  nature  (558c- 
562a).  Lastly,  there  are  left  for  discussion  tyranny  (562a-569c) 
and  the  tyrannical  soul  (571a-576b).  Throughout  this  description 
of  the  four  degenerate  types  of  state  and  individual  the  transitions 
are  simple  and  unelaborate,  mostly  of  the  ordinary  dismissive- 
introductive  type  which  is  especially  suitable  for  the  connection  of 
sub-divisions  in  the  argument,  where  any  decided  break  in  the 
continuity  is  undesirable. ^^^ 

Transition  to  the  next  main  division  of  this  section  of  the  dialogue 
is  marked  by  a  change  of  interlocutors  and  by  Socrates'  recurrence 
(576b)  to  the  ethical  problem,  which  is  the  main  issue  of  the  Republic, 
and  of  which  he  reminded  his  hearers  in  571a,  before  beginning  the 
description  of  the  tyrannical  man.  With  the  completed  picture  be- 
fore us  of  the  worst  and  wickedest  type  of  soul,  the  tyrannical,  we  are 
ready  for  the  comparison  with  the  best  and  m.ost  just  and  the  judg- 
ment as  to  their  happiness.  The  provisional  conclusion  of  Bk.  IV 
is  here  substantiated  by  three  formal  arguments.  The  first  proof 
(576c-580c)  for  the  superior  happiness  of  the  just  man  is  based  on 
the  parallelism  between  state  and  individual  and  is,  in  a  way,  a  sum- 
mary of  the  whole  social  and  political  thought  of  the  Republic.     The 

>«I1.  XVI  112. 
i«Il.  VI  221;  XX  241. 
'"  Aeschylus,  Septem  451  and  570. 

"^  For  an  account  of  the  recurrent  metaphor  of  the  drones  as  a  unifying  ele- 
ment in  Bks.  VIII  and  IX,  see  pp.  81  f. 


44  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

formal  proclamation  of  the  five  types  of  state  in  order  of  their  happi- 
ness and  the  other  references  to  the  methods  of  theatrical  contests 
merely  serve  to  emphasize  the  importance  of  the  conclusion.  With  a 
transitional  eUv  Sij  and  a  regularly  balanced^^^  dismissive-introductive 
formula  advance  is  now  (580c-d)  made  to  the  second  proof.^^^  This 
argument  is  psychological,  based  on  the  tripartite  division  of  the 
soul: — the  man  who  seeks  ideal  pleasures  will  have  experienced  also, 
in  a  fair  degree,  the  lower  pleasures,  while  the  man  devoted  to  honor 
or  gain  has  no  knowledge  of  the  higher  pleasures.  The  third  and 
crowning"^  argument,  the  metaphysical,  rests  on  the  proof  of  the 
unreaHty  and  impurity  of  all  pleasures  except  those  of  the  wise  man 
(583b-588a).  In  588b  Socrates  dismisses  (with  eUv  5?))  as  satisfactory 
the  conclusions  of  the  discussion  up  to  this  point.  By  again  recur- 
ring to  the  main  theme  of  the  dialogue  he  now  introduces,  as 
supplemental  confirmation  of  the  three  formal  arguments,  two  figures, 
the  image  of  the  beast  in  man  (588b-591c)  and  the  analogy  of  health 
and  disease  in  the  soul  (591c-592). 

With  the  end  of  Bk.  IX  the  ethical  demonstration  of  the  superior 
happiness  of  the  just  hfe  is  complete,  Bk.  X  is  an  appendix  in  which 
Plato  adds  to  his  elaborate  sociological  and  psychological  arguments 
the  religious  confimation  of  a  myth  describing  the  rewards  of  the  just 
man  in  the  other  world.  The  eloquent  moral  climax  of  Bk.  IX  is 
thus  superseded  by  a  higher  spiritual  climax. 

The  transition  to  this  concluding  book  is  especially  interesting. 
The  myth  does  not  follow  immediately  upon  the  conclusion  of  Bk. 
IX.  Plato  was  aware  that  sustained  grandeur  becomes  wearisome. 
Accordingly  ^k.  X  opens  with  an  abrupt  return  (introduced  by 
Kai  ixrjv)  to  the  question  of  the  banishment  of  poetry  from  the  ideal 
state.     This  interpolated^*^  discussion  closes  with  a  summary  (607b- 

i«  See  pp.  56  f. 

1"  Pfleiderer  {Platonische  Frage,  p.  74)  and  Rohde  (Psyche,  p.  558)  maintain 
that  580c-588a  is  a  later  insertion.  This  arbitrary  act  is  due  solely,  as  Hirmer 
believes  (p.  622),  to  their  desire  to  exclude  all  mention  of  the  Ideas  from  Bks. 
VIII-IX  and  so  in  their  opinion  establish  their  priority  to  Bks.  V-VII.  No 
illogicality  of  thought  or  awkwardness  in  connection  at  this  point,  which  might 
support  their  position,  can  be  pointed  out. 

"*  The  literary  features  of  the  transition  to  this  argument  are  described  in 
Chap.  Ill,  p.  75. 

'"  Aside  from  the  artistic  reasons  for  the  introduction  of  this  discussion  at 
this  point,  we  should  also  note  that  its  position  is  logically  appropriate.     Plato 


MAIN  TRANSITIONS  45 

608b)  emphasizing  the  importance  of  the  question  for  the  moral  wel- 
fare of  the  State  and  leading  naturally  to  Socrates'  suggestion  (608c)i5'' 
that  the  greatest  rewards  of  virtue  have  as  yet  been  undescribed. 
The  following  proof  of  the  immortahty  of  the  soul,  which  is  introduced 
by  Socrates'  picking  up  of  the  word  'great,'  is  needed  here  to  pave 
the  way  for  the  myth.  In  612a  Socrates  dismisses  further  discussion 
of  the  soul  and  returns  to  the  question  of  the  rewards  of  justice.  The 
speech  of  the  two  brothers  at  the  beginning  of  Bk.  II  is  taken  up  and 
the  prizes  received  by  the  just  man  at  the  hands  of  gods  and  men 
briefly  enumerated.  Finally,  in  613e-614a  Socrates  passes  by  a  dis- 
missive-introductive  transition  to  the  myth  which  details  the  rewards 
of  justice  in  the  hfe  to  come.  In  Bk.  I  we  have  the  picture  of  the  aged 
Cephalus,  the  just  man,  whose  eyes  are  already  turned  in  hope  to  the 
other  world  (330d-331b);  now  at  the  close  of  our  long  investigation 
the  tale  of  the  experience  of  Er  the  son  of  Armenius  strikes  the  same 
key-note  and  rounds  the  dialogue  into  one  harmonious  whole.  The 
single  impressive  summarizing  sentence  which  follows  the  myth  and 
concludes  the  dialogue  sustains  the  note  of  eloquence.  In  its  chmac- 
tic  conclusion  the  Republic  is  unique  among  the  dialogues,  most  of 
which  end  on  a  quiet  commonplace  note  with  their  highest  point  of 
feeling  before  the  conclusion. ^^^ 

There  is  one  important  transitional  problem  in  connection  with 
the  Republic  which  has  been  only  partially  disposed  of  by  the  above 
analysis  of  the  main  transitions  of  the  dialogue,  and  that  is  the  divi- 
sion into  books.  Are  the  transitions  from  book  to  book  real  and  do 
the  divisions  so  made  mark  important  logical  divisions  in  the  argu- 
ment? The  transitions  between  Books  I  and  II,  IV  and  V,  VII  and 
VIII  and  IX  and  X  coincide  with  the  main  transitions  of  the  dia- 
logue.^^2  The  separation  of  the  three  larger  portions  of  the  dialogue 
into  parts  corresponding  in  length  as  nearly  as  possible    with  the 

is  here  supplementing  his  earlier  polemic  of  Bk.  Ill  by  psychological  and  phil- 
osophic arguments  based  on  the  intervening  sections  of  the  dialogue.  For  a  full 
justification  of  this  \dew  see  Hirmer,  pp.  624-625  and  Shorey,  Unity  of  Plato's 
Thought,  p.  81. 

150  Hirmer  (p.  588)  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  this  second  sub-division 
of  Bk.  X,  like  the  first,  begins  with  Kal  nrjv. 

1"  Compare  the  Gorgias,  Philebus,  Cratylus. 

'"  Hirmer  (p.  589)  thinks  the  division  into  books  originated  in  the  recogni- 
tion of  these  main  divisions. 


46  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

introduction  and  conclusion  is  both  natural  and  artistically  desirable, 
provided  always  that  it  does  not  violate  the  logical  structure  by  em- 
phasizing minor  sections  at  the  expense  of  the  more  important.  In 
the  Repubhc  there  is  no  suggestion  of  any  attempt  at  a  slavish 
equahzation  of  the  number  of  pages  in  the  several  books,  though  they 
are  fairly  uniform  in  length. ^^^  The  transitions  from  book  to  book 
are  sometimes  shght,  but  they  always  mark  definite  and  logical  sub- 
divisions of  the  subject.  The  transitions  between  Bks,  II  and  III 
and  III  and  IV  have  been  described  already.^^*  Books  V  and  VI  are 
very  closely  connected.  In  the  last  part  of  Bk.  V  Socrates  distin- 
guishes the  nature  of  the  true  philosopher  from  that  of  the  "lover  of 
opinion."  Bk.  VI  484a  dismisses  with  /jLev  8ri  further  consideration 
of  this  question  and  passes  on  to  discuss  the  comparative  qualifica- 
tions of  the  two  types  for  leadership  (484b).  Bk.  VI  ends  (Slid,  e) 
with  a  brief  dismissive  summary  of  the  interpretation  of  the  im.age  of 
the  divided  line.  Bk.  VII  begins  rather  abruptly,  with  a  mere 
phrase  of  transition  /jLera  ravra  drj  introducing  the  allegory  of  the  cave. 
The  slight  transition  is  perfectly  adequate  because  of  the  general 
parallelism  between  the  two  images,  a  parallehsm  pointed  out  by 
Socrates  himself  (517b). 

The  description  of  the  tyrant  state  and  its  rise  out  of  a  degenerate 
democracy  is  declared  complete  at  the  end  of  Bk.  VIII  (569c).  Bk. 
IX  begins  (571a)  with  the  simple  statement  of  the  tyrannical  type  of 
individual  as  the  next  topic  for  discussion.  Objection  may  be  made 
that  the  book-division  here  is  arbitrary,  that  the  description  of  the 
tyrannical  soul  should  logically  be  included  in  Bk.  VIII.  On  the 
contrary  there  is  both  logical  and  artistic  justification  for  its  position 
at  the  beginning  of  Bk.  IX.  The  first  formal  argument  for  the  su- 
perior happiness  of  the  just  man  hinges  on  the  contrast  which  his  life 
presents  with  that  of  the  tyrant.  The  description  of  the  tyrant  then, 
stands  in  a  closer  logical  and  artistic  relation  to  the  content  of  Bk.  IX 
than  to  that  of  Bk.  VIII,  and  is  rightly  included  in  Bk.  IX.  The  fact 
that  Socrates  refers  to  the  ethical  problem  in  571  before  he  begins  the 
account  of  the  tyrannical  soul  is  a  clear  hint  of  this  relation. 

1"  Birt  {Das  antike  Buchwesen,  Berlin,  1882,  p.  442)  gives  the  following 
statistics  as  to  the  distribution  of  lines:— Bks.  I  1279,  II  1147,  III  1393,  IV  1147. 
V  1371,  VI  1165,  VII  1128,  VIII  1128,  IX  941,  X  1147. 

15"  See  pp.  36  f . 


MAIN  TRANSITIONS  47 

From  the  above  analysis  it  is  evident  that  the  division  of  the 
dialogue  into  books  is  neither  arbitrary  nor  inartistic.  It  does  not 
fall  within  the  scope  of  the  present  paper  to  attempt  to  settle  the 
much  disputed  question^^^  whether  Plato  himself  is  responsible  for  this 
division  or  whether  it  is  the  work  of  a  later  hand.  In  so  far  as  the 
decision  depends  on  evidence  from  the  study  of  the  transitions  there 
seems  to  be  nothing  to  prevent  the  acceptance  of  the  division  as 
Platonic.  However,  there  are  other  considerations  which  give  us 
pause.  In  order  to  reach  a  final  conclusion  it  would  be  necessary  to 
examine  the  evidence  for  an  earher  and  less  satisfactory  division^^" 
into  six  books,  as  well  as  to  investigate  fully  the  claims  based  on  the 
analogy  of  proved  instances  in  the  case  of  Homer,  Hesiod,  Thucy- 
dides,  Xenophon  and  Aristotle.^^^ 

Turning  directly  from  the  structurally  perfect  Republic  one  is 
impressed  by  the  comparative  irregularity  of  the  Laws.  But  if  this 
"masterpiece  of  Plato's  old  age"  falls  short  of  perfect  symmetry  in 
outline,  it  is  at  least  logically  coherent.  Plato  was  perhaps  himself 
aware  that  the  discourse  is  a  little  rambling.  At  any  rate,  throughout 
the  Laws,  there  is  a  very  evident  effort  to  guard  against  logical  confu- 
sion by  frequent  cross-references,^^^  repetitions,^^^  resumes  and  antici- 
pations^^" of  the  main  plan.  Several  quasi-apologies^"  for  the  numerous 
delays  and  false  starts  and  for  the  "many  apparently  trifling  cus- 
toms or  usages"  that  "come  pouring  in  and  lengthening  out  our 

^^*  The  division  into  books  is  regarded  as  unplatonic  by  Schleiermacher, 
p.  4ff.;  Hermann,  PL  Ph.,  pp.  537,  693;  Steinhart,  EM.,  p.  66  ff.;  Christ,  PL 
Stud.,  p.  22;  Birt,  Das  ant.  Buchw.,  p.  447;  Nusser,  Plalons  Poliicia,  p.  95  ff.; 
Dreinhofer,  PI.  Schr.uber  d.  St.,  24  anm.;  Hirmer,  p.  589-91. 

The  following  attempt  to  prove  the  division  Platonic.  Schneider,  Ajisg. 
I,  p.  xiif.;  Rettig,  Prolegomena  ad  Platonis  Rempiiblicam,  Bernae,  1845. 

i5«  Pohlenz  {Aus  Platos  Werdezeit,  Berlin,  1913,  pp.  207-237)  deals  at  length 
with  the  tradition  of  an  earlier  edition  of  the  Republic,  but  does  not  touch  the 
question  of  Bk.  division. 

167  For  a  thorough  discussion  of  these  arguments  see  the  literature  of  the 
subject  noted  above. 

158  649b,  652b,  672c,  682e,  685b,  688a,  696c,  701d,  705b,  d,  707d,  773e,  781e, 
796e,  793b,  e,  794b,  798d,  et  al. 

i59  659d,  688b,  699c,  733,  662-63,  740e,  743e,  754c,  770c,  774c,  812a,  822e, 
876d,  887b. 

'«» 682e-683a,  699e,  701cd,  702a,  722c-723e,  768c,  d,  864c. 

1"  768c,  d;  642a,  682e,  701cd,  723d,  799d,  780d. 


48  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

laws,"^®^  show  that  Plato  fully  recognized  the  possibility  of  criticism 
of  the  structure  of  the  dialogue. 

In  brief  the  plot  of  the  Laws  is  as  follows.  There  is  practically  no 
dramatic  introduction.  The  subject  of  discussion  is  introduced  al- 
most in  the  form  of  a  title  irepi  re  TroXiretas  to.  vvv  Kai  vo/jlwv  (625a).  A 
very  sHght  description  of  the  setting  and  personages  of  the  dialogue 
accompanies  the  announcement  of  the  subject.  But  although  with- 
out dramatic  introduction,  the  Laws  is  by  no  means  lacking  in  pre- 
fatory matter.  The  first  four  books  and  nearly  half  of  the  fifth  (to 
734d,  e)  comprise  a  lengthy  prelude  or  preamble,  sociological,  histori- 
cal, and  ethico-religious,  which  seems  many  times  on  the  point  of 
coming  to  an  end,  but  is  repeatedly  continued  to  include  further  intro- 
ductory material.  In  734e  general  preliminary  considerations  are  at 
last  dismissed.  The  transition  is  made  through  a  formal  dismissive- 
introductive  statement  of  plan.  "Let  the  preamble  to  the  laws 
which  has  been  here  given  suflSce;  after  the  preamble  the  law  must 
needs  follow;  or  rather,  to  speak  more  accurately,  a  sketch  of  the 
laws  of  the  state."  The  laws  of  the  constitution  of  the  state  are 
considered  first;  provisions  for  the  distribution  of  land,  the  appoint- 
ment of  officials  and  the  establishment  of  courts  of  appeal.  These 
enactments  are  each  in  turn  prefaced  by  appropriate  explanatory  and 
hortatory  preambles.  In  768c-e  further  discussion  of  the  courts  of 
law,  the  election  of  magistrates  and  other  details  of  political  ad- 
ministration is  dismissed  for  the  present.  The  Athenian  declares  that 
they  are  now  ready  to  proceed  to  the  actual  laws  of  the  state.  After 
a  rather  lengthy  proem,  he  at  length  begins  with  the  enactments  regu- 
lating marriage  and  the  birth  of  children  which  occupy  the  remainder 
of  Bk.  VI.  Bk.  VII  treats  of  education,  Bk.  VIII  of  festivals,  games, 
mihtary  exercises  and  other  institutions  of  civil  life.  Bk.  IX  is  con- 
cerned with  criminal  offences.  Bk.  X  is  an  eloquent  ethico-religious 
preamble  to  all  the  laws  of  sacrilege.  The  transition  to  this  from  Bk. 
IX  is  made  by  the  introduction  at  the  beginning  of  Bk.  X  of  a  general 
law  summing  up  all  acts  of  violence.  The  recognition  of  the  impor- 
tance of  offences  against  the  Gods  leads  naturally  to  the  following 
protest  against  atheism.  Books  XI  and  XII  are  occupied  with  a  great 
variety  of  miscellaneous  laws  relating  to  dealings  between  man  and 
man.     With  the  discussion  of  the  regulations  regarding  burial  the 

"^  793d. 


MAIN  TRANSITIONS 


49 


laws  strictly  speaking  are  completed— 960b.  It  remains  to  make  pro- 
vision for  the  permanence  of  these  institutions.  The  impressive 
description  of  the  nocturnal  council  of  guardians  which  shall  be  the 
eyes  and  mind  of  the  state,  acquainted  with  the  final  aim  of  the  law- 
givgj.163  «  a  guard  set  according  to  law  for  the  salvation  of  the  state,  "^^^ 
forms  the  final  main  division  of  the  dialogue.  In  the  transition  to 
this  conclusion  a  familiarises  literary  transitional  device,  the  respon- 
dent's failure  to  understand,  is  followed  up  by  an  analogy.  We  need 
some  preserving  power  in  our  state  which  shall  be  Hke  the  third  of  the 
Fates,  Atropos,  the  unchanging  one.  In  this  way  the  full  explanation 
is  naturally  introduced. 

That  the  Laws,  while  loose  in  structure  is  by  no  means  devoid  of 
plan  the  above  brief  analysis  will  show.  The  long  rambling  proemium 
presents  the  greatest  structural  difficulties;  and  it  is  this  section  of  the 
dialogue  that  contains  the  largest  number  of  those  transitional  sum- 
maries, reminders  of  the  plot  and  similar  devices  by  which  Plato  strives 
to  correct  the  impression  of  disorder.i^^  xhe  discussion  in  Bk.  I  begins 
very  abruptly  with  the  Athenian's  question^^^  as  to  the  aim  of  certain 
Cretan  institutions,  the  common  tables  and  the  gymnastic  drill. 
Cleinias  replies  that  their  purpose  is  to  inspire  courage  in  war.  In 
the  course  of  the  following  criticism,  which  is  based  on  the  fundamen- 
tal principle  that  laws  should  be  framed  with  a  view  to  all  the  virtues 
rather  than  one  alone,  the  Athenian  describes  at  length  the  purpose 
and  procedure  of  an  ideal  lawgiver.  This  description,  631b-632d,  is 
an  excellent  summary  of  the  entire  plot  of  the  dialogue  and  an  argu- 
ment for  the  belief  that  from  the  start  Plato  held  the  plan  of  the  whole 
firmly  in  his  mind.  The  discussion  of  courage,  resumed  after  this 
summary,  is  followed  (635e)  by  an  investigation  of  institutions 
relating  to  temperance.  In  this  way  the  subject  of  the  disciplinary 
value  of  pleasure  is  introduced.  The  discussion  of  this  sociological 
problem  continues  through  Book  II  and  is  worked  out  with  consider- 
able detail:— the  use  of  wine,  the  song  and  dance  and  festive  inter- 
course in  general  are  considered.     The  transition  from  Book  I  to  II 

163  964e-965a. 

1"  968a. 

If"  See  p.  88. 

"56  See  above  pp.  47  f.  notes  158-162. 

"7  625c. 


50  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

is  made  by  a  simple  progressive  formula  to.  8ri  /xera  tovto  us  eoiKe  aKeirrkov 
and  the  dismissal  of  the  point  last  established. 

Book  II  closes  with  a  summary  of  the  discourse  on  wine  and  music. 
The  sociological  part  of  the  proemium  is  now  complete.  At  the 
beginning  of  Bk.  Ill  instead  of  taking  up  gymnastic^^^  Plato  turns 
to  the  question  of  the  origin  of  society.  He  attempts  to  disguise  the 
lack  of  real  connection  between  Books  II  and  III  by  the  use  of  the 
transitional  formula  ravra  jxh  ovu  8r]  ravrrj.  Book  III  contains  several 
important  recapitulations  and  reminders  of  the  plot.  When  in  the 
course  of  the  historical  survey  of  the  development  of  civilization  the 
settlement  of  Lacedaemon  is  reached,  it  is  made  the  excuse  for  a 
reference  back  to  the  beginning  of  the  dialogue,  and  the  recognition 
of  the  prefatory  and  preliminary  character  of  all  the  preceding  dis- 
cussion of  wine  and  music. ^^^  In  683e  there  is  a  further  reminder  of 
the  same  conclusion,  that  in  pursuing  the  discussion  of  the  settlement 
of  Lacedaemon  they  are  really  resuming  the  original  inquiry  after  a 
digression.  688b  again  strikes  the  keynote  of  Bk.  I  that  the  lawgiver 
should  regard  all  virtue  not  merely  a  part.  In  the  latter  pages  of  Bk. 
Ill  the  balance  of  powers  in  the  Spartan  consitution  is  contrasted 
favorably  with  the  extreme  tyranny  of  Persia  and  the  equally  extreme 
democracy  of  Athens.  Here  the  Athenian  pauses  to  consider  the  best 
method  of  procedure  and  call  attention  to  the  importance  of  the  pre- 
vious arguments.^^"  Megillus  calls  for  a  fuller  explanation  and  thus 
transition  is  made  to  an  emphatic  statement  of  the  characteristic 
Platonic  doctrine  that  degeneracy  in  morals  follows  degeneracy  in 
music.  In  701c  there  is  an  important  reminder  of  the  plot  and 
plain  hint  of  Plato's  purpose  in  inserting  frequent  summaries — 
"Now  why  have  I  said  all  this?  Because  it  seems  to  me  that  the 
argument,  like  a  horse,  ought  to  be  pulled  up  from  time  to  time,  not 
let  to  go  with  mouth  unbridled  as  it  were. "  The  following  resume  in 
702a  leads  to  the  discovery  that  their  conclusions  may  be  put  to  prac- 
tical proof  in  the  new  Cretan  colony  which  is  about  to  be  sent  out. 
This  foundation  of  the  Cretan  state  forms  the  external  basis  of  the 
whole  plot  of  the  Laws.  Its  introduction  here  serves  as  the  transi- 
tion to  Book  IV  which  continues  with  further  particulars  as  to  site 
and  the  character  of  the  colonists.     705de   reiterates,   in    the    tone 

"'  The  discussion  of  gymnastic  is  postponed  until  813,  814. 
1"  682e-683a. 
"°  699e. 


MAIN  TRANSITIONS  51 

of  Bk.  I,  the  warning  as  to  the  final  aim  of  the  lawgiver.  715e  marks 
the  completion  of  the  historical  and  political  section  of  the  proemium 
and  the  beginning  of  a  general  ethico-religious  preamble  which  is 
introduced  under  the  guise  of  an  address  to  the  new  colonists  (716-7 18) . 
In  718b-d  an  idea  is  introduced  which  is  of  the  utmost  importance  in 
the  literary  frame-work  of  the  dialogue/^^  that  of  the  need  of  a  special 
preamble  prefixed  to  each  law,  whose  purpose  shall  be  the  pre- 
disposition of  the  citizens  to  obedience.  This  idea  is  developed  with 
considerable  repetition  by  the  use  of  image  and  quotation  and  by  the 
example  of  a  specimen  law  of  marriage  with  appropriate  preamble. ^^^ 
Finally,  in  722c  d,  the  entire  discussion  up  to  this  point  is  formally 
recognized  as  the  general  prelude  or  preamble  to  the  laws  which  are 
to  follow.  After  a  little  further  explanation  and  generalization  of 
the  idea,  the  transition  to  Bk.  V  is  made  (723e-724a)  by  dismissive 
introductive  formulas  marking  out  the  order  of  discussion.  A  part  of 
the  ethical  principles  necessary  to  their  preamble  have  already  been 
sufficiently  developed  in  the  hortatory  address  to  the  new  citizens 
on  the  honors  due  to  the  gods  and  their  parents. ^^^  It  remains  to 
complete  this  unconscious^^''  proemium  by  a  further  prefatory  ethical 
discourse  dealing  with  all  that  relates  to  the  souls  and  bodies  and 
possessions  of  the  citizens.  The  completion  of  this  ethico-religious 
preamble  occupies  the  first  half  of  Bk.  V.  In  734e  the  general  pre- 
amble comes  to  a  sudden  end.  Its  dismissal  is  marked  by  the  use  of 
the  imperative  of  completion. ^''^  The  next  topic  for  consideration  is 
the  laws  of  the  constitution.  Further  preliminary  material,  a  special 
proemium  to  these  laws,  is  here  introduced,  734e,  by  the  figure  of 
weaving,  which  suggests  the  idea  of  purification.  In  737c  the  laws 
are  at  last  begun. 

Throughout  the  main  body  of  the  dialogue  the  plan  is  fairly  regu- 
lar; laws  with  their  preambles  prefixed  follow  one  another  in  the 
order  given  in  the  general  outline  above. '^^  The  literary  significance  of 
the  idea  of  the  proemium  to  the  plot  of  the  laws  is  here  apparent. 
Most  of  the  numerous  passages  of  eloquent  moral  reflection,  the  philo- 

"1  See  below. 

172  721. 

1"  716-718. 

"<723d. 

1'°  Kal  TO  n'ev  Trpoolfxiov  rihv  vojj.o.^v  kvTavOoi  XexOev  rdv  Xoyo^v  riXos  ex^TO}. 

i"«  See  pp.  48  f. 


52  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

sophical  and  political  disquisitions,  by  which  the  dry  detail  of  legisla- 
tion is  constantly  varied,  are  introduced,  either  explicitly  or  implicitly 
as  preambles  to  the  following  laws,  not  as  irrelevant  digressions  dis- 
turbing the  unity  of  the  whole.  It  is  interesting  to  note^^^  that  the 
formula  of  transition  from  preamble  to  law  always  suggests  the  hope 
that  the  persuasive  power  of  the  former  will  render  the  threats  and 
penalties  of  the  law  unnecessary. 

The  transitions  from  book  to  book  in  the  Laws  are  simple  and 
abrupt.  That  from  Bk.  Ill  to  IV  is  the  only  one  that  shows  any 
attempt  at  artistic  elaboration.  Bks.  XI  and  XII  are  absolutely 
unconnected;  a  mere  formula  forms  the  only  transition  between 
Books  II  and  III.  In  the  case  of  the  other  books  a  single  transitional 
sentence  of  the  dismissive-introductive  type  at  the  beginning  of  the 
book,  connects  it  with  the  preceding  But  it  is  not  only  the  book  to 
book  transitions  in  the  Laws  that  are  abrupt  and  stereotyped;  the 
transitions  throughout  the  dialogue  are  more  artificial,  less  natural 
and  artistic  than  in  the  Republic.  Increased  formality  and  precision 
are  indeed  characteristics  of  the  style  of  all  the  "later"  dialogues. ^^* 
The  abruptness  and  conventionality  of  the  book  to  book  transitions 
in  the  Laws  is  therefore  no  convincing  argument  that  the  division 
into  books  is  unplatonic.  As  in  the  case  of  the  Republic,  however, 
the  question  is  far  too  complicated  to  be  decided  by  a  mere  considera- 
tion of  the  transitions.^^' 

1"  See  Shorey,  "Plato's  Laws  and  the  Unity  of  Plato's  Thought,"  Class. 
Phil.  IX,  p.  369. 

1"*  See  Appendix,  pp.  102  f. 
'"^  See  above,  p.  47. 


CHAPTER  II 

Minor  Conventional  Forms  of  Transition 

An  exhaustive  account  of  the  transitional  phrases,  formulas  and 
particles,  of  the  more  stereotyped  methods  of  transition  used  by 
Plato  would  require  a  sentence  to  sentence  analysis  of  the  dialogues. 
No  one  has  as  yet  attempted  such  a  comprehensive  summary,^ 
though  various  statistical  studies  of  particles^  supply  some  material. 
The  present  paper  aims  merely  to  collect  and  illustrate  some  of  the 
commonest  of  the  conventional  forms  of  transition  which  appear  in 
the  dialogues. 

Most  numerous  of  all  is  that  type  in  which  the  transition  is  made 
by  some  explicit  reference  to  the  discussion.  This  may  take  the 
form  of  a  command  to  investigate,  an  exhortation  to  joint  activity, 
a  statement  of  the  need  of  inquiry,  a  brief  prothetic  declaration  of 
intention,  or  a  detailed  description  of  the  method  and  purpose  of  the 
subsequent  discussion.  Forms  of  aKeirrco,  eTrto-KeTrrco,  (TKoreu,  opaco, 
X47W,  hpoko^  and  similar  verbs,  deictic  pronouns  and  adverbs^  such  as 
TovTo,  T68e,  TOLovTov,  ovTus,  w5e  and  a5,  combined  with  inferential  particles 
like  olv  or  8i]  constitute  the  usual  vocabulary  of  this  variety  of 
transition.     Its  simplest  type  is  a  brief  form.ula  of  command,^  intro- 

1  Hans  V.  Arnim's  Sprachliche  Forschungen  zur  Chronologie  der  Platonischen 
Dialogen  (Wien,  1912)  p.  9,  contains  a  very  slight  attempt  at  classification  of 
formal  transitions.  There  are  also  several  treatises  on  methods  of  transition  used 
b>-  the  Greek  orators.  These  have  been  listed  by  R.  D.  Elliott,  TransUion  in  the  Attic 
Orators,  Menasha,  Wis.,  1919,  pp.  1-9. 

"  See  Appendix,  p.  102,  n.  1. 

3  Deictic  pronouns  and  adverbs  are  always  transitional  because  they  contain 
in  themselves  elements  of  repetition  and  incompleteness.  See  Mendell,  Latin 
Sentence  Connection,  pp.  19,  33,  91-93,  142  f. 

*  Cf.  Protag.  316c,  323a,  355a,  356c;  Euthyph.  9d,  10a,  12d;  Crat.  389a, 
392c-  Rep.  477c,  485b,  524d;  Gorg.  476b,  495c;  Theaet.  147a,  153d,  158e,  182a, 
166d,  e;  Meno  71c,  d,  73d,  82b,  e,  90b,  93b;  Phil.  49b,  29b,  d,  31d,  32e,  39e, 
45d-  Phaedo  67e,  70d,  73b,  74a,  80a,  92c,  96d,  104b;  Char.  161b;  Phaedr.  243e, 
263d,  264c,  268a;  Laches  189c,  d;  Lysis  206b,  217c;  Crito  51c,  50a;  Symp.  199cd, 

53 


54  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

ducing  a  new  subject  for  investigation.  Thus  in  Gorg.  510b  the  words 
(TKoireL  di]  Kal  rode  mark  the  advance  to  the  next  point  in  the  argument. 
The  resumptive  formula  of  command  which  introduces  a  fresh  start 
in  the  discussion^  should  be  included  here.  aWts  and  TraXtj'  e^  apxrjs 
are  its  common  catch-words.  So  Euthyphro  lib,  dXXa  ttoKlv  eiire  e^ 
apxv^-  For  the  formula  of  exhortation  to  joint  inquiry®  compare 
Protag.  330b — tpepe  drj  .  .  .  .  KOLvfj  ciKep(!ojj.eda  toIgv  tl  avToJv  kcTTiv 
eKa<xTov.  In  Char.  167ab  the  formula  which  marks  a  fresh  start  in 
the  argum_ent  takes  the  form  of  an  exhortation.^  TrdXti^  roivw  .... 
ucrirep  e^  apxrjs  eTrL(jKep(!cjj.tda.  The  transitional  statement  of  the  need 
of  investigation  as  an  obligation  is  also  very  common.  The  verbal  in 
-reos  may  be  used^  as  in  Theaet.  203e,  aKeirrkov  Kal  oh  irpoboTeov  ovrcos 
avav8pcos  /xeyap  .  .  .  \6yop ;  xpv  or  i5eT  may  take  the  place. of  the 
verbal.^  Thus  Laches  ISle,  gvkovv  /cat  vvp  xPV  t^'Pootov  avro  tovto 
(jKepaadai  and  Rep.  46 le  bet  or]  to  fxerd.  tqvto  jSejSaLcoaaadaL  -wapa  tov 
Xoyov.  The  simple  formula,  whether  of  command,  exhortation  or 
obligation,  may  be  slightly  elaborated  by  the  injunction  not  to  be 
discouraged;^"  so  in  Protag.  333b,  Wl  617  ....  /117  aTOKafjLccfxev  dXXd  /cat 
TO.  Xotrd  8LacrKe\pa)p.e9a.  Compare  also  Crat.  411a,  ovk  a-KobeCKLaTeov  dXX' 
eTTKr/ceTrreoi/. 

The  transition  may  be  made  by  a  prothetic  statement  of  intention 
or  purpose. ^^  The  myth  in  Protag.  320c  is  introduced  by  a  clear 
indication  of  the  speaker's  feeling  with  regard  to  it,  5o/cet  roivvv  (xol,  eipt], 


210e,  217b,  214b,  215b,  207c,  200a,  d,  176a.     For  a  further  discussion  of  these 
formulas,  see  infra,  p.  62. 

<*  Cf.  Theaet.  151d,  184b,  187a;  Protag.  333d;  Phaedo  105b;  Meno  79e,  90c; 
Char.  160d;  Laches  198a,  191e. 

«  Cf.  Theaet.  151e,  157e,  203a;  Laches  192e,  198c;  Euthyph.  7a,  9e;  Lysis 
216c,  218d;  Laws  649b;  Soph.  261d,  267e;  Gorg.  476a;  Protag.  343c;  Meno  78c, 
86c,  87e,  88a;  Phil.  Ud,  12b,  14c,  34d,  35d,  37a,  39c,  51e,  54a;  Rep.  372a,  e, 
334e,  436b,  c,  473b,  489e,  576b.  For  the  interrogative  form  with  PovXei  ovv  see 
infra,  p.  60. 

'  Cf.  pp.  74  f.  and  Laws  626e. 

8  Cf.  Theaet.  164c,  179d,  181b,  204b;  Euthyph.  15c;  Phaedr.  244a,  246b; 
Meno  96d;  Char.  158d;  Phil.  26e,  28a,  34d,  e,  36e,  46b,  49a. 
~~ — »  Cf.  Laches  179b;  Theaet.  192a;  Meno  79c,  87c;  Symp.  189d;  Crat.  384c. 

"  Cf.  Theaet.  151d,  157d;  Rep.  445b;  Soph.  261b,  264b;  Phil.  21d;  Crat.  428a. 

"  Cf.  Protag.  324d,  338c,  d,  353c;  Phil.  18a,  26b;  Symp.  177c,  186b,  189d, 
194e,  204d;  Gorg.  473a,  464b;  Rep.  491a;  Phaedo  96a;  Crat.  404e;  Pol.  267d. 


MINOR  FORMS  OP  TRANSITION  55 

Xo-pikaTepov  tlvai.  ixvBov  v/juu  XeyeLv.  Again  in  Protag.  342a  Socrates  pre- 
faces his  interpretation  of  the  poem  of  Sinionicles  with  an  announce- 
ment of  his  own  intention,  eyed  to'luvv,  riv  b'  €700,  a  yk  iiol  boKet  wepl  tov 
acrfiaTos  tovtov  TecpaaofxaL  vjjuv  SeL^eXdeiv. 

Transitions  in  which  the  reference  to  the  discussion  is  confined  to 
a  stereotyped  formula  illustrate  the  external  method  of  connection, 
which  may  or  may  not  be  strengthened  by  further  transitional  ele- 
ments. In  many  cases  the  idea  of  the  formula  is  reinforced  by  or 
developed  into  a  more  definite  description  of  the  plan  and  method 
of  the  discussion. 1^  These  detailed  outlines  of  method  are  charac- 
teristic of  the  later  and  more  difficult  dialogues.  They  are  especially 
frequent  in  the  Laws.  So  in  Laws  632d-e  the  common  transitional 
resumptive  formula,  k^  a.pxvs  ■koXlv  e/xoL  ye  boKel  xPW<^i-  bie^eXdelv 
KaOairep  y)p^afj.eda  is  elaborated  by  a  description  of  the  proposed  order 
of  topics  in  the  discussion. 

A  transitional  discussion  of  method  may  include  protest  against 
or  rejection  of  some  unsatisfactory  course  of  procedure. ^^  So  in 
Theaet.  191  a-c  in  a  lengthy  outline  of  his  plan  for  further  investiga- 
tion Socrates  condemns  a  previous  decision. ^^  The  sum.marizing 
formula  /jltj  yap  ovru  Tidc^fxeu,  dXX'  w5e  serves  as  the  final  explicit  link 
in  transition  to  the  reconsideration  of  the  question,  "what  is  false 
opinion."  A  criticism  of  former  methods  may  be  combined,  in  a 
transitional  passage,  with  a  resumptive  recurrence  to  the  main  ques- 
tion at  issue.  The  Meno  affords  several  examples  of  this  type  of 
transition ;^-^  for  instance  in  77a,  after  Socrates  has  finished  his  series 
of  sample  definitions,  he  urges  Meno  to  redeem  his  promise  to  define 
virtue  Kara  oXov  and  stop  "making  many  out  of  one." 

The  transitional  resumptive  statement,  summary,  or  reminder  of 
the  issue  is  not  always  associated  with  criticism.  It  is  constantly 
used  to  mark  the  return  from  a  digression;^"  it  provides  a  method  for 

'2  Cf.  Crito  48b-e;  Gorg.  505e,  506a;  Laches  189e,  197e;  Meno  86d,  e;  Symp. 
201d,  e;  Protag.  333c;  Phil.  20c-e,  23b-e,  28c,  d,  31b,  32c,  d,  34c,  d,  44c,  d;  Phaedr. 
237c,  d;  Laws  626d,  638b,  643a,  799d  et  al.;  Rep.  368e,  369a,  545b. 

'^  The  introduction  of  the  idea  of  criticism  or  correction  is  a  common  transi- 
tional device.    Cf.  ittfra  p.  63,  also  p.  93. 

"  Cf.  Theaet.  162e-163e,  166d,  e,  187d,  e,  188c,  d;  Rep.  354;  Symp.  180c,  d; 
Laches  190c,  185b-c. 

16  Cf.  Meno  74a,  93a-b. 

«  Cf .  pp.  98  f. 


56  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

advancing  the  argument  common  in  all  the  dialogues,^'  especially 
suited  to  the  more  complicated  and  difficult. ^^  A  brief  resumptive 
summarizing  phrase  often  serves  to  introduce  the  conclusion  of  a 
passage  of  reasoning. '^^  The  phrase  oOrco  dij  tovtuv  viroKeLfxevo^v  is  so 
used  in  Protag.  359a. 

Cross  reference  to  a  previous  point  is  a  usage  closely  allied  to  the 
resumptive  transition,  though  far  broader  in  its  scope.  Its  effect  is 
always  unifying  and  in  many  cases  it  is  also  transitional.  Advance 
to  a  new  step  in  the  argument  is  frequently  made  through  the  appeal 
to  a  previously  established  point.  So  in  Laches  198a  the  reference 
back  to  a  former  fundamental  assumption  (190d)  is  an  important 
element  in  the  transition  to  renewed  discussion.  This  use  of  cross 
references  in  the  progress  of  the  argument,  in  binding  one  division 
to  another  and  making  the  whole  logically  coherent,  is  distinctly 
transitional.  In  many  instances,  however,  their  purpose  is  much 
more  general;  they  contribute  to  the  unity  of  tone,  the  artistic  unity 
of  the  dialogue.^"  Of  such  a  character  is  the  reference  to  Thrasy- 
machus  and  his  views  in  Rep.  367a-c,  and  the  recurrence  to  the  style 
and  philosophy  of  Thrasymachus  in  Adeimantus'  objections  in  419. 
Cross  references  naturally  occur  more  frequently  in  the  longer,  more 
complex  dialogues,  but  they  are  used  in  all  the  dialogues.-^ 

A  prothetic  statement  of  the  point  next  to  be  considered  is  often 
combined  with  the  formal  dismissal  of  a  preceding  discussion.  This 
dismissive-introductive  form  of  transition  is  very  common."  It  may 
be  used  to  mark  either  a  minor  advance  or  an  important  division  of 
the  argument.  The  type  admits  of  numerous  variations,  but  the 
principle  underlying  them  all  is  the  characteristic  Greek  fondness 
for  balance.     The  expression  of  dismissal  is  usually  marked  by  the 

'"  Cf.  supra,  p.  54,  n.  5;  also  Euthyph.  9a;  Protag.  349a-c. 

18  Cf.  p.  26,  notes  85  and  86;  p.  47,  notes  158,  159,  160;  also  Theaet.  169d;  Phaedo 
91c-d;  Protag.  359ab;  Gorg.  506c;  Rep.  543ab. 

19  Cf.  Meno  76d,  98a;  Phil.  48c;  Symp.  178c,  180b;  Phaedo  66b,  80ab,  11  la. 

20  Scholars  have  made  extensive  use  of  cross  references  in  proving  the  struc- 
tural unity  of  the  Republic.    Cf.  pp.  33-45. 

21  The  following  list  of  cross  references  in  the  Laches  and  Phaedrus  will 
illustrate  the  usage.  Laches  186e  ref.  to  184d;  187c  to  179b;  191c  to  190e;  193d 
to  188d;  198a  to  190d.  Phaedrus  243e  ref.  to  237b;  249d  to  245b;  249e  to  249b; 
250c  to  250b;  253cd  to  246a;  257a  to  243b;  262d  to  259b;  265a  to  245bc;  265b 
to  244. 

22  For  a  literary  variant  of  this  t>'pe  cf.  pp.  89  f. 


MINOR  FORMS  OF  TRANSITION  57 

particle  fih  alone  or  strengthened  by  ovu,  8r]  or  roivvv,  while  the  new 
topic  of  discussion  is  introduced  by  a  balancing  5e,  677  or  5e  by]P  Both 
parts  of  the  transition  admit  of  all  the  variety  of  expression  noted 
in  the  consideration  of  introductive  formulas  (pp.  53-55),  i.e., 
command,  exhortation,  statement.  In  the  dismissal  the  perfect 
imperative,  which  implies  completion,  is  more  frequently  used  than 
the  present.  Deictic  pronouns  and  adverbs  form  an  important 
transitional  element  in  both  dismissive  and  introductory  statements. 
Protag.  332a  illustrates  the  simplest  method  of  balance,  with  ixh  and 
5e,  the  formula  of  exhortation,  and  the  deictic  pronouns,  tovto  point- 
ing backward  and  robe  forward,  tovto  /xeu  eaaw/jLeu,  Tode  de  dXXo  JJv 
€X67€s  k-KiaKepuiixtda}^  For  the  use  of  the  imperative  in  the  dismissaP^ 
compare  Laws  734e — koL  to  ixh  -kpooIijilov  tccv  v6/xccp  kvTavddl  \exdev  tccv 
'Koycov  reXos  exeroj,  yuerd  6e  to  irpoolixLov  avayKOLov  tov  vofxov  eireaOai. 
In  Rep.  456c  both  the  balancing  particles  are  strengthened  by  an 
inferential  617.  Kai  6tl  jxiv  8rj  SvpaTo.,  5Lcc/xo\6yrjTaL ;  Nai.  6tl  8e  St) 
^eKTiaTa,  to  fxtTa  tovto  SeT  bioixoXoy-qd-qvat}^  In  Theaet.  182c  one  point 
is  selected  to  continue  the  discussion;  the  others  are  dismissed  with 
^t^^  Tolvvv.  TO.  /xev  Toivvv  aXXa  xaipetv  edaco/jLev  .  .  .  .  ov  8'  evtKa  Xeyo- 
fjL€v,  TOVTO  fjLovov  ipvXaTTWjitv,  kpoiTOiVTes.^"^  Similarly,  fxtv  toivvv  and  the 
perfect  imperative  upladui  are  used  in  Rep.  439e  to  dismiss  the  dis- 
cussion of  the  two  elements  in  the  soul,  desire  and  reason,  while 
8e8ri  introduces  the  investigation  of  the  third  element,  "spirit." 
Dismissals  with  pev  ovv  are  especially  common,  not  only  in  Plato,^^ 

2^  In  a  few  cases  the  balance  is  differently  marked.  So  in  Rep.  444a  an 
inferential  617  is  followed  by  yap.  ecn-co  6^  .  .  .  .  /ierd  yap  tovto  aKeivTtov  ol/xai 
&8iKiav.  Again  in  Rep.  607b  ravra  8ri  .  .  .  .  a.ivo\t\oyi}a9o}  in  the  dismissal  is 
balanced  by  an  introductory  Trpoe'L-irufj.ev  dk.  Compare  Rep.  553a,  562a;  Laws 
820e. 

^  For  other  cases  of  the  pev-Se  balance,  cf.  Protag.  347b,  358a;  Phaedr.  246a, 
248a,  265c;  Symp.isOc,  186a,  201d,  207b;  Pol.  287a;  Rep.  432b,  580c;  Laws  745e; 
EuthjT)h.  3c;  Phil.  12c,  15a,  28e;  Meno  86b,  89d;  Phaedo  69e,  95a. 

25  Cf.  Laws  698a;  Rep.  392c,  503b;  Meno  92d;  Phil.  28a;  Phaedr.  246d. 

2«  For  other  examples  of  pev  8r)  in  the  dismissal,  cf.  Theaet.  173b,  187a; 
Gorg.  470b;  Laws  672e,  698a,  832ab;  Symp.  196a,  216c,  220c;  Meno  93e;  Phil. 
59b;  Phaedo  78ac;  Phaedr.  238d,  246d;  Rep.  392c,  376c,  386a,  415d,  436a. 

^^  For  other  examples  of  ptv  toIwv  in  dismissal  cf.  Theaet.  150a;  Rep.  427c, 
502a;  Symp.  200a;  Phil.  32b;  Rep.  611a,  613e;  Phaedr.  264e;  Soph.  245e;  Laws 
779d. 

28  For  other  examples  cf.  Protag.  321d,  319c,  323c,  324c,  d,  355e;  Theaet. 
180c;  Laws  816d,  e;  Symp.  178a,  183c,  195c,  196b,  d,  204b,  221c;  Phil.  13ab 


58  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

but  in  other  Greek  writers  as  well.^^  In  Laches  183d  in  transition 
to  the  dimax  of  the  amusing  anecdote  of  the  scythe-spearman 
nev  ovv  is  used  to  dismiss  uninteresting  details,  to.  iih  oivv  aXka  ovk 
a^ia  \kytiv  irepi  r'  avSpos'  to  8e  cxotpKJixa  to  tov  8peiravov  tov  Tpos  rfj  \6yxv 
olov  inrk^T].  A  formula  of  dismissal  may  be  reinforced  by  a  detailed 
dismissive  summary.^"  So  in  Rep.  350d  the  formula  tovto  ixh  runv 
ovTo:  KelaOw  is  preceded  by  a  resumptive  summary  of  conclusions, 
introduced  by  8e  ovv.  Compare  also  Laws  689c-e  where  the  dismissive 
formula  tovto  fiep  toIvw  ovTi^i  Kdadoo  is  followed  by  a  long  explanatory 
summary.  At  the  close  of  the  paragraph  the  dismissal  is  repeated 
with  another  formula,  TavTa  fxev  ovv,  KaQinrep  tlivoiiev  apTi,  ^ekeyneva 
TedrjTo:  TavT-g  and  the  next  topic  is  introduced  by  5€  bi]. 

The  Platonic  dialogues  contain  also  another  type  of  dismissive 
transition,  that  in  which  discussion  of  a  subject  is  either  passed  over 
altogether,  or  dismissed  by  a  formula  of  indefinite  postponement.^^ 
The  subject  so  postponed  is  not  usually  treated  again.^^  avdis  or 
CIS  avdi^  is  a  common  catch- word  of  the  dismissal;  the  new  topic  for 
discussion  is  usually  introduced  immediately  with  5e.^^  So  in  Pro  tag. 
347b  Alcibiades  checks  Hippias  from  making  a  display  speech  and 
recalls  the  agreement  between  Socrates  and  Protagoras  as  to  further 

16e,  22c;  Phaedr.  238d,  239b,  c,  d,  246a,  250c;  Rep.  357a,  347de.  The  combina- 
tion M^"  olv  may  be  further  strengthened  by  an  intensifying  617.  So  in  Rep. 
359b,  360d;  Phaedo  112e. 

29  Cf.  Isoc.  IV  43d,  47c,  61d;  Thuc.  I  123,  15,  40;  III  64;  Isaeus  VII  11; 
Isoc.  II  17d;  V  93d,  98d,  100a,  101b;  VII  151b;  VIII  164b,  171c,  e;  Lysias  X  31; 
XII  47;  XIII  51;  XIV  3;  XXIII  13;  XXIX  8. 

s"  Cf.  Rep.  398bc;  461d-462a;  Phaedr.  245b;  Laws  674a-676a;  697c-698a; 
822cd;  832ab. 

31  Cf.  p.  78  for  a  literary  elaboration  of  this  method  of  transition. 

3=  This  is  the  view  defended  by  Adam  {Republic  of  Plato,  Vol.  I,  pp.  46-7,  Cam- 
bridge, 1905)  in  a  note  to  Rep.  347e.  He  cites  Siebeck's  unsuccessful  attempt  to  prove 
that  "phrases  of  this  sort  always  refer  either  to  some  future  dialogue  contemplated  by 
Plato,  or  to  a  later  part  of  the  same  dialogue."  (Siebeck,  Zur  Chron.  d.  PI.  Didoge, 
pp.  121  ff.) 

An  occasional  instance  occurs  in  which  a  subject  postponed  receives  further 
attention.  Rep.  466a  takes  up  the  question  of  the  happiness  of  the  guardians 
dismissed  in  420d.  The  phrase  els  avdis  is  not  used  in  420d,  but  appears  in  466a 
where  Socrates  recalls  the  previous  dismissal.  Compare  Phil.  42c-43e,  where  the 
discussion  of  the  neutral  life  dismissed  with  els  avdis  in  33b  is  again  renewed. 

33  Cf.  Protag.  357b;  Rep.  347e,  430c;  Euthyph.  6c;  Meno  99e;  Tim.  50c; 
Symp.  194e;  Euthyd.  275a.  In  Symp.  175e  oKlyof  vanpov  is  used  instead  of 
avdis.     Cf.  Kal  T-dxa  in  Soph.  254b. 


MINOR  FORMS  OF  TRANSITION  59 

debate,  els  avQls  ye'  vvu  de  bUaLov  ecfTiv  a  (h/jLoXoyrjaarrju.  This  formula 
of  postponement  may  be  used  to  bring  a  dialogue  to  an  end;^^  thus 
Euthyph.  15e,  els  aii^ts  tolvvu,  .  .  .  vvv  yap  (Tirevbo)  ttol,  Kal  jjlol  cbpa 
awLevai. 

In  Laches  181c  a  /uep  ovv  of  dismissal  is  combined  with  a  postponing 
aS^ts  ;  8e  returns  to  the  point  at  issue,  ravra  ixev  ovv  Kal  av  iroLrjaecs  Kal 
rineTs  ere  Kal  avdts  viroiJLvrjao/jLeV  irepl  de  <j)v  rjp^aiJLeda  tL  ipare.^^  Another 
paraleiptic  formula^^  is  used  in  Rep.  412b,  in  passing  over  minor 
details^^  of  legislation,  xop^tas  yap  tI  au  tls  Ste^tot  tup  tolovtoov;  elev  and 
the  phrase  to  8ri  ixeTo.  tovto  introduce  the  next  point.  Phil.  50c-e  fur- 
nishes an  example  of  a  more  elaborate  paraleiptic  transition.  In  dismis- 
sing further  discussion  of  the  class  of  mixed  pleasures  Socrates  acknow- 
ledges that  much  remains  to  be  said.  He  has  purposely  treated  the 
difficult  case  of  comedy  in  order  that  Protarchus  might  excuse  him  from 
the  rest.  "  I  fancy, "  he  continues,  "  that  I  may  obtain  my  release  with- 
out many  words,  if  I  promise  that  tomorrow  I  will  give  you  an  account 
of  all  these  cases.  At  present  I  want  to  sail  in  another  direction. " 
Protarchus  agrees  to  the  postponement.  Socrates  then  states  as  the 
next  topic  of  discussion  the  unmixed  pleasures.  The  particle  toIvvv 
and  a  dismissive  prepositional  phrase  //era  tcls  fjieLxBelaas  rjdoi'as  connect 
this  statement  with  the  preceding. 

In  the  case  of  a  subject  to  be  treated  again  the  postponement  is 
usually  to  a  time  more  definite  than  the  vague  els  aWts.^^  So  in  Phil. 
18a  Socrates  postpones  his  answer  to  Philebus'  question  as  to  the 
relevancy  of  his  discourse  on  method  until  he  shall  have  given  some 
further  illustrations.  He  recurs  to  the  question  in  18d,  dismissing 
his  explanations  as  adequate. 

34  Cf.  Protag.  361e;  Crat.  440e. 

'^  Cf.  Phil.  41a.  In  Phaedr.  268a  a  regular  dismissive  formula  of  exhortation 
is  used  in  a  paraleiptic  transition;  in  Rep.  400c  a  dismissive  perfect  imperative  is 
similarly  used. 

36  Cf.  Phaedr.  241e;  Euthyd.  291  b. 

3'  The  omission  of  detail  may  be  implicit  rather  than  explicit,  as  in  Theaet. 
179c.  Compare  the  explicit  paraleiptic  statements  in  Phil.  26b;  Gorg.  465b; 
Rep.  47le,  484a,  548d;  Laws  772a.  The  use  of  dXXd,  alone  or  in  combination 
with  yap,  ovv  or  8ri,  in  waiving  further  discussion  should  be  noted  here.  Cf.  Meno 
92c;  Phaedr.  261c;  Rep.  530c;  Theaet.  177e;  Phaedo  100a. 

38  Compare  Phil.  24a  with  25  b,  d;  Laws  768c,  d  with  853  f,  956  f. 


60  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

Transition  to  further  discussion  may  be  made  by  an  assumption 
evading  proof  or  dismissing  difficulties.^^  So  in  Euthyphro  9c-d, 
Socrates  dismisses  by  an  assumption  the  consideration  of  Euthyphro's 
treatment  of  his  father  and  is  thus  enabled  to  resume  the  quest  for 
the  definition  of  piety.  In  Theaet.  185e,  Socrates  avoids  by  an 
assumption  the  necessity  of  proof.  He  declares  that  Theaetetus  has 
done  him  a  kindness  in  releasing  him  from  a  very  long  discussion, 
"if  you  are  clear  that  the  soul  views  some  things  by  herself  and 
others  through  the  bodily  organs. "  The  division  of  things  into  two 
classes  is  a  further  transitional  elem.ent  in  this  passage. 

Gorg.  454e  illustrates  the  introduction  of  a  dichotomy'*''  as  a 
method  of  advancing  the  argument.  Transition  to  the  amended 
definition  of  rhetoric  is  made  by  the  division  of  persuasion  into 
8vo  etdr].  Note  the  introductory  interrogative  formula  iSouXet  ovu 
.    .    .   duiixev. 

Akin  to  this  method  of  formal  dichotomy  is  the  transition  made 
by  formulating  a  distinction  and  offering  a  choice.^^  Of  this  nature 
is  the  transition  in  Laws  654c  to  the  discussion  of  what  is  the  standard 
of  the  beautiful.  So  in  Meno  73e  Socrates'  question  whether  justice 
is  virtue  or  a  virtue  serves  as  a  transition  to  the  effort  to  show  Meno 
the  distinction  between  genus  and  species.  The  piece  of  inductive 
reasoning  in  Meno  77b-78b  by  which  Socrates  proves  that  all  men 
desire  the  good  furnishes  a  more  extended  illustration  of  this  method 
of  advancing  the  argument  by  formulating  distinctions.  Meno  has 
just  given  his  definition  of  virtue  as  kividvixovvTa  rcbv  koKwv  dwarov  dvai 
TTopi^eadai.  With  a  view  to  using  the  most  sharply  contrasted  terms 
Socrates  asks  permission  to  substitute  the  word  ayadwv  for  KoKibv. 
Meno  consents  and  Socrates  states  the  question  he  wishes  to  discuss  — 
Do  some  men  desire  evil  and  others  good?  Do  not  all  desire  the  good? 
Meno  will  not  agree  to  the  latter,  but  declares  expHcitly  that  some 
men  desire  evil.  Socrates  then  formulates  a  distinction  and  offers 
Meno  his  choice;  do  those  who  desire  evils  do  so  in  ignorance,  think- 
ing them  goods  or  are  they  aware  that  they  are  evils?  Meno  thinks 
that  there  are  instances  of  both.     Once  again  Socrates  makes  Meno 

"  Compare  the  adoption  of  a  method  of  hypothesis  in  Phaedo  100a  and  Meno 
86e. 

"  Cf.  Theaet.  198d;  Laws  629c;  646e;  Crat.  424c;  Phil.  18b  c;  Phaedr.  277b; 
Rep.  397b. 

«  Cf.  Theaet.  196c,  203c;  Meno  73d,  78d. 


MINOR  FORMS  OF  TRANSITION  61 

agree  to  the  explicit  statement;  some  men  desire  evil,  knowing  that 
it  is  evil.  He  now  makes  this  question  still  more  definite,  do  they 
desire  that  this  evil  should  become  their  possession?  Meno  believes 
that  desiring  a  thing  can  have  no  other  meaning.  Socrates  proceeds 
with  another  dichotomy;  do  they  desire  this  ignorantly,  thinking 
that  evil  is  a  benefit,  or  do  they  know  it  to  be  an  iajury?  Again  Meno 
boldly  asserts  that  there  are  instances  of  both.  "  Do  you  really  think 
that  they  recognize  evil  as  evil,  when  they  think  it  is  a  benefit?" 
continues  Socrates,  and  by  this  question  forces  from  Meno  the  reluc- 
tant admission  (with  -ye)  that  he  does  not  think  they  do.  With  an 
inferential  ovkovv  Socrates  states  his  conclusion;  these  men  do  not 
really  desire  evil,  but  good,  in  their  ignorance  mistaking  the  one  for  the 
other.     Meno  grudgingly  assents. 

Socrates  now  returns,  with  tI  be ;  to  the  other  group,  those  who 
desire  evil,  knowing  that  it  is  injurious.  Meno  agrees  that  they  must 
be  aware  that  they  will  be  injured  by  it.  With  an  introductory 
dXXa,  pointing  the  contrast  of  the  new  thought,  Socrates  asks  whether 
these  men  do  not  think  that  those  who  are  injured  are  wretched,  in  so 
far  as  they  are  injured.  Meno  agrees  that  this  too  must  be  so.  With 
a  view  to  strengthening  the  statement,  Socrates  picks  up  the  word 
ad\lovs  with  be  and  asks  whether  they  do  not  consider  the  wretched  as 
KaKobaifxovas ,  unfortunate.  Meno  assents,  and,  with  an  ovv  marking 
the  inference,  Socrates  asks  whether  anyone  wishes  to  be  wretched 
and  unfortunate.  This  seems  to  Meno  impossible.  Socrates  now 
states  his  conclusion  with  apa ;  no  one  chooses  evil  unless  he  wishes  to 
be  wretched  and  unfortunate,  for  wretchedness  is  just  desiring  evil 
and  getting  it.  Meno's  assent  is  an  expHcit  statement  of  the  con- 
clusion toward  which  Socrates  has  been  working,  "You  seem  to  me, 
Socrates,  to  speak  the  truth;  and  I  think  that  no  one  chooses  evil.  "^^ 

The  introduction  of  new  suggestions,  usually  by  Socrates,  is  an 
extremely  common  form  of  transition  to  further  discussion.^^  Some- 
times the  argument  is  led  on  by  a  series  of  such  suggestions.''*  Various 
transitional  phrases,  formulas  and  particles  are  used  to  preface  them. 

^2  The  above  analysis  will  illustrate  not  only  the  use  of  dichotomy,  but  also 
Plato's  method  of  advancing  from  point  to  point  in  an  induction. 

"•^  Cf .  pp.  92  f .  for  a  literary  elaboration  of  this  method  of  transition. 
*'  Cf.  Phil.  26e  seq.,  31b  seq. 


62  THE  ART  or  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

The  formulas  of  command  and  exhortation  noted  above/^  and  similar 
phrases  bespeaking  the  attention^^  are  regularly  used  to  introduce 
new  suggestions.  So  in  Protag.  324a  the  phrase  ei  yap  WeXets  hvorjaai,, 
introduces  Protagoras'  views  on  punishment.  Similarly  the  com- 
mand Tu  8e  oij  evTevdev  rjbrj  wpoaaxes  tov  vovv  introduces  the  discussion 
of  the  arithmetician  in  Theaet.  198b. 

The  introductory  formula  often  takes  the  form  of  a  question  as  to 
the  agreement  of  the  respondent.'*^  So  in  Theaet.  189e,  the  definition 
of  thought  as  conversation  of  the  soul  with  herself  is  introduced  by  the 
query  to  8e  dtavoetadaL  ap'  oirep  eyCs  KoXets.  A  new  term  or  idea  is 
sometimes  introduced  by  the  abrupt  question  whether  it  is  included 
in  the  respondent's  vocabulary,  whether  he  recognizes  its  existence.^^ 
The  subject  thus  introduced  often  seems  entirely  irrelevant.  So  in 
Rep.  349d,  the  subject  of  music  introduced  in  this  way,  fiovaiKov 
5e  TLva  \eyeLs,  eTepov  de  ixfjLovcrou,  seems  at  first  sight  to  have  nothing  to  do 
with  the  argument.  However,  it  serves  as  the  starting-point  for  a 
refutation  of  Thrasymachus  drawn  from  the  analogy  of  the  arts. 

One  of  the  commonest  methods  of  opening  a  discussion  or  making 
a  fresh  start  in  an  argument  is  by  demand  for  a  definition.^^  The 
demand  may  be  introduced  in  various  ways.  In  Euthyphro  the  dra- 
matic explanation  of  the  benefit  to  Socrates  from  becoming  a  pupil 
of  the  pious  Euthyphro  (5a-c)  and  the  generalization  of  the  idea  of 
piety  (5d)  lead  up  to  the  request  for  a  definition  which  starts  the  dis- 
cussion. (5d).  In  Euthyphro  lib  the  formula  dXXd  TrdXti'  elire  e^  dpx^s 
introduces  the  reiteration  of  the  request  and  consequent  fresh  start  in 
the  argument.     Again  in  15c  a  similar  transition  appears,  reinforced 

*5  Cf.  supra,  pp.  53  f.  Akin  to  the  formula  of  exhortation  is  the  inter- 
rogative formula  with  /SouXet  and  the  subjunctive.  Cf.  Phil,  lib  where  Socrates 
introduces  an  explicit  statement  of  the  question  at  issue  with  the  words  /SoOXet 
(TvyKfipaXaLwauneda  eKarepov.  Also  Protag.  317d;  Laches  193e,  194b;  Meno  76c, 
86c;  Phil.  28e;  Rep.  521c,  577b;  Theaet.  199a;  Crat.  383a;  Phaedo  70b,  79a,  104c. 

«Cf.  Phil.  24e,  29a;  Symp.  177b;  Theaet.  201d;  Meno  82b;  Euthyph.  lie. 
See  also  pp.  67  f. 

"  Cf.  Theaet.  189b-c;  Phil.  31b,  38e;Phaedr.  268a;  Phaedo  64c,  103c;  similarly 
Rep.  456d;  434a. 

<8  Cf.  Gorg.  454c,  464a;  Theaet.  163e,  198a;  Protag.  332a;  Phaedo,  103c,  d; 
Crat.  385b;  I  Ale.  128  b;  Soph.  226b;  Meno  75e,  76a,  c,  d,  88a;  Rep.  352d;  348c. 
These  same  formulas  are  also  used  to  introduce  a  definition  of  terms;  so  in  Protag. 
358c  d;  Theaet.  145d;  Phil.  34e,  37a;  Phaedo  64c. 

«  Cf.  Phil.  13b;  Theaet.  146c,  148d,  I51d,  187b,  200d;  Char.  159a,  160d; 
Laches  190d,  191e,  194c;  Lysis  212a;  Gorg.  449d;  Meno  71d,  72c,  86c. 


MINOR  FORMS  OF  TRANSITION  63 

by  the  appropriate  image  of  Proteus.  As  Euthyphro  refuses  to  exert 
himself  further  the  dialogue  comes  to  a  conclusion. 

There  are  several  types  of  transition  in  which  the  idea  of  criticism 
or  correction  is  the  prominent  element.  One  such  has  already  been 
noted.^"  The  criticism  may  take  the  form  of  a  demand  for  greater 
clearness  which  serves  to  introduce  discussion  or  explanation."^  So 
in  Rep.  332c  the  request  for  a  more  specific  definition,  developed  and 
illustrated  through  the  analogy  of  the  arts,  leads  to  an  explanation  of 
terms  which  provokes  discussion.  Similarly,  in  Protag.  318b-c,  Soc- 
rates' criticism  of  the  vague  reply  of  Protagoras,  supported  by  ana- 
logous examples,  leads  to  a  more  adequate  response  which  is  capable 
of  being  discussed.  The  demand  for  clearness  may  come  from  Socra- 
tes, as  in  the  examples  noted  above,  or  it  may  be  consequent  upon  the 
respondent's  failure  to  understand  some  statement.  His  request  for 
more  exact  explanation  of  a  point  not  sufl&ciently  clear  is  a  frequent 
method  of  introducing  concrete  illustration  or  detailed  exposition. 
The  uses  and  varieties  of  this  type  of  transition  will  be  discussed  fur- 
ther^2  in  connection  with  its  Hterary  value.  Its  characteristic  vocabu- 
lary includes  imperative  formulas  such  as  X€7e  ij.6mu,  (ppa^t  aa<peaTepov, 
and  interrogative  formulas  such  as  ttoIop  drj  Xeyets ;  ttcoj  Xeyetj.^^  The 
criticism  may  take  the  form  of  a  question  as  to  the  adequacy  of  some 
statement  or  its  relevance  to  the  present  discussion.^"*  So  in  Phil. 
17e-18a  Philebus  praises  Socrates'  discourse  on  method,  but  demands 
what  its  application  is  to  the  problem  in  hand.^^  In  Meno  75c  Meno's 
objecton  to  Socrates'  definition  of  figure  serves  as  the  transition  to 
a  short  digression  on  the  difference  between  dialectic  and  eristic. 

Another  common  method  of  advancing  the  argument  is  through 
generahzation.  In  the  search  for  definition  it  often  serves  as  the 
transition  from  a  failure  to  further  attempts  on  the  respondent's  part. 
The  generalization  is  frequently  introduced  by  some  words  of  praise 
or  excuse  to  soften  the  following  criticism.     So  in  Rep.  331c  Socrates 

"0  Cf.  supra,  p.  55. 

"  Cf.  Protag.  312d,  320b-c;  Phil.  37a;  Euthyph.  6c  d. 
«  Pp.  87  lif. 

"Laws  691b,  700a;  Phaedr.  257e,  261e,  263a;  Phil.  14c,  17a,  23e,  25d,  31e, 
51b,d,  53d,  e;Theaet.  155d. 

"  Cf.  Meno  73d,  78d,  79c,  97d;  Theaet.  169de. 

"  Cf.  pp.  89  ff.  for  a  different  combination  of  praise  and  criticism  in  transition. 


64  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

compliments  the  aged  Cephalus  on  his  excellent  words  before  he 
generalizes  them  into  a  definition  of  justice  and  proceeds  to  test  their 
adequacy.  The  generalization  in  this  case  forms  a  transition  to  the 
testing  by  negative  instances,  and  to  consequent  further  discussion. 

In  Laches  191e,  the  generalization  follows  the  testing  and  rejection 
of  Laches'  first  definition  of  courage,  and  serves  as  the  transition  to 
his  second  attempt.  Here,  however,  owing  to  Laches'  inability  to 
grasp  the  meaning  of  a  general  concept,  Socrates  is  obliged  to  give 
him  the  further  assistance  of  a  sample  definition  (192a  b);  thus  an 
additional  element  enters  into  the  transition.  Socrates  prefaces  the 
generalization  with  a  word  of  apology  for  his  own  unskilful  question- 
ing to  which  he  attributes  Laches'  failure.  With  this  passage  in  the 
Laches,  it  is  interesting  to  compare  Laws  633c,  where  a  similar  gen- 
eralization of  courage  is  used  as  a  transition.^" 

A  generahzation  m.ay  be  developed  as  a  conclusion  from  several 
particular  instances  or  it  may  serve  as  the  basis  for  a  conclusion 
through  appHcation  to  a  particular  instance.  It  is  interesting  to 
note  how  such  shifts  from  particular  to  general  and  from  general  to 
particular"  are  effected.  In  Protag.  327c  the  transition  from  general 
to  particular  is  made  by  the  appHcation  to  the  inquiry  about  virtue 
of  a  general  analogy  drawn  from  the  arts.  The  phrase  ovtcos  g'lov  Kal 
vvv  marks  the  application.  Various  combinations  of  deictic  adverbs 
and  inferential  phrases  and  particles  are  similarly  used;  e.g.,  ha  tI  ovv  ; 
/cat  vvv  8ri,  tovto  av  jjLade,  ovkovv  and  the  elliptical  eirei.^^  Laches  185d 
illustrates  the  establishment  of  a  general  conclusion  from  several 
particular  instances,  ovkovv  ivl  \6yco  introduces  the  generalization. 
A  slighter  instance  of  this  shift  appears  in  Theaet.  175c  where  the 
generalizing  phrase  irepl  tovtcov  airavTcov  gathers  up  a  long  list  of  de- 
tails. The  adverb  avWrjlSSriv  is  another  word  characteristic  of  this 
form  of  transition.'^^ 

58  Cf.  Euthyph.  5d;  Theaet.  178a.  Theaet.  147d-148b  is  interesting  as  an 
exercise  in  generalization. 

*^  In  Theaet.  190b,  particular,  general  and  particular  follow  one  another  in  the 
aba  order. 

"Cf.  Laches  183c,  185e,  189e;  Protag.  326e;  Symp.  205d;  Phaedr.  238b; 
Meno  71b,  87e;  Euthyph.  12a;  Rep.  346a,  353d. 

55  Cf.  Theaet.  155c,  193b,  175b,  196b;  Meno  73bc,  85c,  88c;  Phaedr.  238b, 
247e,  249e;  Phil.  29d,  32a,  50b;  Protag.  325c;  Rep.  335d,  342e,  350a,  353d;  Laches 
192b;  Lysis  215d;  Char.  167d;  Gorg.  476d;  Phaedo  66b;  Euthyph.  13c. 


MINOR  FORMS  OF  TRANSITION  65 

The  constant  appeal  to  analogous  illustrations  is  a  common 
characteristic  of  the  Socratic  method  of  reasoning.  Their  employ- 
ment in  making  the  shift  from  general  to  particular^"  is  only  one 
instance  of  their  appearance  in  the  dialogues.  They  occur  so  often 
that  it  seems  worth  while  to  make  a  further  study  of  the  transitional 
phrases  used  in  their  introduction  and  application.  The  introductory 
transitional  reference  to  the  illustration  may  be  very  explicit,  as  in  the 
phrase  (t/jllkpov  Xa/Se  ■Kapabei'ytJ.a  and  similar  phrases;"  more  often  a 
phrase  with  coo-Trep  or  olov  is  used,®-  or  an  introductory  avTUa,  ovkovv, 
ovv  or  elliptical  kivd.^^  In  introducing  further  illustrations®'*  or  ex- 
amples, when  one  has  been  already  given,  the  adverbs  /cat,  en,  om  and 
the  prepositional  phrases  irpbs  and  eirl  tcvtols  appear  in  various  com- 
binations.®^ The  mechanical  phrase  ei  8e  (3ov\eL  is  similarly  used.®^ 
In  marking  the  transition  to  the  apphcation  of  an  illustration  or 
example  the  deictic  adverb  oCrco  is  frequently  used  combined  with 
some  connective  or  inferential  particle,  e.g.,  ovtco  8r],  ourco  Kal  vvv,  ovtco 
de  Kal,  ovTO)  to'ivvv  f  less  Stereotyped  phrases  are  also  common,  so 
6is  Tama  aivoP\kiro:v  in  Protag.  320b;  irpos  t'l  ovv  hi]  Xeyco  ravra,  Meno 
97e.®8 

To  keep  the  machinery  of  the  dialogues  in  motion  a  multitude  of 
minor  conventional  phrases  and  particles  of  transition  is  necessary, 

«o  Cf.  supra,  p.  64. 

"  Cf.  Theaet.  154c,  176e;  Soph.  218d. 

^^  oxnrep,  Phil.  18a;  Phaedr.  265e;  oxxTrep  rode,  Symp.  205b;  ibawep  ovv  el,  Pro- 
tag.  334d;  olov,  Theaet.  147c,  I75e,  207a,  208d;  Phaedr.  240b;  Euthyph.  13ab; 
Symp.  181a;  Meno  73e,  86e;  Phil.  29b;  Crat.  387a;  Phaedo  81e;  Gorg.  495e. 

^^  avTiKa,  Protag.  359e;  Theaet.  166b;  Phaedr.  235e;  Gorg.  483a.  ovv,  ovkovv, 
Phil.  31e;  Crat.  388a,  c,  390b;  kwet,  Protag.  319e;  Symp.  208c,  d;  Euthyph.  4c, 
5e;  Euthyd  307a;  Laches  183c;  eTrel  avrUa,  Laches  195b. 

**  For  further  discussion  of  transitions  in  a  series  cf.  infra,  p.  66. 

^^ovKodvKal,  Symp.  199d;  Meno  90d,  94a;  Gorg.  477b;  Theaet.  172a,  158d; 
Euthyph.  10a,  c;  Crat.  387b.  eTrei  Kal,  Phaedr.  344c;  Theaet.  153a,  157a;  Symp. 
188a;  Phil.  14d,  55a.  en  rolvw;  "en  oiv;  Symp.  188b,  199e,  216a,  220e;  Meno  88a; 
Phil.  47d,  51e;  Phaedr.  240a;  Protag.  326b;  Theaet.  153c.  Phrases  with  irpos  and 
iirl;  Phil.  20b,  37c,  23d,  55b;  Theaet.  153c;  Symp.  184e;  Rep.  363e;  Protag.  326b. 

«6  Cf.  Protag.  320a;  Symp.  177b,  209d,  220d;  Meno  94b. 

"  Cf.  Protag.  334d,  347e;  Theaet.  153d,  207b;  Symp.  181a,  184c,  186c,  202b; 
Meno  72c,  87b;  Phaedr.  245d;  Phil.  18b. 

Cf.  also  vvv  Tolvvv  Meno  90e;  tolvtov  de  tovto  Kal;  Symp.  178e,  Pol.  287c. 

«8  Cf.  Phil.  34c,  Char.  154b,  Euthyph.  12c. 

In  Crat.  388d  a  transitional  elev  introduces  the  application  of  a  series  of  in- 
ductive examples  to  the  case  in  hand. 


66  THE  ART  OF  TRANSTTION  IN  PLATO 

Some  of  these  are  purely  mechanical,  with  no  inherent  transitional 
meaning,  such  as  the  phrase  el  5e  /SouXei  noted  above ;^^  others  are  by 
nature  connective,  e.g.,  the  numerous  inferential  phrases  and  par- 
ticles. An  adequate  treatment  of  transitional  particles  would  involve 
a  careful  analysis  of  many  minor  distinctions  in  usage  and  shades  of 
meaning^''  which  is  far  beyond  the  scope  of  the  present  paper.  The 
following  very  incomplete  collection  of  examples  of  some  of  the  more 
obvious  and  general  types  of  transitional  phrases  and  particles  will 
illustrate  the  possibilities  for  investigation  along  this  line.  In  this 
discussion  the  material  considered  has  been  grouped  under  these 
headings:  1)  transitional  phrases  and  particles  used  in  enumeration; 
2)  inferential  phrases  and  particles  used  to  mark  somiC  slight  advance 
in  the  argument;  3)  interrogative  transitional  phrases;  4)  miscel- 
laneous adverbial  and  prepositional  phrases  and  particles  of  connec- 
tion; 5)  narrative  phrases  and  formulas  of  transition. 

In  marking  the  transitions  from  point  to  point  in  an  enumeration 
Plato  uses  not  only  the  regular  phrases  irpwrov,  hevrepov,  Tpirov,''^  etc., 
but  various  other  expressions  as  well.  Often  the  first  step  is  intro- 
duced by  Tcpwrov  and  further  steps  by  simple  variants  such  as  dra, 
eireLTa,  avdts  or  avf^  or  the  introductory  phraseology  of  the  whole 
series  may  be  varied  from  the  conventional  numerical  expressions. 
avTiKa,  e^rjs,  ert,  fxevSe,  forms  of  aXXos,  prepositional  phrases  such  as 
juerct  TovTo  and  eTrt  tovtols,  the  phrase  el  8e  /SouXet^^  and  other  similar 
expressions  may  be  used.^-*  The  long  speech  of  Nicias  in  Laches 
181e-182e  affords  a  good  example  of  the  skilful  management  of 
transitions  in  enumeration.  The  following  is  the  series:  ToXkaxv, 
fxri  aXKodi  .  .  ,  dXX'  h  tovtco,  Kal  a/jLa,  eireLTa,  n'eyicnov  fievTOL,  en  8e 
Kai,  wpoadrjao/jLev  8'  avT^  ov  afxiKpav  TpoaOrjKrjv,  jxi]  aTL/jLaaco/jLev  8e  elTrelv. 
Word,  phrase  and  sentence  transitions  are  included.  Finally  a  sum- 
marizing and  dismissive  fxev  ovv  brings  the  speech  to  a  conclusion  and 
a  following  8e  introduces  the  speech  of  Laches. 

"  Cf.  supra,  p.  65. 

"  This  has  been  done  for  the  particle  yap  by  Geneva  Misener,  (University 
of  Chicago  Press,  1904) 

"  Cf.  Phaedr.  266de,  271ab;  Phil.  27b;  Theaet.  193ab;  155ab;  Rep.  358c. 

"  Cf.  Phil.  15b,  21bc;  Meno  90a,  95a;  Symp.  181b,  c,  184a,  189de,  207b, 
210a,  211a,  219e-220a,  221ab,  222a;  Theaet.  194d,  199d;  Laches  186a. 

"  Cf.  supra,  p.  65  for  discussion  of  transitions  in  a  series  of  illustrations. 

'^Phil.  12cd,  18bc;  Meno  71e,  92a,  93b-94b;  Symp.  207de;  Theaet.  166b; 
Laches  182e-183c,  191d-e;  Gorg.  491b-c. 


MINOR  FORMS  OF  TRANSITION  67 

The  inferential  particles  6/7,  ovv,  ovkovv,  apa,  and  toIvvv  are  con- 
stantly^^ used  in  transition,  either  alone  or  in  combination  with  other 
particles  and  phrases.  The  use  of  ij.ev  ovv,  fxtv  8r]  and  /xev  toIvvv  in 
dismissals  has  been  noted. '^^  ovv,  iiev  ovv  and  bi]  are  also  frequently- 
used  with  resumptive  force. '^^  The  common  idiomatic  iiiv  ovv  which 
marks  a  correction'^  is  of  course  transitional;  so  is  the  ovv  or  §'  ovv 
which  waives  further  consideration  of  some  point. ''^  An  inferential 
8r]  or  ovv  combined  with  the  adverb  outcos  may  introduce  a  summary.*" 
Inferential  particles  are  often  attached  to  an  imperative.  The  intro- 
ductory formulas  of  command  with  verbs  of  investigation  discussed 
above*^  usually  contain  an  inferential  8rj  or  ovv.  This  construction  is 
widely  extended.  Forms  from  dfiL,  exw  or  any  verb  which  may  serve 
to  attract  the  attention  are  used.^-     These  brief  quasi-exclamatory 

'6  Their  use  with  simple  inferential  force  to  mark  some  slight  advance  in  the 
argument  is  so  common  as  scarcely  to  need  illustration.  Cf.  Symp.  178e,  180a,  e, 
181b,  c,  183e,  201b,  207a,  208b;  Meno  79ab,  87d,  90b;  Phil.  21d,  26b,  e,  40c,  49d; 
Protag.  330d;  Euthyph.  7e,  13b,  14c;  Phaedo  109a;  Theaet.  170a,  185b;  Phaedr. 
244d,  261c,  262b  et  passim.  apa  is  constantly  used  to  mark  a  conclusion;  cf. 
Crat.  388b,  e;  Lysis  212d,  214d;  Laches  186a;  Protag.  332b,  e,  340d;  Theaet. 
160cd;  Rep.  350b;  et  passim. 

^^  Cf.  supra,  pp.  56  ff. 

"  Char.  157b;  Phil.  20a,  24d,  28a;  Symp.  177c,  181a,  e,  186e,  201d,  207a; 
Phaedr.  243b,  230e,  259d;  Protag.  359b,  329b;  Rep.  350d;  Soph.  249b. 

^8  Protag.  309d,  349e;  Theaet.  165a,  181d;  Symp.  201c,  202b;  Phil.  25b, 
39c;  Phaedr.  234d;  Laches  192c;  Crat.  405a;  Euthyd.  284b;  Crito  44b;  Rep. 
341a,  392b,  444b. 

"  Phaedr.  230e,  253e,  260d;  Laws  739e;  Rep.  337c,  620d. 

80  Cf.  Symp.  180b,  181a,  184a;  Phaedr.  245d,  241e;  Meno  88e;  Pol.  301c; 
Rep.  556c. 

For  another  transitional  use  of  the  same  expression  cf.  supra,  p.  65. 

81  Cf.  stipra,  pp.  53  f. 

82gx€697  Theaet.  186b;  Laches  198b;  Protag.  349e;  Rep.  353b;  Gorg.  460a, 
490b.  <ptpt  Sf,  Crito  47a;  Soph.  229b,  261d;  Pol.  267a;  Rep.  453e;  Gorg.  493d; 
Protag.  330b,  332c,  349e;  Meno  75b,  82d;  Euthyd.  293b;  Theaet.  203c,  206c, 
209b;  Phaedo  79b;  Crat.  385  b;  Phil.  27c.  W^  di,,  Theaet.  148d,  178b,  203b; 
Laches  194c,  e;  Gorg.  495c;  Phaedr.  262d;  Meno  77a;  Phil,  lid,  27d;  Protag. 
332d,  333b,  352e,  359c;  Crat.  389a;  Hipp.  II  368a;  Pol.  305b;  Rep.  399e,  455b. 
Wi  ovf,  Rep.  376d;  Symp.  199c;  le^  ovv  Sv,  Theaet.  195e;  Wl  vvv,  Euthyph.  9a. 
6pa  8ri,  Phaedo  79e;  Euthyph.  12d;  Theaet.  197c,  203c;  Protag.  339b;  Rep.  416d. 
aye  br),  Phil.  39e;  Soph.  235a.  Compare  also  the  more  explicit  phrase  irpocxexi  817  t6v 
vovv  and  its  variants,  Meno  82b;  Char.  160d;  Phil.  31d,  32e,  45d;  Symp.  210e, 
217b;  Theaet.  198b;  Soph.  262e;  Pol.  259d,  306c;  Lysis  219b;  Laws  667a. 


68  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

phrases  may  be  used  alone  to  introduce  a  point  or  they  may  simply 
precede  and  reinforce  a  regular  formula  of  command  or  exhortation. 

Interrogative  transitional  formulas  with  H  are  very  common. 
t'l  8e ;  tL  8r];  TL  ovv ;  H  8e  8r] ;  TL  8ri  ovv ;  and  other  combinations  occur.^^ 
They  are  used  to  mark  any  slight  advance  in  the  argument;  to  intro- 
duce an  objection,  a  new  suggestion,  an  illustration,  or  the  appKcation 
of  some  point.   Formulas  with  ttws  and  forms  of  ttoTos  are  also  used.^^ 

The  importance  of  adverbs  as  an  element  in  various  forms  of 
transition  has  already  been  sufficiently  illustrated.^^  The  adverbs 
ourcos,  Si8e,  av,  aWts,  ttciXlv,  e^rjs,  Itl,  i]8r]  all  have  transitional  force. 
The  exclamatory  eUv,  which  is  also  transitional  may  for  convenience 
be  included  here.^®  Here  too  should  be  noted  the  resumptive 
elra,  exetra  or  ovtus  which  picks  up  and  summarizes  a  list  of  par- 
ticiples.^^ Demonstratives  always  have  transitional  value.  Transi- 
tions are  often  made  by  means  of  demonstratives  alone  or  by  phrases 
with  the  demonstrative  pronouns,  fxera  tovto  and  /jLera  ravra  are 
especially  common, ^^  either  appearing  alone  or  in  some  transitional 
formula.  Similar  phrases  with  k,  Sta,  irpos,  Kara,  and  Trept  are  also 
used.^^     The  transitional  vrpos  or  ext  tovtols  has  already  been  noted. ^^ 

«^Ti5e,  Laches  185e,  192d,  195e,  199a;  Meno  7lc,  73a,  76a,  77e,  92e,  93e, 
98b;  Symp.  201b,  206a;  Euthyph.  4a,  8b;  Rep.  332e,  515b,  517d;  Theaet.  148c, 
153b,  154a,  205b;  Protag.  332c,  351b,  353a,  356e;  Phaedr.  234e,  258b;  Phil,  lid, 
22a,  29c,  40e;  Phaedo  59c,  64d;  Gorg.  478d,  495c.  t'l  Si);  Protag.  351c,  360d; 
Theaet.  204a;  Gorg.  486e;  ri  oiv;  Char.  154e;  Protag.  317d,  331a,  360c;  Rep. 
437b,  516c;  Laches  193e;  Meno  95b;  Phil.  38e,  41e,  53b;  Phaedr.  242d;  263c; 
Theaet.  154c,  158d,  164c,  168d,  200d;  Gorg.  498a.  W  Se  di,;  Protag.  358b,c;  Theaet. 
204b;  Meno  87d,  95b;  Euthyph.  14a;  Phaedo  58c,  65a;  Rep.  468a,  523e;  Gorg. 
502b.  tI  5'  av;  Theaet.  206a;  Gorg.  504c.  ri  617  av;  Euthyph.  14c.  tI  drj  ovv;  Rep. 
369e;  Gorg.  515e;  Symp.  205a,  206e;  Meno  89d;  Euthyph.  lOd. 

"Cf.  Phaedo  73d,  89c,  104d;  Euthyd.  284c,  293e;  Meno  91c,  96e;  Laches 
193e;  Gorg.  491d;  Phil.  Ud,  13b,  d,  e,  14c,  21d,  29a,  24e,  31c,  35c,  36c,  39e  and  see 
Appendi.x-,  p.  103. 

85Cf.  ^(^/'ra,  pp.  53,  57,  58f.,63. 

8«  Cf.  Chap.  I,  pp.  29,  42,  44;  also  Crat.  388d;  Laws  690,  691b;  Gorg.  472d,  480a; 
Apol.  18e,  19b;  Symp.  176a;  Crito  47c;  Meno  75c,  78d,  83c;  Char.  156a;  Phaedo  95a; 
Phil.  15d,  25b,  27e;  Rep.  332d,  e,  350d,  353b,  412b;  et  al. 

87  Cf.  Theaet.  193c;  Protag.  319d,  358c;  Rep.  331b,  336e,  443e,  591e. 

88  Cf.  Protag.  311a,  313a,  325d,  330d,  e,  344b,  355a;  Theaet.  148a;  Rep.  456c; 
Meno  72c,  87c;  Euthyph.  12d;  Phaedo  102b;  Phil.  29d,  38c,  52d;  Symp.  175c, 
176a,  e,  197c,  199c,  204d,  210b,  215b,  219e  d  passim. 

83  Cf.  Protag.  326a;  Lysis  218a;  Gorg.  454b;  Phaedo  58c,  59a,  66b,  d,  67e, 
74a;  Rep.  408c;  Symp.  180b,  184a,  198e;  Phil.  29e,  57c,  et  al. 
"0  Cf.  supra,  p.  65. 


MINOR  FORMS  OP  TRANSITION  69 

The  phrases  e^  apxfjs  and  et<>  avOts  have  also  been  discussed. ^^  Phil. 
52d  is  interesting  as  an  illustration  of  the  frequent  piling  up  of 
transitional  phrases  and  adverbs  in  one  minor  transition,  ert  toLvvv 
■jrpos  TOVTOLS,  /uLera  ravra,  Tohe  avTOiv  oiadereop.  to  ttolov; 

The  ordinary  connective  usages  of  /cai,  ixkv-bk  and  dXXd  do  not  need 
illustration,  but  there  are  several  idiomatic  transitional  uses  of  these 
particles,  alone  and  in  combination  Vvith  others,  which  may  be  noted. 
E.g.,  Kal  8ri  KaL  is  used  to  apply  a  general  statement  to  a  particular 
case  or  introduce  emphatically  an  important  point ;^^  ye  alone  or  with 
^17  or  Kai  may  indicate  the  transition  to  a  new  class ;^'  8e  ye  is  regularly 
used  to  mark  a  minor  premise ;^^  8k  is  used  to  pick  up  and  define  a 
term  already  introduced ;^^  dXXd  fiiiv,  r)  Kai,  rj  Kai  and  Kal  fxriv  may  mark 
the  advance  to  a  new  point,  or  a  sHght  step  forward  in  the  argument.^^ 
dXXd  yap  and  dXXd  8r]  are  used  to  introduce  an  objection  or  its 
answer." 

The  narrated  dialogues  furnish  countless  exam.ples  of  the  various 
common  transitional  formulas  with  e^??,  elirop,  aKovo)  and  similar  verbs, 
which  are  essential  to  that  type  of  writing.^^  In  a  v/ell-known  pas- 
sage in  the  Theaetetus^^  Plato  himself  lists  some  of  these  phrases. 

"  Cf.  supra,  pp.  54,  58. 

82  Cf.  Meno  70b,  88d,  89e;  Phil.  12e;  Laches  182d;  Euthyph.  2d;  Theaet. 
171d,  187c;  Symp.  182a;  Protag.  339a,  343b,  345e;  Rep.  328e,  343b,  373a,  420d 
et  al.;     Phaedo  59d,  85d. 

93  Cf.  Rep.  425b;  Theaet.  156b;  Gorg.  450d. 

9"  Cf.  Rep.  335d,  349c,  412d;  Theaet.  204e;  Meno  84e;  Gorg.  498e. 

95  Cf.  Symp.  186d,  207d;  Phil,  lie;  Phaedr.  246d,  247c;  Meno  86e;  Theaet. 
176b;  Laches  198b;  Euthyph.  10c;  Phaedo  68a;  Rep.  444d.  Cf.  also  5e  8r)  in 
Phaedr.  238a;  and  yap  in  Euthyph.  2d;  Laches  198b. 

^^Kalti7,v  Phaedo  71a,  72e;  Gorg.  471d;  Laws  629b,  640a;  Rep.  370e,  424a, 
431d;  Laches  181a,  193c,  199e;  Euthyph.  12a;  Theaet.  143e,  148b,  149c,  153b, 
159a,  170d,  182e,  188a,  204d;  Meno  87d,  98c;  Symp.  I79b,  196c,  202b,  199c; 
Phil.  17b,  18e,  21c,  26a, d,  27a,  31a,  33c,  48a,  et  passim.  Kal  ixrjv  is  sometimes 
slightly  adversative  in  tone  hke  Kal  toi.  dXXd  ixiiv  Rep.  370b,  468c,  502b, 
525a;  Phil.  35b;  Phaedr.  240a,  244d;  Symp.  176d;  Protag.  332a,  359d,  360c; 
Theaet.  lS8e,  189a,  190d;  Crat.  386d;  Phaedo  74c,  75a.  f,  Kal  Protag.  330a; 
Euthyph.  8c;  Theaet.  149a,  178b,  184e,  186a,  188e;  Phaedo  76b;  Rep.  348d. 

"  Cf.  Protag.  338c;  Theaet.  176b;  Euthyph.  6d;  Meno.  94d,  e;  Rep.  365cd, 
487b;  Symp.  199a;  Laws  805b;  Rep.  366a;  Phil.  43a,  49c.  Cf.  also  dXXci  in  Meno 
75c;  aWa  fxrjp  Symp.  202d. 

98  Cf.  Symp.  174c,  175b,  176e,  185c,  198a,  208b,  212c,  218d,  219a,  222c; 
Char.  156d;  Protag.  318b,  330b,  339b,  d,  337a,  c,  340e,  347b;  Phaedo  69e,  73a; 
Rep.  336b,  d,  337a  et  passim. 

»» Theaet.  143c. 


70  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

Besides  these  formulas  with  verbs  of  saying,  the  common  continua- 
tive  particles,  ovv,  fxev  ovv,  b-q,  yap,  /cat,  /xev,  8e,  dXXd  and  the  conjunc- 
tions and  adverbs  which  indicate  time  sequence,  such  as  kirei,  eTrei.8rj, 
drJTa,  ii8r],  are  naturally  used  with  special  frequency  to  mark  transitions 
in  narrative.^"*' 

looCf.   Char.  153a-d,  155b;  Symp.    174a,  175b,  176ab,    177a-e,   180d,  189c; 
Protag.  318a,  320c  seq.,  342a,  310a;  Phaedo  59d-e;  Rep.  614b-621b,  et  passim. 


CHAPTER  III 

The  Literary  Art  of  Transition 

Plato  is  the  first  great  artist  of  prose  style.  He  resembles  the 
cleverest  modern  writers  in  his  complete  mastery  over  his  material 
and  his  ready  commiand  of  every  device  for  securing  unity  and  variety. 
This  skill  is  nowhere  more  apparent  than  in  his  management  of 
transitions.  In  Plato's  hands  transition  becomes  a  literary  art. 
Not  only  does  he  understand  how  to  use  to  the  best  advantage  the 
ordinary  conventional  means  of  connection,  the  formulas  of  summary 
and  dismissal,  the  explicit  statement  of  purpose,  the  multitude  of 
transitional  plirases  and  particles  which  are  the  natural  resource  and 
the  common  property  of  other  ancient  writers;  but  he  is  master  also 
of  the  use  in  transition  of  image,  proverb,  quotation,  continued  meta- 
phor; he  is  aware  of  the  artistic  value  for  purposes  of  transition  of 
literary  devices  such  as  the  ironic  self-check,  the  paradox,  dramatic 
personification  of  the  argument,  and  he  is  not  afraid  to  play  with 
the  order  of  the  subject  for  the  sake  of  gaining  variety  and  heighten- 
ing interest. 

The  use  of  literary  allusion  or  adapted  quotation  in  transition 
seems  preeminently  modern.  But  in  Symp.  220c  through  an  adapted 
Homeric  quotation^  Plato  secures  real  literary  value  for  an  otherwise 
ordinary  dismissive-introductive  transition.  "I  have  told  you  one 
tale,  but  another  instance  is  worth  hearing  of  the  deeds  and  endurance 
of  that  mighty  man,  while  he  was  on  the  expedition. "  Different 
but  equally  modern  is  the  passage  in  the  Phaedrus  (243a)  where  the 
reference  to  Stesichorus  and  quotation  from  his  palinode  form  the 
chief  step  in  transition  to  the  idea  of  a  second  speech  from  Socrates 
in  recantation  of  his  first.  What  seems  like  a  playful  whim  or 
capricious  impulse  is  really  studied  art,  a  clever  literary  method  of 
securing  an  effective  transition  from  a  superficial  and  inadequate 
treatment  of  love  to  one  that  is  deeper  and  more  complete. ^     Another 

1  Od  IV  242. 
-  See  p.  21. 

71 


(^ 


72  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

interesting  element  in  this  paragraph  of  transition  is  Socrates'  use  of 
proverbial  language  in  the  explicit  statement  of  purpose  which  closes 
his  brief  summary  of  his  reasons  for  recantation.  "I  desire  as  it 
were  to  wash  the  brine  from  my  ears  with  water  from  the  spring."* 

In  Lysis  213e-214b  an  appeal  to  the  authority  of  the  poets  is 
combined  with  metaphor  in  advancing  to  a  new  point  in  the  dis- 
cussion. The  transitional  formula  of  exhortation,  "  But  let  us  proceed 
no  further  in  this  direction, "  suggests  the  noun-metaphor  of  the  hard 
road  of  investigation.  The  language  of  this  metaphor  continues, 
leading  up  to  the  reference  to  the  poets.  And  here  another  metaphor, 
the  description  of  the  poets  as  "fathers  and  leaders  in  wisdom,"  adds 
further  variety  before  the  actual  quotation'*  which  starts  the  new 
discussion.  This  transition  then  includes  formula,  image  and  literary 
reference. 

A  recurrent  metaphor  used  in  transition  may  be  an  important 
element  in  the  literary  frame  work  of  a  dialogue.  So  in  the  Republic 
the  figure  of  the  "sea  of  difficulty,"  first  casually  introduced  in  a  dis- 
missive transitional  formula  in  441c,5  appears  again  with  greater 
elaboration  in  453d  in  transition  to  a  refutation  of  the  charge  of  incon- 
sistency. It  is  further  developed  into  the  figure  of  the  three  waves  of 
ridicule  in  457bc  where  it  serves  as  the  transition  from  the  first 
paradox,  the  community  of  education  between  male  and  female 
guardians  to  the  second,  the  community  of  wives  and  children  for  the 
guardians.  After  much  postponement  and  digression,  it  is  used  again 
in  472a  to  introduce  the  discussion  of  the  possibiHty  of  the  third 
paradox,  the  rule  of  philosopher-kings.  Finally  in  473c  the  metaphor 
of  the  "laughing  wave"  prefaces  the  actual  statement  of  the  third 
paradox  which  in  472  was  postponed  by  a  brief  digression  on  the 
relation  of  the  ideal  to  the  actual.  This  image  then  not  only  helps  to 
give  artistic  unity  to  Book  V  but,  if  we  accept  441c  as  a  preparatory 
hint,  Hnks  this  book  to  the  preceding. 

'The  probable  literary  source  of  this  expression  is  Od.  6:224,  as  has  been 
pointed  out  by  Shorey  in  The  English  Classical  Review,  1904,  p.  302  f. 

*0d.  XVII  218. 

'  Campbell  {Republic,  Vol.  II,  p.  12)  finds  the  first  hint  even  earlier,  in 
iyLTre-KTiiKaixiv,  435c.  Shorey,  (.1.  J.  P.,  XVI  225)  rejects  as  fanciful  any  dis- 
covery of  the  image  of  the  wave  in  these  passages  (435c  and  441c).  At  the  best, 
in  his  opinion,  they  are  "unconscious  anticipations." 


LITERARY  ART  OF  TRANSITION  73 

The  above  description  of  instances  of  artist'c  transition  is  suf- 
ficient to  show  how  any  attempt  at  classification  is  beset  with  diffi- 
culties. In  the  majority  of  cases  where  the  transition  has  any  literary 
value  it  is  not  simple  but  complex,  a  skilful  combination  of  a  number 
of  transitional  elements.  It  may  be  that  one  element  is  so  evidently 
predominant  that  the  transition  easily  falls  under  one  category.  On 
the  other  hand,  several  elements  may  seem  equally  important.  The 
classification  followed  in  this  chapter,  is  purely  tentative,  adopted 
for  convenience  of  discussion,  not  intended  to  be  either  definitive 
or  exhaustive. 

Other  Greek  writers  quote  proverbs;  Plato  is  the  first  to  incor- 
porate a  proverb  in  his  argument  so  that  it  becomes  the  link  of  transi- 
tion from  one  point  to  the  next.  In  Rep.  423c-e  where  Socrates  and 
Adeimantus  are  discussing  the  injunctions  to  be  laid  upon  the  guard- 
ians, transition  is  made  by  means  of  a  proverb^  to  the  idea  that,  if 
only  the  guardians  receive  the  proper  education  and  nurture,  "the 
one  great  thing,"  then  the  "many"  minor  details  of  legislation  may 
safely  be  left  to  them.  Similarly  in  Laches  196d  by  means  of  the 
proverb,  "not  every  pig  would  know,"  to  which  he  adds  the  words, 
"nor  be  courageous,"  Socrates  passes  to  the  point  that,  according 
to  the  definition  of  Nicias,  courage  must  be  denied  to  animals.^ 
Euthydemus  297c  presents  an  entertaining  variation  of  this  method. 
The  sophist  accuses  Socrates  of  running  away  and  refusing  to  answer. 
He  retorts  with  the  proverb  that  "not  even  Hercules  could  fight 
agains  two,"  whih  he  proceeds  to  explain  and  adapt  playfully  to 
the  present  case.  But  the  sophist,  in  no  wise  abashed,  picks  up  the 
reference  to  the  proverb  and  uses  it  to  continue  the  game  of  eristic 
quibbles.^ 

In  Phaedo  99c  a  proverb  is  used  in  combination  with  a  transition 
of  the  ordinary  dismissive-introductive  type.  The  failure  of  Socrates 
to  find  the  final  cause  is  dismissed  with  ^h  ovv;  the  narrative  then 
advances  with  a  continuative  bk;  but  it  is  the  following  proverbial 

*  The  proverb  is  ttoXX'  oI5'  dXwTnj^  dXX'  extws  tu  ixkya.  Adam's  edition  of  the 
Republic  notes  the  reference  to  proverbial  language,  but  does  not  cite  the  proverb. 
Other  editors  seem  to  have  missed  the  meaning  of  to  \ey6ixtvov  here.  The  same 
proverb  is  similarly  used  in  Pol.  297a. 

'  See  also  Phaedr.  257d;  Phaedo  108d;  Pol.  264b;  Lysis  207c;  Phil.  48c. 

*  See  also  Phaedo  89c  and  Laws  919b  for  use  of  this  proverb. 


74  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

expression  "rw  behrepov  ttXow"^  that  really  supplies  the  main  element 
of  transition  to  the  theory  of  ideas  and  method  of  hypotheses.  In 
many  similar  cases  of  transition  by  other  methods  a  proverb  appearing 
at  the  point  of  transition  attracts  the  attention  and  adds  emphasis. 
So  in  Phaedrus  260c,  the  transition  is  very  effectively  reinforced  by  a 
proverb.  The  amusing  illustration  of  the  man  who,  deceived  by  an 
ignorant  but  eloquent  friend,  purchases  an  ass  in  the  belief  that  it  is 
a  horse,  is  appHed  to  the  case  of  an  orator  who,  himself  ignorant  of 
good  and  evil,  deceives  an  equally  ignorant  city.  The  transition  to 
the  application  is  really  made  by  the  words  "not  about  an  ass. "  But 
these  words  at  once  suggest  the  proverb  "The  shadow  of  an  ass." 
The  adoption  of  the  proverbial  expression  here  adds  to  the  eiTective- 
ness  of  the  transition.^'' 

A  proverb  brought  in  at  the  point  where  a  change  in  speakers  is 
made  may  add  greatly  to  the  smoothness  and  naturalness  of  the 
transition.  Note  for  example  the  use  of  the  proverb,  "Let  brother 
help  brother,"  in  Rep.  362d,  and  the  expression  "Your  will  is  my 
will"  in  Theaet.  162b  where  Socrates  returns  to  Theaetetus  as 
respondent.  Again  in  Crat.  411a  in  the  transition  to  the  explanation 
of  the  derivation  of  the  names  of  the  four  virtues,  the  famihar^^ 
exhortation  not  to  be  discouraged  gains  a  new  emphasis  from  the 
addition  of  the  proverbial  phrase  "put  on  the  lion's  skin."^^  Simi- 
larly, in  Phil.  60a,  the  proverb  "twice  and  thrice  what  is  fair, "^^  in 
modified  form  reinforces  the  statement  of  the  need  of  recapitulation 
which,  set  in  a  framework  of  minor  transitional  formulas,  introduces 
another  resume  and  reminder  of  the  issue. 

The  familiar  proverb,  "  the  third  to  the  Savior, "  is  frequently  used 
by  Plato  in  the  introduction  of  the  final"  stage  in  an  argument  or 
discussion.  So  in  Char.  167ab  where  the  regular  formula,  "Then  let 
us  investigate  again  as  if  from  the  beginning, "  serves  as  the  transition 

^Compare  our  expression,  "the  second  best."  This  proverb  is  used  also 
in  Phil.  19c,  Pol.  300c. 

"  Cf.  also  Laws  753e;  Phil.  29a;  Rep.  435c,  563d,  497d,  521c;  Theaet  208b; 
Pol.  300c;  Laws  723d,  701d,  968e;  Lysis  218c;  Phaedr.  272c;  Theaet.  201d. 

»  Cf.  p.  54. 

'-  See  also  Soph.  261b  where  the  proverb  "such  a  faint  heart  will  never  take 
a  city"  is  similarly  used. 

"  This  proverb  is  similarly  used  in  Gorg.  498e  in  Socrates'  appeal  to  Callicles 
for  his  help  in  drawing  out  the  conclusions  from  their  argument.  See  also  Laws 
754c,  956e. 


LITERARY  ART  OF  TRANSITION  75 

to  examination  of  the  sixth  definition  of  temperance,  the  proverb 
"the  third  to  the  Savior"  inserted  in  the  formula  emphasizes  the 
finality  of  the  attempt  and  gives  a  literary  value  to  the  transition. 
Again,  in  Rep.  583b,  this  proverbial  expression  appears  in  combina- 
tion with  the  figure  of  the  Olympic  contest  to  introduce  the  third 
and  last  argument  for  the  superiority  of  the  just  over  the  unjust  life. 
The  use  of  the  figure  enhances  the  idea  of  finality  suggested  by  the 
proverb.  In  this  greatest  of  moral  contests,  as  in  the  physical,  it  is 
the  third  throw  that  wins.^^ 

Plato  uses  quotations  in  transition  in  several  ways.^''  The  quota- 
tion may  serve  to  introduce  a  new  character  either  in  narrative  or 
argument.  The  case  in  Protag.  315bc  is  especially  apt.  The  lines 
which  introduce  the  heroes  Heracles  and  Tantalus  in  the  eleventh 
book  of  the  Odyssey  (Od.  XI,  601  and  582)  are  here  adapted  to  preface 
the  half-humorous  descriptions  of  the  famous  sophists  Hippias  and 
Prodicus.  Again  in  Protag.  340a  it  is  by  means  of  a  Homeric  quota- 
tion (II.  XXI,  308)  that  Prodicus  is  brought  into  the  argument  to 
assist  Socrates.  There  is  a  somewhat  similar  use  in  Gorg.  505e, 
where  a  quotation  from  Epicharmus,  "Two  men  spoke  before,  but 
now  one  shall  be  enough, "  introduces  Socrates'  consent  to  serve  in  the 
double  capacity  of  questioner  and  respondent. 

More  frequent  and  important  is  the  use  of  quotations  in  the  pro- 
gress of  the  argument  to  effect  the  transition  from  point  to  point  in 
the  discussion.^^  So  in  Charmides  173a  an  allusion  to  the  passage  in 
the  Odyssey^^  describing  the  two  gates  of  dreams  forms  the  transition 
to  the  investigation  whether  tem.perance  as  a  "science  of  sciences" 
would  have  any  practical  value.     Two  such  cases  of  transitional  use 

"  For  further  examples  of  the  use  of  this  proverb  in  transition  see  Phil.  66d, 
where  it  introduces  the  third  recapitulation,  and  Laws  692a. 

1^  The  use  of  a  proverb  or  a  quotation  to  formulate  a  definition  or  a  new 
point  for  debate  can  hardly  be  called  transitional.  Although  the  quotation  or 
proverb  in  such  cases  does  serve  to  indicate  a  new  phase  of  discussion,  the  actual 
transition  is  usually  found  in  some  prefatory  phrase  or  formula.  See  Meno  77b; 
Gorgias  510b;  Char.  164d;  Rep.  407ab;  Euthyphro  12b;  Laws  629,  630a-c,  731e. 
The  common  use  of  quotations  in  illustration  or  proof  is  also  non-transitional. 
See  Char.  163b;  Gorgias  484b,  526d;  Symp.  195d;  Laches  201b;  Lysis  215c; 
Laws  680b,  68 le,  690e. 

'*  Instances  of  this  use  of  quotation  in  Rep.  545d,  e,  547a,  550c;  Crito  44b, 
have  been  described  already  in  Chap.  I,  pp.  8,  43.     See  also  Crat.  428a. 

i^Od.  XIX  562. 


76  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

of  quotation  occur  in  the  Gorgias.  The  reference  to  the  well-known 
drinking  song  in  45 Id  introduces  the  idea  that  Gorgias'  definition  of 
rhetoric  is  inadequate,  being  praise  not  definition.  Again,  in  492e, 
a  saying  of  Euripides^^  prefaces  Socrates'  explanation  of  the  Pytha- 
gorean view  that  our  body  is  our  tomb. 

A  familiar  quotation  may  be  adapted  as  a  transitional  formula, ^^ 
a  minor  connecting  link  in  the  train  of  thought.  So  in  Meno  76d 
Socrates  introduces  his  Gorgian  definition  of  color  with  the  words, 
"And  now,  as  Pindar  says,-"  read  my  meaning."  The  quotation 
here  is  combined  with  the  inferential  phrase  k  tovtuv  b-q.  Similarly 
in  Rep.  563c  a  quotation  from  Aeschylus,^!  "Why  not  .  .  .  utter  the 
word  which  rises  to  our  lips,"  is  combined  with  ovkovv  to  form  a 
transition.  Another  possible  instance  is  Crat.  428d.  Here  a  Homeric 
quotation^^  is  cleverly  introduced  into  a  transitional  self-check. 

Proverb  and  quotation  occasionally  appear  together  in  a  transi- 
tion. So  in  Symp.  174b  Socrates'  punning  adaptation  of  the  proverb, 
"To  the  feasts  of  inferior  men  the  good  go  unbidden,"  combined  with 
playful  criticism  of  II.  II  408  and  another  Homeric  reference  (II. 
X  224)=^^  are  important  transitional  elements  in  the  passage  of  by- 
play which  serves  as  the  introductory  explanation  of  Aristodemus' 
presence  at  Agathon's  banquet.  Similarly  the  "subtly  moralized" 
paraphrase  of  Hesiod  (0.  D.  293)  which  appears  in  Phil.  IQc^^  involved 
with  the  proverbial  expression,  "tw  devrepov  ttXovv"  serves  as  the 
transition  to  the  demand  that  Socrates  shall  undertake  the  enumera- 
tion and  definition  of  the  species  of  pleasure  and  wisdom,  which  Pro- 
tarchus  feels  unable  to  attempt. 

Plato's  use  of  images  in  transition  is  even  more  varied  than  his 
use  of  proverb  and  quotation.  In  some  cases  the  language  of  the 
transition  is  only  slightly  figurative  or  fanciful,  suggesting  metaphor, 
in  others  the  figure  is  clearly  developed  and  applied.  Sometimes  such 
a  metaphor  is  extended  over  several  pages;  it  may  even  appear  as  a 

i«  Frag.  7  of  the  Polycides. 

"  For  additional  examples  see  Phaedr.  260a;  Symp.  220c. 
^^Frag.  82. 
"  Frag.  351  Nauck. 
«I1.  Ill  109. 

="  The  same  quotation  is  used  transitionally  in  II  Alcib,  140a.     Compare 
Protag.  348c  where  it  is  used  by  Socrates  to  support  his  claim  of  disinterestedness. 
s^Shorey,  A.  J.  P.  XIII,  p.  372. 


LITERARY  ART  OF  TRANSITION  77 

unifying  element  throughout  the  dialogue.  In  Rep.  427d  the  regular 
dismissive-introductive  transition  by  which  Socrates  introduces 
the  search  for  justice  in  the  now  completed  ideal  city,  is  varied  by  the 
addition  of  the  words,  "bringing  a  torch  from  somewhere,"  which 
give  a  figurative  touch  to  the  whole.  So  in  Theaetetus  187b  in  a 
transition  to  a  fresh  start  in  the  argument  the  ordinary  transitional 
formula,  "and  now  consider  again  from  the  beginning,"  is  enlivened 
by  the  added  figure,  "having  wiped  out  all  that  went  before. "^^ 
In  Theaetetus  164c  as  in  187b  the  image  appears  in  conjunction  with 
a  conventional  formula  of  transition  to  a  fresh  start  in  the  argument. 
But  the  more  fully  developed  metaphor  of  164c,  "Like  a  cock  of 
mongrel  breed  we  seem  to  have  leaped  away  from  the  argument  and 
begun  to  crow  before  we  have  won  the  victory,"  does  more  than  add 
vigor  and  individuality  to  the  transition.  This  striking  figurative 
expression  of  the  idea  of  mistaken  confidence  forms  a  natural  and 
effective  introduction  to  the  criticism  of  the  previous  method  of 
conducting  the  argument. 

A  figure  may  be  used  for  climactic  effect  in  a  transitional  series. 
So  in  Symp.  217e-218b,  where  Alcibiades  prefaces  an  anecdote  of 
Socrates  by  an  enumeration  of  his  reasons  for  relating  it,  the  regular 
phraseology  of  the  series^''  is  employed,  but  it  is  the  vigor  and  vivid- 
ness of  its  imagery — detailed  comparison  of  the  effect  of  philosophy 
on  the  soul  to  the  bite  of  a  serpent,  followed  by  the  lesser  figures  of 
the  philosophic  madness  and  Bacchanalian  frenzy — which  makes  the 
third  reason  an  effective  climax  and  the  most  important  step  in  the 
transition. 

In  Rep.  403e,  the  comparison  of  the  guardians  to  athletes  of  war 
is  used  in  working  out  the  conclusion  that  their  gymnastic  training 
must  be  "simple"  and  "not  over-precise."  The  more  specific  transi- 
tion to  this  subject  is  in  the  phrase  tI  8e  617;  but  the  following  words, 
"for  are  the  men  not  in  training  for  the  greatest  contest?"  add  a  more 
important  element,  for  the  application  of  this  figure  colors  the  whole 
discussion. 

An  image  may  be  used  in  the  introduction  of  another  personage 
into  the  dialogue  or  in  making  a  shift  of  interlocutors.  So  in  Theaet. 
162b  the  implicit  application  to  the  present  case  of  the  Spartan 

^  Similarly  the  figure  of  "retracing  our  steps"  gives  artistic  value  to  the 
transition  in  Theaet.  187e.     See  also  Theaet.  200e;  Laws  892d,  893b. 
»•  See  Chap.  II,  p.  66. 


78  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

custom  of  compelling  every  one  who  enters  the  gymnasium  to  strip 
and  display  his  skill  in  contest  is  pressed  by  Socrates  and  evaded  by 
Theodorus  with  the  result  that  Theaetetus  again  becomes  the  respon- 
dent. Again  in  169a-b  the  shift  to  Theodorus  is  finally  effected  by  a 
reference  to  this  same  simile  of  162b  and  a  further  comparison  of 
Socrates  to  Skiron  and  Antaeus.  So  also  in  Laches  194bc,  when  the 
elenchus  has  reduced  Laches  to  perplexity,  it  is  by  means  of  the  figures 
of  the  huntsmen  and  the  storm  that  Nicias  is  introduced  into  the 
discussion.-^ 

A  figure  may  be  em.ployed  as  a  formula,^^  as  an  external  means  of 
transition  to  a  new  line  of  investigation.  An  instance  of  this  is  the 
figure  of  the  wrestler  in  Rep.  544b  which  introduces  the  return  to  the 
discussion  of  the  types  of  degenerate  states.  "Then,  like  a  wrestler 
....  you  must  put  yourself  again  in  the  same  position;  and  let  me 
ask  you  the  same  questions,  and  do  you  give  me  the  same  ansv/er 
which  you  w^ere  about  to  give  me  then."  An  even  clearer  case  is  the 
metaphor  of  the  game  of  draughts  used  in  transition  in  Laws  739a, 
"The  next  move  in  our  pastime  of  legislation." 

The  transitions  from  point  to  point  in  the  progress  of  an  argument 
afford  great  opportunity  for  a  varied  use  of  metaphor.  Transition 
to  an  objection  or  correction  may  be  made  through  an  image. ^^  So  in 
Theaet.  203d-e  the  comparison  of  the  argument  to  a  runaway  slave 
introduces  the  correction,  "Perhaps  v/e  ought  to  have  maintained 
that  a  syllable  is  not  the  letters,  but  one  single  idea  formed  out  of 
them."  Rep.  458  a-b  illustrates  the  literary  elaboration  of  a  post- 
ponement^o  by  means  of  a  figure.  The  discussion  of  the  possibility 
of  the  second  paradox  involves  the  discussion  of  the  possibility  of  the 
entire  state.  Socrates  introduces  the  idea  of  postponement  by  the 
metaphor  of  the  day-dreams  of  an  indolent  man,  in  the  application  of 
which  he  outlines  the  order  he  wishes  to  adopt.  "  So  now  I  too  shrink 
from  the  harder  task,  and  I  want  to  postpone  those  matters  and  con- 
sider later  how  they  are  possible,"  etc. 


"  Also  Theaet,  184b. 

28  Compare  also  Phaedr.  236b;  Pol.  287c;  Phil.  13d,  41b,  44d. 
'9  See  also  Theaet.  164c,  208e. 

30  111    Symp.    209e-210a   a   dismissive-introductive    transition   is   similarly 
embellished  by  a  figure.     Compare  also  Rep.  432b-d;  Phil.  55c. 


LITERARY  ART  OF  TRANSITION  79 

Personification  of  the  argument  is  a  type  of  metaphor  rather  fre- 
quently used  in  transition.^^  So  in  Phaedr.  260e  Socrates  employs 
the  personified  \6yot.  to  bear  witness  to  the  theory  that  rhetoric  may 
be  a  mere  unscientific  knack,  rather  than  an  art.  The  figure  is  more 
elaborately  developed  in  Theaet.  164e,  where  complaint  against  the 
maltreatment  of  the  orphaned  discourse  of  Protagoras  and  the  failure 
of  its  natural  protectors,  such  as  Theodorus,  to  come  to  its  assistance 
serves  as  a  clever  transition  to  the  so-called  "defence  of  Protagoras" 
by  Socrates.  The  personification  of  the  argument  in  Laches  194a 
involves  a  literary  conceit.^^  After  the  failure  of  the  definition  of 
courage  as  endurance,  Socrates,  picking  up  and  playing  on  the 
phraseology  of  the  subject  under  consideration,  makes  abrupt  transi- 
tion to  further  discussion  by  the  literary  conceit  of  enduring  at  the 
bidding  of  the  argument  that  courage  may  not  laugh  at  their  lack  of 
courage  in  investigating  her  nature. 

Although  the  figure  in  transition  often  seems  a  mere  artistic  sub- 
stitute for  or  reinforcement  of  a  conventional  formula,  it  sometimes 
stands  in  a  much  more  intimate  relation  to  the  argument.  The  new 
idea  introduced  may  be  implicitly  suggested  by  the  figure  or  developed 
by  its  direct  application.^^  Thus  in  Rep.  343b  it  is  through  the  figure 
of  the  shepherd  and  its  application  that  transition  is  made  from  the 
ideal  to  practical  experience  in  the  consideration  of  justice  and 
injustice.  The  paragraph  of  transition  in  Theaet.  179d  illustrates 
both  uses  of  metaphor.  The  first  figure  is  incorporated  in  a  transitional 
formula.  "And  therefore  let  us  draw  nearer  .  .  .  and  give  the 
truth  of  the  universal  flux  a  ring;  is  the  theory  sound  or  rotten?" 
The  second  figure,  that  of  the  war  which  is  raging  about  the  theory, 
contributes  both  language  and  ideas  to  the  following  discussion.  In 
181a  it  is  used  in  transition  again,  combined  with  further  figurative 
language,  Socrates'  comparison  of  their  position  to  that  of  "players 
in  the  palaestra  who  are  caught  upon  the  line,  and  are  dragged  dif- 
ferent ways  by  the  two  parties." 

3>  Compare  Theaet.  200c;  Rep.  503a,  538d;  Laws  699e,  701c,  892d;  Phaedo 
95a. 

'^  Another  example  of  a  Hterary  conceit  used  in  transition  occurs  in  Symp. 
185c,  where  the  usual  transitional  reference  to  the  previous  speaker  takes  the 
form  of  a  Gorgian  paronomasia. 

'3  Compare  Rep.  368d,  484c;  Theaet.  155e,  167b;  Gorg.  4S6d;  Phil.  38e-39b; 
Laws  803ab;  Phil.  59de;  Laws  960cd. 


80  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

There  is  a  very  clever  instance  of  the  use  of  an  applied  figure  in 
transition  in  Meno  72a.  After  the  enumeration  of  virtues  which 
Meno  offers  as  a  definition,  Socrates  comments,  "I  certainly  seem  to 
have  met  with  great  good  fortune,  Meno,  if,  when  seeking  for  one 
virtue,  I  have  discovered  a  whole  swarm  of  them  which  are  in  your 
keeping. "  Then  picking  up  this  image  of  the  swarm  he  uses  it  in  an 
illustration,  introduced  by  arap,  put  in  the  form  of  an  imagined 
question  whether  bees  differ  "as  bees."  In  this  way  he  reaches  the 
idea  that  a  definition  must  give  the  essence  or  "common  notion"  of 
the  thing  defined.  Again  in  Laws  734e-735a,  the  image  of  weaving 
the  web,  introduced  by  Kadairep  ovv  8r],  suggests  the  idea  of  cleansing 
from  which  is  developed  the  need  of  tests  and  purification  in  the  state. 

A  case  like  that  of  the  applied  metaphor  of  the  dog  in  Rep.  375 
is  sometimes  criticized  as  fallacious.  But  the  Republic  is  not  a 
debate  with  an  adversary  nor  is  any  argument  in  this  instance  based 
upon  the  metaphor.  The  image  here  is  merely  a  literary  device  for 
illustrating  the  exposition  of  the  temperament  of  the  guardians.  This 
is  shown  by  375d  where  a  departure  from  the  image  is  playfully  alleged 
as  the  cause  of  their  temporary  bewilderment.  "And  I  was  at  a  loss, 
and  when  I  had  considered  our  previous  words,  I  said,  'My  friend 
it  is  with  good  right  that  we  are  in  difficulty,  for  we  have  left  the 
metaphor  which  we  set  before  ourselves.'  "  Socrates  then  proceeds  to 
further  illustration  through  a  return  to  the  metaphor.^^ 

The  use  of  recurrent  metaphor^^  is  a  feature  of  Platonic  style  which 
is  often  utilized  in  transition.  Even  when  not  strictly  transitional 
its  effect  is  always  unifying;  so  in  the  Laches  where  the  figure  of  the 
Doric  harmony  between  a  man's  words  and  deeds  introduced  by  Laches 

34  In  some  cases  where  transition  is  made  by  an  image  and  its  application,  it 
is  a  subtlety  of  Platonic  style  to  blend  the  image  with  the  thing  to  which  the 
image  refers.  This  blending  often  results  in  a  repetition  of  the  phraeseology  of 
the  image  in  the  application,  or  a  slightly  strained  adaptation  to  the  image  of  the 
characteristics  of  the  thing  compared.  The  echoing  of  words  and  phrases  recalls 
in  outward  semblance  the  Homeric  simile.  So  in  Rep.  402a-c  where  the  figure  of 
the  letters  and  their  images  in  water  or  in  mirrors  is  applied  to  the  forms  of  the 
virtues  and  their  appearance  in  concrete  shapes,  the  term  el/cij/as  is  used  in  both 
sides  of  the  comparison,  while  the  phrase  ovr'  kv  ffixupQ  ovt'  iv  M«Ta>>^w  riTLna^ofiev 
aira,  used  of  the  letters,  seems  framed  especially  to  correspond  to  nvTe  kv  aixiKpols 
fiiire  iv  fjityaXois  aTijjLa^wii^v  of  the  application. 

^  See  George  B.  Hussey,  The  More  Complicated  Figures  of  Comparison  in 
Plato,  A.  J.  P.,  Vol.  XVII,  pp.  329-346. 


LITERARY  ART  OF  TRANSITION  81 

in  188d  is  picked  up  by  Socrates  in  193d-e.  The  image  of  the  (papnaKov 
by  which  Socrates  characterizes  the  useful  lie  in  Rep.  382c  appears 
again  in  389b,  where  its  use  is  restricted  to  physicians  and  to  the 
rulers.  Later  still,  459c,  with  a  reference  back  to  the  earlier  passage, 
it  introduces  the  idea  that  the  rulers  must  enforce  proper  regulations 
of  marriage.     Thus  a  new  and  important  point  is  emphasized.^^ 

In  these  simple  cases  the  figure  recurs  but  once  or  twice.  In  the 
longer  dialogues  one  may  find  also  more  elaborate  examples  of  this 
use  of  metaphor."  Bks.  VIII  and  IX  of  the  Republic  contain  a 
striking  instance.  The  growing  image  of  the  drones  in  the  hive  plays 
an  important  part  in  binding  together  the  descriptions  of  the  degen- 
erate states  and  the  corresponding  individuals.  It  is  first^*  introduced 
in  552c  in  the  description  of  the  evils  of  oligarchy,  where  the  idle 
spendthrift  is  compared  to  a  drone.  Socrates  pauses  here  to  elaborate 
the  image  by  the  distinction  between  the  flying  drones  which  are 
stingless  and  the  walking  drones  which  are  both  stinging  and  stingless. 
Through  the  further  application  of  the  developed  figure  he  passes  to 
the  conclusion  (552de)  that  paupers  and  criminals  will  be  found 
together  in  the  state.  In  554bc  drone-like  desires,  as  ofa  pauper  or 
rogue,  are  declared  to  exist  in  the  oligarchical  man.  The  figure 
reappears  again  in  555de  in  the  description  of  the  rise  of  democracy 
out  of  oligarchy.  Ruined  men  of  rank,  ripe  for  conspiracy,  and 
unscrupulous  business  men  who  reduce  men  to  pauperdom  by  exor- 
bitant rates  of  interest  are  both  compared  to  stinging  drones.  The 
figure  is  used  in  559c  in  pointing  the  difference  between  the  democratic 
man  and  the  oligarchical.  Again,  559d,  it  is  from  the  tasting  of 
drone's  honey  that  the  change  of  the  oligarchical  principle  into  the 
democratic  begins.  In  the  account  of  the  rise  of  tyranny  out  of 
democracy  all  the  classes  of  the  democratic  state  are  described  in 
terms  of  this  figure;  the  idle  spendthrifts  who  form  the  ruling  power 
are  drones  (564b-d),  the  wealthy  tradesmen  are  food  for  the  drones 
564e),  and  the  people  get  their  share  of  drone's  honey  (565a).  Finally 
(565c),  it  is  the  drones'  sting  that  drives  men  deprived  of  wealth  to 

'"  Similarly  the  figure  of  the  "feast  of  reason"  introduced  in  Rep.  352b  is 
picked  up  in  transition  in  354a.     Cf.  pp.  34  f. 

'' The  recurrent  figure  of  the 'wave' in  Rep.  V  has  been  described  above, 
p.  72.  See  also  Chap.  I,  p.  20  for  reference  to  the  recurrent  metaphor  of  the 
defence  in  Phaedo  63b,  d,  e;  69d,  e. 

"  The  comparison  of  the  state  to  a  hive  appears  earlier  (520b). 


82  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

revolt  and  leads  to  the  subsequent  establishment  of  a  tyranny.  In 
567d  the  tyrant's  body-guard  are  described  as  drones.  The  figure 
recurs  for  the  last  time  in  the  account  of  the  nature  and  origin  of  the 
tyrannical  man;  in  573a,  where  the  master-passion  in  his  soul  is 
described  as  a  "monstrous  winged  drone";  in  574d,  which  describes 
the  rise  of  this  passion  when  pleasures  begin  to  swarm  in  the  hive  of 
his  soul;  and  in  577e,  where  the  conclusion  is  reached  that  the  tyranni- 
cal soul  will  be  least  of  all  able  to  do  as  it  likes,  being  continually 
goaded  by  the  sting  of  passion.^^ 

The  figure  of  the  midwife  in  the  Theaetetus  is  one  of  the  most 
important  examples  of  the  recurrent  transitional  image.  It  appears 
frequently  throughout  the  dialogue,  sometimes  alone,  sometimes  in 
combination  with  other  methods  of  transition.  The  image  is  intro- 
duced first  in  148e-149a,  after  Theaetetus'  confession  of  his  inability 
to  define  knowledge  and  his  dissatisfaction  at  this  failure.  Through 
a  long  digression  of  dramatic  dialogue  and  description,  the  figure  is 
fully  developed  and  in  its  entirety  serves  as  the  transition  to  renewed 
attempt  at  definition.  In  a  narrower  sense  the  resumptive  form.ula 
and  the  familiar  exhortation  not  to  grow  weary^''  with  which  the 
description  closes  (151d),  mark  the  return  from  the  digression  to  the 
argument.  In  15  le  after  the  statement  of  the  definition  the  formula, 
"  But,  come  now,  let  us  examine  it  together, "  reinforced  by  a  reference 
to  the  metaphor,  introduces  the  testing  of  the  definition.  In  15  7c-d 
the  transition  from  puzzlement  to  continued  effort  on  the  part  of 
Theaetetus  is  made  by  another  recurrence  to  the  metaphor  and  the 
ideas  involved  in  its  interpretation,  the  principle  of  Socratic  ignorance 
and  the  method  and  purpose  of  the  elenchus.  In  160e,  161b,  the 
figure  of  the  midwife  is  combined  with  a  new  figure,  that  of  the 

^^  The  figure  of  the  drones  in  the  hive  is  a  subordinate  comparison  in  the 
larger  analogy  of  the  state  and  the  individual  which  extends  as  a  framework 
throughout  the  Republic.  See  especially  368d,  434d-435e,  440b,  442de,  444a-e, 
449a,  545b,  552c,  564b,  567c,  576a,  580c.  Hussey,  pp.  339  f.  has  worked  out  this 
analogy  by  diagrams.  In  its  development  a  group  of  minor  images,  some  of 
them  recurrent,  are  used:  the  comparison  of  state  and  individual  with  the 
human  body  (401c,  409a,  591cd),  especially  in  regard  to  health  and  disease 
(444d,  490c,  495d),  with  a  harmony  (401d,  430e,  432a,  591d),  a  ship  (488,  573d), 
a  beast  (440b,  493ab,  572b,  588b,  591c),  a  bird's  nest  (543a,  573e),  a  many-colored 
cloak  (557c,  558c,  561e).  The  references  given  above  are  not  complete.  See 
also  Hussey,  loc.  clt. 

■-*See  p.  54. 


LITERARY  ART  OF  TRANSITION  83 

ainpibpbixLa  to  introduce  the  testing  of  the  definition  that  knowledge 
is  perception,  as  interpreted  and  supported  by  the  doctrines  of  Pro- 
tagoras and  the  "flowing"  philosophers.  Again,  in  184b,  transition 
is  made  by  means  of  reference  to  the  image,  to  a  fresh  start  in  the 
argument  and  to  the  return  to  Theaetetus  as  respondent.  Finally, 
in  210b,  the  image  is  employed  to  bring  the  dialogue  to  a  conclusion.^^ 

Hardly  less  im.portant,  though  far  less  complicated,  is  the  recur- 
rent figure  of  the  second  prize  in  the  Philebus.  It  appears  first  in  22c. 
Dismissing  (with  fxlv  ovv)  the  attempt  to  establish  niind  alone  as  the 
highest  good,  Socrates  restates  (with  be  drj)  in  the  form  of  this  image 
of  the  second  prize  the  modified  view  of  the  issue.  Thus  the  transition 
is  miade  to  further  investigation.  In  23a  the  image  is  picked  up,  with 
8e  8rj,  by  Protarchus  v/ho  agrees  with  Socrates  as  to  the  value  of  the 
discussion.  In  33c  the  question  v/hether  the  gods  are  or  are  not 
indifferent  to  pleasure  is  postponed  by  a  reference  to  the  image  in  a 
dismissive  formula.  Again  in  61a,  Socrates  recurs  to  the  main  issue 
by  means  of  this  same  image ;  "Then  now  we  must  ascertain  the  nature 
of  the  good  more  or  less  accurately,  in  order,  as  we  were  saying,  that 
we  may  assign  the  second  prize. "  And  in  66e  the  image  prefaces  the 
final  resume  and  conclusion  of  the  discussion.^- 

A  trait  that  is  sometimes  missed  by  literary  critics  and  translators 
of  Plato  is  his  use  of  recurrent  figurative  language  or  continued  meta- 
phor to  lead  up  to  and  emphasize  some  moral  idea.  So  in  the  Laws 
a  figurative  expression  from  the  language  of  the  Ideas,  ttoT  ^Xtiroiv, 
repeated  with  minor  variations  of  phraseology  and  grammar,  con- 
stantly appears  in  connection  with  and  leading  up  to  the  idea  of  the 
ethical  aim  of  the  law  giver,  which  is  itself  one  of  the  recurrent  themxCS 
of  the  Laws.^^     A  similar  transitional   use   of  musical  terms  occurs 

■•1  The  Theaetetus  contains  an  unusual  number  of  recurrent  metaphors;  the 
image  of  the  chorus,  used  in  transition  in  173bc;  the  wax  tablet,  191cd,  194c, 
200c;  and  the  aviary  197c,  198d,  199a-e  and  200c. 

^^  Other  cases  of  extended  recurrent  metaphor  in  the  Laws,  Timaeus  and 
Politicus  are  treated  by  Hussey,  pp.  343  ff.  For  another  example  of  recurrent 
metaphor  in  the  Philebus  cf.  Phil.  12bc,  22c,  26b,  28a. 

*'  Laws  625e,  irpos  tovto  0\kTvuiv;  626a,  a-Ko^Xkivuv  els;  630c,  irpos  ttju  neyiaTTjf 
aptrifv  .  .  .  0\kiruv;  688a,  irpos  tovto  pXkwovTa;  688b,  irpos  wa^rav  piv  (SXeireLv;  687a, 
xoT  pXewoiv;  687b,  irpos  tovto  ^Xeiruv;  693b,  Trpos  raDra  ^XkirovTa;  707d,  airo^XkirovTes 
vvv  irpos  .  .  .  apeTTiv;  714b,  Trpos  aptTXfv  .  .  .  ^Xeireiv;  743c,  euTavQa  effXeirev; 
757c,  iiropXeiroPTas;  770c,  Trpos  raDra  ^XtwovTas;  962a,  ol  0,XkwtLV  5eT;  962d,  vrpis 
aXXo  .   .   .  /3Xe7r«.     See  also  962e;  705d;  784a;  965b;  922e,  et  al. 


84  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

in  Laws  689  seq.;^'*  the  musical  figure  is  kept  up  throughout  the 
discussion  of  ignorance. 

In  this  guidance  of  the  thought  by  the  choice  of  words  the  language 
is  not  necessarily  figurative,  nor  is  it  always  a  moral  tone  that  is 
thus  secured.'*^  Irony  and  a  slightly  hostile  intention  are  shown  by 
the  persistent  harping  on  7roptfo/xat  and  its  derivatives  in  Meno  78c-e. 
In  Rep.  332  the  constant  repetition  of  6ipeLX6fj,evov ,  the  word  of  the 
definition,  emphasizes  its  inadequacy.  A  more  important  instance 
is  the  repetition  of  evxv  in  the  third  main  division  of  the  Republic 
(Bks.  V-VII),  by  which  Plato  subtly  hints  his  own  recognition  of  the 
ideal  and  slightly  chimerical  character  of  his  suggestions.  The  word 
occurs  first  in  450d  in  the  introductory  transition  scene,  where 
Socrates  protests  his  "reluctance  to  approach  the  subject,  lest  our 
aspiration  .  .  .  should  turn  out  to  be  a  dream  only. "  It  is  repeated 
in  456b,  when  the  possibility  of  the  community  in  education  between 
the  male  and  female  guardians  has  been  established.  Again  in  499c 
it  recurs  in  a  strong  affirmation  of  the  possibiUty  and  necessity  of  the 
rule  of  the  philosopher-king.  Finally  in  540d,  at  the  end  of  Bk.VII, 
it  appears  in  a  summarizing  statement,  "that  what  has  been  said 
about  the  state  and  the  government  is  not  a  mere  dream,  and  although 
difiicult,  not  impossible." 

Akin  to  the  usage  treated  above  is  the  frequent  repetition,  in 
widely  separated  parts  of  a  dialogue,  of  some  single  word  or  phrase, 
which  thus  serves  as  a  link  of  connection,  subtle  but  psychologically 
strong.^  So  irapaKaTadrjK-q  which  is  prominent  in  Bk.  I  of  the  Repub- 
lic (331  seq.)  recurs  after  a  long  interval  in  Bk.  IV  442e  in  the  applica- 
tion of  the  common  tests  of  justice  to  the  city  and  individual  just 
described. 

When  a  recurrent  phrase  has  emotional  connotations  it  may  be 
styled  a  leit-mitif.  Such  an  artistic  device  seems  at  first  sight  purely 
ornamental,  but  is  really  unifying  and  transitional  as  well.  The  hint 
of  the  coming  trial  of  Socrates  appears  as  a  leit-mitif  in  the  Gorgias 
(511c,  521e  and  522b)  in  the  conversation  of  Socrates  and  Callicles 

^*  689a  biaifioplav ;  689b  TrXrjfxneXeffTaTas;  6S9d  dceu  (Tu/X(^aj;'ias;  691a  6ta  ttXtj/u- 
fieXeiav  Kal  knovalav. 

*^  In  Rep.  342  the  importance  of  the  idea  of  the  ruler  is  emphasized  by 
repetition. 

"  yr)p6Tpo<pov,  Rep.  331a,  is  picked  up  in  569b.  Compare  also  the  repetition 
of  {nrepairoev^ffKeiv  in  Symp.  179b,  180a,  207b,  208d. 


LITERARY  ART  OF  TRANSITION  85 

and  yet  more  clearly  in  Meno  94e,  99e  and  100c  in  the  thinly  veiled 
threats  of  Anytus  and  Socrates'  references  to  his  hostility.  In  the 
Euthyphro  the  trial  is  imminent  and  what  was  before  a  leit-motif  is 
utilized  in  the  development  of  the  dramatic  setting  (Euthy.  2,  3,  15). 
A  very  impressive  instance  of  the  use  of  leit-motif  occurs  in  the 
Phaedo.  The  words  of  Socrates  in  61e  referring  to  the  impending 
discussion  "For  what  else  should  one  do  in  the  time  before  sunset," 
repeated  in  substance  if  not  in  exact  phraseology  at  the  crisis  of  the 
argument  in  89c,  "Well,  he  said,  summon  me  as  your  lolaus,  as  long 
as  it  is  still  light,"  are  echoed  by  Crito  with  almost  intolerable  pathos 
in  the  closing  scene  of  the  dialogue,  (116e)— "But  I  think,  said  he, 
Socrates,  that  the  sun  is  still  shining  upon  the  mountains,  and  that  it 
has  not  yet  set.  "'*^ 

The  variety  of  ways  in  which  Plato  effects  a  transition  by  a  single 
word  is  noteworthy.  The  use  of  a  recurrent  word  in  the  guidance  of 
the  thought  or  as  a  unifying  element  has  already  been  discussed.  A 
figurative  or  poetic  word  is  often  used  to  arrest  the  attention  and 
force  the  request  for  further  explanation.  Rep.  412e-413c  illustrates 
this  device.  In  making  the  statement  that  the  guardians  must  be 
watched  to  see  whether  they  constantly  hold  to  their  belief  that  they 
must  act  always  to  the  best  advantage  of  the  city  Socrates  uses  the 
poetic  and  figurative  expressions  yorjTevofjLevot  and  eK^aWovat.  Glaucon 
at  once  requests  an  explanation,  picking  up  k|3dXXou(n  in  €k^oKt]v 
(412a).  After  satisfying  him  on  this  point  Socrates  repeats 
'YorjTevofj.evoL  with  yorjTevdevTes  and  introduces  besides  the  metaphori- 
cal KkaweuTes.  Glaucon  is  again  completely  mystified.  Explanation 
follows.  By  this  literary  device  Plato  is  enabled  to  elaborate  an 
important  idea  and  to  impress  it  on  the  mind  of  the  reader  more 
surely  than  he  could  have  done  by  pages  of  dogmatic  exposition.^^ 

A  term  which  is  to  figure  more  or  less  prominently  in  later  discus- 
sion may  be  introduced  elaborately  or  casually  into  an  earlier  part  of 
the  discourse.  So  the  term  (xeXKov  which  is  introduced  and  defined  in 
Theaet.  178a  appears  (in  the  form  tccp  fxeWoPTUp)  in  the  latter  part 
of  b  in  an  important  new  step  in  the  argument.  Similarly,  in  Theaet. 
173e  the  verb  aarpovonovaa  which  appears  merely  as  one  of  many 
details  in  the  description  of  the  philosopher  paves  the  way  for  the 

"  Compare  also  Phaedo  85b  where  the  same  idea  occurs,  though  the  phrase- 
ology is  different. 

"  Compare  twas  in  Rep.  415e. 


86  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

typical  illustrative  anecdote  of  Thales  the  astronomer  which  follows  in 
174a.  There  is  an  important  instance  of  this  method  of  transition 
in  Euthyphro  4e — where  daiov  used  by  Euthyphro  in  the  climax  of 
his  narrative  is  picked  up  by  Socrates  in  tuv  daio^v  and  becomes  the 
theme  of  inquiry  for  the  remainder  of  the  dialogue.^^ 

A  transition  may  be  made  by  a  play  on  words.^'*  In  Theaet.  171c, 
Theodorus  protests  against  the  rather  invidious  harping  on  "truth" 
with  which  Socrates  concludes  his  half-serious  refutation  of  Protago- 
ras;— "We  are  running  my  friend  too  hard,  Socrates."  Socrates 
picks  up  the  figurative  Karadeonev  with  another  compound  of  6ecc; — 
"But  it  isn't  evident,  my  friend  v/hether  we  are  running  beyond  the 
truth,"  in  transition  to  the  assurance  that  he  will  not  rely  seriously 
upon  the  foregoing  argument. 

A  word  used  literally  may  be  picked  up  and  applied  in  a  figurative 
sense  as  in  Char.  154e.  Socrates  has  just  given  a  moral  turn  to  the 
conversation  by  the  transition  from  body  to  soul.  He  now  makes 
the  transition  to  the  idea  of  discussion  by  the  suggestion,  (introduced 
by  tI  ovv)  that  they  lay  bare  the  soul  of  Charmides.  The  verb  used  is 
aTre5v(TaiJ.ev  which  repeats  metaphorically  the  aToddvai  of  154d.  Simi- 
lar in  many  respects,  though  set  in  a  more  complicated  frame  work, 
is  the  transition  in  Protag.  352ab.  In  an  imaginary  illustrative 
conversation  dealing  with  the  condition  of  the  body,  Socrates  uses  the 
word  airoKa\v\l/as .  Then  by  a  shift  from  body  to  soul,  he  m.akes  the 
application  of  the  illustration  to  the  mental  attitude  of  Protagoras  by 
repeating  the  verb  in  a  figurative  sense. 

In  most  cases  the  repetition  of  the  word  involves  no  shift  in  mean- 
ing. So  in  Laches  181ab  a  short  digression  on  the  character  of  Soc- 
rates is  introduced  by  Kal  iir}v  and  a  repeated  word.  With  opdovvra. 
Laches  picks  up  the  bpQoLs  in  the  speech  of  Lysimachus.  There  is  a 
further  echo  in  bpQi).  The  device  may  be  repeated  through  several 
consecutive  sentences  forming  a  kind  of  "chain  figure.  "^^     So  in 

^*  Compare  Rep.  374d  where  <f>v\a.Kuiv  first  appears  in  the  technical  sense  in 
which  it  is  used  throughout  the  Republic. 

'"In  Laches  194d;  Theaet.  180b;  Rep.  330b,  transition  is  made  by  a  play 
on  the  double  meaning  of  ttoTos.  Compare  Laws  655a  where  a  play  on  the  double 
meaning  of  xp^l^-o.  serves  as  the  transition  to  a  slight  digression.  See  also  Phil. 
14b;  Rep    5n4bc. 

^'  See  Theaet.  176b. 


LITERARY  ART  OF  TRANSITION  87 

Char.  157a  where  the  sequence  runs  depaireveti',  depareveadai.  eirccSoLS, 
eTcodas — X670US,  Xd'YiiiP—'eyyiypeadat,  kyyevoijLeprjs. 

It  would  be  easy  to  multiply  examples  of  transition  by  repeti- 
tion.^2  Those  described  will  perhaps  suffice  to  illustrate  the  possibili- 
ties of  a  simple  mechanical  device  in  the  hands  of  a  master. 

In  a  form  of  literary  expression  like  the  philosophical  dialogue 
special  problems  of  transition  confront  the  writer.  The  stream  of 
question  and  answer  must  flow  naturally  and  smoothly  without 
becoming  monotonous.  Important  points  must  be  duly  emphasized, 
minor  details  subordinated,  necessary  explanations  introduced  in 
such  a  way  that  they  will  not  seem  forced.  In  a  general  way  all  the 
methods  of  transition  described  above,  the  use  of  image,  proverb, 
quotation  and  repeated  word,  contribute  to  the  solution  of  these 
problems,  for  they  add  variety  and  interest.  But  these  devices  are 
not  peculiar  to  the  dialogue;  they  are  equally  suited  to  other  forms  of 
discourse.  To  meet  more  directly  the  special  difficulties  of  the  dialogue 
form,  Plato  employs  transitions  of  another  type  which  may  be  des- 
cribed as  rhetorical  methods  for  varying  the  conventional  conduct  of 
an  argument.  These  more  unusual  forms  of  transition,  however 
apparent  their  purpose  may  be  to  the  student  of  literary  style,  seldom 
seem  forced  or  artificial,  but  fit  naturally  into  the  logical  framework  of 
the  dialogue.  One  such  device  has  already  been  mentioned,  the  use 
of  unusual  or  poetic  words  to  surprise  the  attention  and  provoke 
inquiry  for  explanation.  Plato  makes  use  of  paradox  for  a  similar 
purpose.^^  The  case  may  be  very  slight  as  in  Rep.  377a  where  the 
paradoxical  suggestion  of  the  use  of  \pevbets  \6yoL  in  education  requires 
explanation.  Compare  also  Rep.  376ab  where  Socrates  confirms  the 
principle  that  the  guardians  must  be  lovers  of  wisdom  by  developing 
the  analogy  of  the  well-bred  dog  with  the  humorously  paradoxical 
claim  that  the  dog  is  fond  of  learning. 

Without  having  recourse  to  actual  paradox,  Plato  may  state  his 
idea  in  a  figurative  or  elHptical  way  which  is  at  first  blush  quite  unin- 
telligible; or  he  may  use  expressions  intentionally  difficult,  obscure  or 

'"  See  Theaet.  155cd,  156a,  158b-d,  172cd,  195bc;  Protag.  361d;  Symp.  178c; 
Euthyph.  3e;  Laws  692d;  Phaedr.  258de;  Phaedo  72a,  92d,  109a;  Phil.  19a,  28c, 
29ab;  Rep.  440cd,  504d,  548c,  607c,  608c.  See  Mendell,  C.  W.,  Latin  Sentence 
Connection,  pp.  21-85  for  a  complete  treatment  of  the  element  of  repetition  in 
transition. 

"  See  Phaedo  64;  Rep.  422a.    Also  Phaedo  61bc  and  p.  6,  n.  12. 


88  THE  ART  or  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

technical.  In  all  these  cases  it  is  the  interlocutor's  failure  to  under- 
stand which  supphes  the  final  step  in  transition  to  further  explanation. 
So  in  Gorg.  463d  Socrates'  definition  of  rhetoric  as  a  "shadow  of  a 
part  of  the  poHtical  art"  is  purposely  enigmatical  and  naturally 
provokes  the  demand  for  the  long  explanation  which  follows.^^  In 
Euthyphro  10a,  the  intellectually  sluggish  Euthyphro  fails  to  grasp 
the  significance  of  the  distinction  between  essence  and  attribute 
implied  in  Socrates'  question,  whether  the  "holy  is  loved  by  the  gods 
because  it  is  holy,  or  holy  because  it  is  loved  by  the  gods. "  His 
admission  of  his  inabiHty  leads  at  once  to  more  simple  and  detailed 
explanation.  If  the  case  of  the  slow-witted  Euthyphro  were  the 
only  one  to  be  considered  we  might  conclude  that  this  "failure  to 
understand"  was  introduced  for  the  characterization  of  the  re- 
spondent. But  the  fact  that  it  is  just  as  liable  to  be  used  of  those  who 
are  quick  in  comprehension,  like  Theaetetus  or  Glaucon  and  Adeiman- 
tus,  excludes  such  a  theory;  and  the  frequency  of  its  occurrences^ 
supports  the  view  that  it  is  purely  transitional. 

A  variant  on  this  method  of  transition  is  the  respondent's  ignor- 
ance of  some  point  or  his  inability  to  grapple  with  some  question.^^ 
This  always  shifts  the  burden  of  responsibility  to  Socrates.  Thus  in 
Phil.  48d  Protarchus'  inability  to  apply  the  method  of  diaeresis  to 
the  idea  of  ignorance  of  self,  forces  Socrates  to  undertake  the  task. 
So  also  in  Theaet.  201  d,  Theaetetus'  unwillingness  to  undertake  to 
recall  all  the  account  which  he  has  heard  of  "things  knowable"  paves 
the  way  for  Socrates'  long  exposition.  The  respondent's  misunder- 
standing" of  some  statement  may  serve  as  the  excuse  for  further 
explanation.  In  Rep.  475d  Glaucon's  misinterpretation  of  Socrates' 
definition  of  the  philosopher  and  his  continued  failure  to  understand 
the  explanation  by  which  Socrates  narrows  that  definition  lead  to  an 
interesting  statement  of  the  theory  of  ideas. 

Similarly  the  respondent  may  himself  advance  a  wrong  but  plaus- 
ible view  which  comes  under  discussion  thereby.^^     So  in  Rep.  439e 

s-*  See  also  Rep.  449c  and  pp.  39  f. 

«  Rep.  352e,  398c,  429c,  438b,  504d;  Theaet.  152d,  155d,  164cd;  Symp.  206b; 
Meno  Sle;  Phil.  26c,  44b,  51b;  Phaedo  93a;  Laws  700a,  960c.  This  method  of 
transition  may  be  repeated  several  times  in  the  course  of  an  exposition.  See 
Theaet.   192c;  Rep.  392c. 

65  See  Theaet.  197a;  Phil.  54b,  57a,  28b. 

"  See  Phil.  14d;  Rep.  523b. 

'8  Phil.  21a;  Rep.  578b. 


LITERARY  ART  OF  TRANSITION  89 

Glaucon  advances  the  opinion  that  the  9vn6s,  instead  of  being  a  third 
element  in  the  soul,  may  be  akin  to  desire.  This  theory  is  thus  in  a 
natural  manner  brought  up  for  consideration  and  refutation.  The 
mistake  of  Cleinias  in  Laws  792b  serves  as  the  transition  to  an  ethical 
discourse  on  pleasure  and  pain  in  the  vein  of  the  Philebus.  In  Laws 
857bc,  the  dialogue  is  diversified  by  the  error  of  the  legislator  in  pro- 
posing an  unreasonable  law.  He  is  recalled  by  Cleinias  and  the 
correction  leads  to  a  further  discussion  of  the  subject  of  proemia. 

Self-correction  is  a  similar  device  introduced  into  the  argument 
for  transitional  purposes.^^  In  Laws  894d  the  legislator  corrects  his 
own  error  in  assigning  the  tenth  place  instead  of  the  first  to  that 
motion  which  changes  both  itself  and  other  things.  He  thereby 
emphasizes  the  importance  of  spontaneous  motion.  Similarly  in 
Theaet.  195b-c  Socrates'  ironicaF"  self-criticism  introduces  his  dis- 
covery of  an  objection  to  his  previous  conclusion;  the  image  of  the 
wax-tablet  does  not  explain  all  cases  of  false  opinion. 

The  self-check^^  is  a  transitional  device  familiar  to  writers  from 
Homer  down.^^  In  Plato  it  is  sometimes  playful  or  ironical  in  tone. 
So  in  Phaedrus  238c-d  where  Socrates  pauses  in  the  midst  of  his 
discourse  on  love  to  comment  on  his  own  inspired,  dithyrambic  style. 
Crat.  428d  is  very  similar  in  tone.  Socrates  replies  to  the  playfully 
extravagant  praise  of  Cratylus,  "I  have  long  been  wondering  at  my 
own  wisdom;  I  cannot  trust  myself.  And  I  think  that  I  ought  to 
stop  and  ask  myself,  what  am  I  saying?"  The  self-check  in  this 
case  forms  the  transition  to  a  careful  examination  of  the  previous 
argument.  In  Phaedrus  260d  Socrates  checks  himself  in  his  criticism 
of  rhetoric,  "But  perhaps,  my  friend,  we  have  been  abusing  rhetoric 
more  roughly  than  we  ought."  Thus  the  defence  of  rhetoric  is 
introduced. 

The  type  of  transition  in  which  a  general  expression  of  praise, 
satisfaction  or  assent  is  followed  by  the  statement  of  "one  little 

6«  See  Lysis  214e;  Phil.  43b-c;  Theaet.  169e. 

*"  Note  the  repetition  of  the  significant  dSoXeo-xr??. 

«'  See  Rep.  536b;  Laws  701c,  722d,  803bc. 

^-  dXXa  riri  fjioi  ravra  (piKos  SieXe^aro  Oviios;  is  a  Homeric  tag  used  in  transition 
in  soliloquy.  Cf.  II.  22 :121  and  385.  Pindar,  P.  4,  247  affords  a  striking  e.xample 
of  the  self-check  in  transition.  See  also  P.  11,  38.  For  a  less  happy  use  of  this 
transitional  device  see  Apol.  Rhod.  I,  648  and  919. 


90  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

difficulty"  may  be  styled  a  literary  variant  of  the  dismissive- 
introductive  transition.  Protag.  328e-329b  is  a  good  example  of  this 
form  of  transition.  Socrates  dismisses  with  extravagant  praise  the 
myth  of  Protagoras  just  completed.  "Yet,"  he  concludes,  "I  have 
still  one  little  difficulty."  In  this  way  the  discussion  of  the  unity 
of  virtue  is  introduced.^^  Similarly,  in  Euthyphro  12e-13a  these 
words  of  Socrates,  "That  is  fine,  Euthyphro,  but  there  is  still  a  little 
point  on  which  I  need  further  information,"  serve  as  the  transition 
to  investigation  of  the  meaning  of  the  term  attention. 

The  dismissive  expression  of  praise  may  be  followed  by  an  abrupt 
turn  to  a  new  point.  This  is  the  form  which  the  transition  takes  v/hen 
Socrates  is  baffied  in  the  fine  of  argument  he  has  been  pursuing.^* 
So  in  Theaet.  163c  "Splendid,  Theaetetus,  and  it  isn't  worth  while 
disputing  with  you  about  these  matters,  .  .  .  but  consider  now  this 
other  difiSculty  which  is  coming  up,  and  see  how  we  shall  get  rid  of  it. " 

One  of  the  most  characteristic  devices  for  introducing  a  discussion 
is  the  Socratic  profession  of  ignorance.^^  "You  perhaps  understand, 
Polemarchus,  but  I  do  not."  These  half  ironical  words  of  Socrates 
preface  the  testing  of  the  definition  of  justice  supported  by  the  author- 
ity of  Simonides,  Rep.  331e.  *So  in  the  beginning  of  the  Meno  (71b), 
Meno  asks  Socrates  whether  virtue  can  be  taught.  After  a  compli- 
mentary contrast  between  the  flourishing  condition  of  wisdom  in 
Thessaly  and  the  drought  in  Athens,  Socrates  introduces  the  dis- 
cussion by  a  very  emphatic  avowal  of  his  own  ignorance:  "Now  I 
myself,  Meno,  am  in  like  case;  I  share  my  fellow  citizens'  poverty  in 
this  respect;  and  I  blame  myself  for  knowing  nothing  at  all  about 
virtue;  and  when  I  do  not  know  what  a  thing  is,  how  could  I  know 
anything  about  its  characteristics?"  By  the  cleverly  inserted  dis- 
tinction between  essence  and  attribute  the  subject  of  discussion  is 
shifted  to  'what  is  virtue.' 

The  imaginary  or  supposed  question  in  its  different  forms  affords 
an  easy  method  of  varying  the  transitions  from  point  to  point  in  a 

"For  further  examples  see  Theaet.  145d,  161c,  202d;  Cbar.  154e;  Symp. 
201c;  Laches  180b.  Less  clearly  marked  cases  occur  in  Protag.  319ab;  Euthyph. 
7a;  Phaedo  69e. 

"In  Protag.  351b  the  new  point  is  introduced  abruptly  without  connection 
with  the  preceding  through  any  expression  of  satisfaction. 

^  For  other  examples  see  Meno  80cd;  Laches  186c;  Theaet.  145e,  157cd; 
Rep.  354c,  450e-451ab;  Gorg.  506a;  Lysis  212a;  Crat.  384c. 


LITERARY  ART  OF  TRANSITION  91 

discussion.  It  may  be  little  more  than  a  softened  form  of  inquiry  used 
for  politeness'  sake.  Compare  Meno  72b  where  the  question  really 
adds  nothing  to  the  transition  except  the  artistic  effect  of  a  varied 
phraseology.*^®  An  imagined  request  for  explanation  on  the  part  of 
the  respondent  may  introduce  the  concrete  illustration  of  some  point, 
or  the  description  of  an  analogous  case.  So  in  Rep.  337a  and  341e. 
Or  the  questioner  and  respondent  may  be  represented  as  being  inter- 
rogated by  an  imaginary  third  party."  This  is  the  form  most  fre- 
quently used  by  Plato.  So  in  Protag.  353a  seq.  Socrates  sets  forth 
the  meaning  of  the  phrase,  "being  overcome  by  pleasure,"  and  the 
theory  of  the  balancing  of  pains  and  pleasures,  by  means  of  a  long 
imaginary  dialogue  with  ol  toXXoI  twv  avOpcarcov.  Various  formulas 
introduce  these  questions  and  serve  as  the  explicit  verbal  transition 
in  each  case. 

While  the  invented  interlocutor  is  usually  the  versatile  and  ever- 
present  Tis  he  sometimes  assumes  a  more  definite  character  as  in 
Theaet.  200ab;  "For  that  hero  of  dialectic  will  say  with  a  laugh." 
Here  an  objection  is  dramatically  put  in  the  mouth  of  an  imaginary 
eristic  opponent  who  is  mentioned  also  in  197a  and  165d.  In  165d 
the  description  of  the  experience  of  Theaetetus  at  the  hands  of  this 
imaginary  eristic  questioner  leads  to  a  return  to  the  subject  of  the 
defence  of  Protagoras,  mentioned  already  in  164e.  In  this  defence, 
Socrates  imagines  Protagoras  himself  addressing  them.  This  is  the 
final  stage  in  the  development  of  the  device  of  an  imaginary  inter- 
locutor.®^ 

The  reported  imaginary  conversation  of  a  man  with  himself  is 
another  transitional  device  employed  for  the  sake  of  variety.  So  in 
Phil.  38c-d  Socrates  introduces  and  develops  a  psychological  analysis 
of  perception  and  recognition  by  describing  the  imaginary  discourse 
of  the  mind  with  itself,  rts  merely  takes  the  place  of  rifxas  in  this 
passage.  Again,  in  Euthyphro  9c,  Socrates  sets  forth  in  dramatic 
form  as  an  imaginary  discourse  with  himself  his  doubts  whether  he 
has  yet  learned  from  Euthyphro  the  nature  of  piety.  This  leads  to 
an  assumption  for  the  sake  of  argument  that  Euthyphro  may  be 

"«  See  also  Symp.  199e. 

"  See  Symp.  204d;  Gorg.  451ab;  Protag.  311b,  c,  de,  312d,  330c,  d,  e,  331a; 
Rep.  332c;  Theaet.  147a,  163d,  184b,  188d,  195c,  203a,  et  al. 
«8  See  also  Theaet.  154c,  178b;  Phaedr.  268a-e,  269a-c. 


92  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

right  in  his  claims  in  regard  to  the  impiety  of  his  father's  act,  and  so 
to  a  further  demand  for  the  definition  of  piety. 

Transition  may  be  made  by  the  interlocutor's  answering  his  own 
question  or  anticipating  and  forestalling  an  objection.*^  In  Protag. 
325c,  Protagoras'  answer  to  liis  own  rhetorical  question  introduces  his 
account  of  Greek  education.  In  Laws  893a,  the  legislator's  stated 
intention  to  answer  his  own  questions  and  avoid  bewildering  his 
companions,  forms  one  element  in  the  highly  figurative  transition  to 
the  proof  that  soul  is  prior  to  body.  Throughout  the  enumeration  of 
the  ten  kinds  of  motion  the  legislator  follows  this  method.  In  Gorg. 
505cd  this  method  is  employed  under  shghtly  different  circumstances. 
Callicles  refuses  to  continue  the  discussion  with  Socrates  and  remains 
firm  in  his  decision  in  spite  of  Socrates'  plea  that  the  argument  shall 
not  be  left  without  a  head.  When  Socrates  asks  for  a  volunteer  to 
help  him  finish  the  debate,  Callicles  suggests  the  possibility  that  he 
himself  assume  the  role  of  respondent  to  his  own  questions.  With 
the  approval  of  the  others  Socrates  adopts  this  plan  and  for  some  time 
continues  the  discussion  alone  except  for  an  occasional  appeal  to 
Callicles  for  his  approval.  By  510a,  however,  Callicles  has  been  insen- 
sibly won  over  to  good  nature  and  is  again  drawn  into  the  argument.^" 

When  discussion  is  blocked,  the  sudden  recollection  of  some  for- 
gotten words  of  another  may  eft"ect  the  transition  to  a  new  definition 
or  further  argument."  In  Theaet.  201c,  the  conclusion  has  been 
reached  that  knowledge  and  true  opinion  are  not  identical.  Transi- 
tion is  made  to  the  new  definition  of  knowledge  as  true  opinion 
yuerd  X6701;  by  the  words  of  Theaetetus,  "I  had  forgotten,  Socrates; 
that  is  just  what  I  have  heard  from  some  one  else;  and  now  I  recall 
it.  "^2  And  Socrates,  in  introducing  his  discussion  of  this  definition, 
picks  up  the  words  of  Theaetetus  with  the  colloquial  phrase,  "Hear 

*^  Compare  Symp.  208d;  Euthyph.  7cd. 

^o  There  is  a  similar  situation  in  the  Protagoras.  In  360d,  Protagoras  sees 
his  refutation  inevitable  and  refuses  to  answer.  When  pressed  by  Socrates,  he 
retorts  "Finish  it  yourself."  Here,  however,  there  is  no  transition  to  further 
discussion.  Socrates  extorts  one  last  admission  from  the  reluctant  sophist  and 
then  passes  to  defence  of  his  own  purpose  and  general  remarks  on  the  outcome  of 
the  discussion. 

"  Cf.  Phil.  20b;  Phaedr.  259e;  Char.  161b;  Lysis  215c. 

"  Note  that  yk  meaning  "to-wit"  picks  up  aXXo  of  the  previous  conclusion, 
thus  aiding  in  the  transition. 


LITERARY  ART  OF  TRANSITION  93 

then  a  dream  in  return  for  a  dream,"  and  declares  that  he  too  is  not 
speaking  upon  his  own  authority. 

In  the  Meno  (80e-81a),  when  further  discussion  seems  blocked 
by  Meno's  introduction  of  the  sophistic  argument  about  the  impos- 
sibiHty  of  inquiry,  Socrates  introduces  his  eloquent,  poetical  exposi- 
tion of  the  theory  of  recollection  with  the  statement  that  he  has  heard 
it  "from  certain  wise  men  and  women  who  spoke  of  things  divine." 
But  the  reference  to  other  authority  is  unconnected  here  with  any 
hint  of  forgetfulaess  or  sudden  remembrance.  Again  in  the  Phaedrus 
(235b)  this  same  idea,  the  recollection  of  some  words  of  the  wise,  is 
an  important  element  in  the  transition  to  Socrates'  extravagant  speech 
in  favor  of  the  non-lover.  Phaedrus  has  finished  reading  aloud  the 
speech  of  Lysias  and  demands  Socrates'  opinion  of  it.  When  Socrates 
ventures  upon  some  criticism,  Phaedrus  protests.  But  Socrates  per- 
sists in  his  opinion.  He  recalls  that  he  has  heard  "ancient  sages, 
men  and  women,  who  have  spoken  and  written  of  these  things." 
And  he  is  sure  that,  repeating  what  he  has  heard,  he  can  make  "a 
speech  as  good  as  that  of  Lysias  and  different."  With  characteristic 
Socratic  irony  he  protests  that  the  speech  is  no  invention  of  his  own, 
though  he  cannot  remember  at  the  moment  from  whom  he  heard  it.^^ 

The  transition  by  a  protest  or  apology,  common  in  the  orators^^ 
is  found  also  in  Plato.  "Then  I  must  speak,"  says  Glaucon  in  Rep. 
361e,  "andnow  if  my  language  is  rather  coarse,  Socrates,  please  to 
suppose  that  it  is  not  I  who  speak,  but  those  who  praise  injustice 
instead  of  justice."  With  this  disclaimer  of  responsibility,  Glaucon 
prefaces  the  second  part  of  his  defence  of  the  unjust  life.  So  in  Gorg. 
494e,  Socrates  prefaces  his  demand  whether  Callicles  still  maintains 
that  pleasure  and  good  are  identical  by  a  protest  that  Callicles  is 
to  blame  for  the  coarse  tone  of  the  preceding  argument. ^^ 

'^  In  the  two  passages  last  described  this  transition  also  marks  the  change 
to  a  more  elevated  style.  It  is  interesting  to  compare  the  transitions  in  Rep. 
614b;  Gorg.  522e-523a;  Phaedo  110b. 

'''  Orators  often  introduce  a  statement  oralineof  argument  with  the  apologetic 
protest  that  their  opponents  force  them  to  take  this  position— e.g.,  Dem.  XVIII, 
228,  269,  312;  Isoc.  XV,  310;  Lysias  III,  3;  XII,  3;  Isaeus  II,  1. 

'^  See  also  Thaedr.  237a.  Socrates'  protest  in  Rep.  509c  that  Glaucon  is  to 
blame  for  any  exaggeration,  "for  you  made  me  utter  my  fancies,  "is  not  strictly 
speaking  transitional,  though  it  is  picked  up  by  Glaucon  in  his  demand  that  the 
discussion  be  continued.  Rather  it  is  a  bit  of  by-play  introduced  to  relieve  the 
strain  caused  by  the  long,  difficult  argument. 


94  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

For  the  sake  of  variety  Plato  sometimes  plays  with  the  order  and 
plan  of  the  subject. '^^  Such  a  structural  device  is  necessarily  transi- 
tional, since  it  offers  a  means  of  introducing  topics  effectively  and  of 
regulating  discussion.  The  frequent  comparison  of  the  argument  to 
a  wind  which  must  be  followed  whithersoever  it  blows,  is  not  of 
course  to  be  taken  seriously."  "Such  words,"  says  Campbell,^^ 
"express  the  spirit  of  the  catechetical  mode  of  expression,  but  only  a 
bhnd  simplicity  can  believe  the  master  serious  when  he  professes  not 
to  know  the  way. "  Whenever  Plato  plays  with  the  order  of  his  sub- 
ject, it  is  for  artistic  reasons  and  not  because  the  plan  was  not  firmly 
fixed  in  his  own  mind.  In  Rep.  430d,  after  the  discussion  of  courage, 
Socrates  pretends  to  want  to  pass  on  to  justice  at  once  "without  any 
longer  troubling  ourselves  about  temperance."  Adeimantus  pro- 
tests. By  this  dramatic  by-play,  the  transition  to  the  definition  of 
temperance  is  varied.  Similarly,  in  Rep.  457e,  instead  of  turning 
directly  to  the  discussion  of  the  desirability  of  the  second  paradox,  the 
community  of  wives,  Socrates  attempts  to  escape  by  the  assumption 
that  its  advantages  are  self-evident  if  only  it  is  possible.  Glaucon, 
however,  will  not  permit  this  evasion,  and  the  discussion  thus  intro- 
duced proceeds. 

Frequently,  the  leader  of  the  discussion  pretends  to  have  stumbled 
on  a  point,  when  in  reality  he  has  led  up  to  it  througlT  a  carefully 
prepared  image  or  argument.  So,  in  Laws  722cd,  the  analogy  of  the 
slave  physician  and  the  true  has  prepared  the  way  for  the  principle 
that  all  laws  need  a  preamble.  This  idea  of  the  necessity  of  a  preamble 
and  the  conclusion  that  all  their  previous  words  have  been  in  reality 
naught  but  prelude  are  nevertheless  introduced  as  unforeseen  and  due 
to  lucky  chance. 

Again  in  Laws  888,  the  long  discussion  of  the  difficulties  of  meeting 
the  problem  of  religious  scepticism  really  forms  a  very  fitting  intro- 
duction to  the  following  generalization  of  the  pre-Socratic  nature 
philosophy;  the  Athenian  stranger,  however,  exclaims  at  the  remark- 
able discussion  into  which  they  have  unwittingly  fallen  (Laws 
888d).79 

'«  Although  this  method  of  variation  is  especially  characteristic  of  the 
Republic  and  Laws,  it  is  not  confined  to  these  dialogues.  Compare  Theaet. 
183b-184b;  Symp.  185c-e. 

"  See  Introduction,  p.  1. 

'«  Essays  in  Edition  of  Rep.,  Vol.  II,  p.  10. 

"  Cf.  also  Rep.  399e;  Laws  681c,  686c. 


LITERARY  ART  OF  TRANSITION  95 

In  the  Republic  and  Laws,  it  is  usually  comparatively  easy  to 
distinguish  the  literary  machinery  from  the  real  argument.  This  is 
not  always  the  case.  One  of  the  most  important  features  of  Platonic 
style  and  one  that  has  often  misled  critics,  is  his  playful  blending  of 
real  arguments  with  mere  literary  devices  for  carrying  out  an  illustra- 
tive imagery.^"  The  concluding  pages  of  the  Philebus  perhaps  afford 
the  most  considerable  example  of  this  puzzling  confusion.  In  59c-d 
Socrates  has  really  established  his  thesis,  the  superiority  of  knowledge 
over  pleasure. ^^  Further  confirmation  is  not  needed  except  for 
rhetorical  effect.  In  59d-e  a  dismissive  eUv  and  an  image  derived 
from  the  idea  of  the  /xlktov  introduce  a  summary  of  previous  argu- 
ments. A  proverb*^  serves  as  the  final  step  in  transition  to  this 
resume.  A  challenge  to  other  investigators  (60d)  prefaces  the  re- 
statement (61ab)  of  their  earlier^^  conclusion  that  neither  knowledge 
nor  pleasure  unmixed  is  the  good;  the  good  is  in  the  mixed  life  where 
it  dwells  as  a  man  in  his  home.  Various  images  and  literary  conceits 
follow,  carrying  out  the  figure  of  the  mixture  and  serving  as  a  transi- 
tion to  the  piece  of  serious  reasoning  that  follows.  "In  the  life  that 
is  well  mixed"  the  good  will  appear  more  clearly.  Let  us  pray  to  the 
gods  and  make  the  mixture.  We  are  like  wine  mixers;  pleasure  is 
like  honey;  knowledge  like  water.  Finally,  with  (pepe  d-q  and  the 
picking  up  of  koKus,  Socrates  turns  (61d)  to  the  serious  question 
whether  every  form  of  pleasure  and  knowledge  should  be  admitted  to 
the  mixture.  Knowledge  is  considered  first  and  in  62bc  the  con- 
clusion is  established  that  all  forms  of  knowledge,  even  the  imper- 
fect, will  be  necessary.  The  following  images  of  the  porter  opening 
wide  the  door,  and  of  the  receiving  basin  of  streams  emphasize  and 
develop  this  conclusion  in  figurative  language.  In  the  second  image, 
Plato  finds  a  suggestion  for  his  transition  to  the  consideration  of 
pleasure;  "And  now  we  must  go  back  to  the  fountain  of  pleasures" 
(62d).  "It  is  time  now  for  us  to  consider  about  the  pleasures  too, 
whether  we  must  let  in  all  these  together  also"  (62e).  True  and 
necessary  pleasures  will  of  course  be  admitted.  With  regard  to  the 
other  pleasures  the  previous  course  of  the  dialogue  has  shown  Plato's 
opinion  clearly  enough.     Accordingly,  instead  of  repeating  the  argu- 

80  As  in  Rep.  375-6.     S:;e  p.  80. 
8>  See  pp.  32  f. 
8=  See  p.  74. 
«  22bc. 


96  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

ment,  he  adopts  the  literary  device  of  an  imaginary  dialogue  with  the 
pleasures  and  sciences  themselves  (63a-64a),  asking  their  opinion  on 
the  subject  of  admitting  all  forms  of  pleasure.  This  gives  him  an 
opportunity  to  review  the  previous  conclusions  in  a  striking,  dramatic 
way. 

With  an  abrupt  formula  of  transition,  dXXa  fxr]p  kuI  robe  ye  avayKotov 
(64a),  Plato  now  turns  to  the  somewhat  arbitrary  selection  of  truth, 
symmetry  and  beauty  as  the  three  chief  elements  of  good.  The  figure 
of  the  dwelling  place  of  the  good  recurs  (64c)  and  a  figure  from  the 
chase  emphasizes  his  conclusion  (65a),  "Then  if  we  cannot  hunt 
the  good  with  one  idea  only,  with  three  we  m.ay  capture  it. "  We  are 
ready  now  for  the  triumphant  final  decision,  "And  now,  Protarchus, 
any  man  could  be  an  adequate  judge  for  us  concerning  pleasure  and 
wisdom,  as  to  which  of  them  is  more  akin  to  the  highest  good  and  more 
to  be  honored  among  men  and  gods."  In  the  rem.ainder  of  the  dia- 
logue, Plato  is  merely  adding  further  reasons  in  a  somewhat  rhetorical 
style,  in  order  to  make  his  conclusion  more  effective.  The  words  of 
Protarchus  (65b)  show  this,  "That  is  plain,  nevertheless  at  any  rate 
it  is  better  to  go  through  with  the  argument."  The  distinctions  and 
terms  of  these  last  pages  should  not,  therefore,  be  too  closely  pressed. 
Bury^'  and  Poste  make  this  mistake  when  they  criticize  the  argu- 
ment which  identifies  truth  with  mind  rather  than  with  pleasure, 
because  Plato  refers  to  pleasures  of  love  instead  of  pure  pleasures. 
This  is  all  mere  rhetorical  reinforcement  of  the  argument;  his  con- 
clusion has  already  been  established. 

Through  a  similar  error,  too  much  is  often  made  of  the  six  grades 
enumerated  in  66.  They  are  not  to  be  taken  seriously.  They  are 
aptly  introduced  by  a  playfully  exaggerated  command  to  Protarchus 
to  proclaim  their  decision  far  and  wide,^  and  end  in  a  quotation  which 
is  also  a  figure,  "And  now,  with  the  sixth  generation,  as  Orpheus  says, 
cease  the  glory  of  my  song"  (66c).  In  transition  KaTaTravaare  is 
picked  up  hy  KaTaTreiravixevos.  The  following  figure  of  putting  a  head 
on  the  argument  and  the  proverbial  "third  to  the  savior"  introduce 
a  third  and  finaP®  restatement  both  of  the  original  thesis  and  the  ques- 
tion of  the  second  prize  and  a  third  and  final  resume  of  their  conclu- 
sions.    Socrates  closes  with  the  triumphant  boast  that  we  shall  not 

*^  Bury,  Philebus,  Appendix  B,  p.  169  ff. 

^  The  transition  in  Rep.  580b  is  similar  in  tone.    Cf .  p.  44. 

«•  Cf.  19c,  60a. 


LITERARY  ART  OF  TRANSITION  97 

believe  pleasure  to  be  first  in  importance  even  if  all  men  and  beasts  so 
affirm.  Although  the  exposition  is  complete,  the  dialogue  ends  with 
Protarchus  still  unwilling  to  let  Socrates  go,  a  touch  probably  added 
by  Plato  to  heighten  the  resemblance  of  the  Philebus  in  outward  form 
to  the  minor  dialogues  of  search. 

In  the  passage  just  analyzed  it  is  significant  to  note  that  it  is  only 
after  his  thesis  is  established  that  Plato  gives  his  fancy  free  rein.  The 
resultant  bafiling  mixture  of  rhetoric  and  serious  thought  does  not 
effect  his  conclusions;  there  is  no  sacrifice  of  logical  clearness  for  the 
sake  of  ornament.  Another  evidence  of  Plato's  care  in  guarding 
against  confusion  in  the  argument  is  found  in  his  treatment  of  digres- 
sions. An  explicit  warning  does  not  usually  precede  the  digression, 
but  the  resumption  of  the  argument  at  its  close  is  always  clearly 
marked.  The  method  of  approach  to  a  digression  is  naturally  deter- 
mined in  great  measure  by  its  content  and  purpose.  The  digression 
may  be  a  passage  of  by-play  or  of  eloquent  moral  reflection  which 
serves  to  vary  the  monotony  and  reHeve  the  strain  of  a  difficult 
argument;  or  it  may  be  a  discussion  of  some  subject  supplemental  to, 
or  illustrative  of  the  main  argument.  Euthyphro  llb-e  furnishes  an 
example  of  the  first  type  of  digression.  Euthyphro  is  completely  at 
a  loss  and  complains  that  their  arguments  ''seem  to  turn  around  and 
walk  away."  The  suggestion  of  motion  leads  Socrates  into  a  com- 
parison of  their  words  to  the  handiwork  of  Daedalus.  The  playful 
discussion  of  the  application  of  this  metaphor  affords  a  pleasant  relief 
from  the  preceding  subtle  dialectic.  The  transition  here  is  cleverly 
made  through  the  development  of  a  chance  expression. ^^  It  is  only 
at  its  close  (lie)  that  the  passage  is  marked  as  a  digression  by  the 
explicit  dismissal,  "Enough  of  this,"  and  the  restatement  of  the 
question  at  issue,  the  nature  of  piety.^^ 

It  is  entirely  natural  that  the  idea  of  leisure  should  frequently 
appear  in  transition  to  a  digression.  In  the  case  of  the  charming 
poetical  digression  in  Phaedrus  258e-259e  it  is  introduced  merely  to 
justify  the  digression.  But  in  Theaet.  172b  it  not  only  serves  this 
purpose;  it  is  also  the  chief  element  in  the  transitions^  to  Socrates'  long 

*'  For  digressions  similarly  introduced  see  Rep.  466d;  Phil.  12bc,  28ab; 
Phaedr.  258e;  Laws  692d. 

**  Compare  Laws  655b  where  a  slight  digression  on  color  is  dismissed  with 
the  phrase  "not  to  be  tedious."     Also  Phil.  59b-c. 

89  See  p.  24. 


98  THE  ART  OF  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

eloquent  description  of  the  life  of  the  philosopher  as  contrasted  with 
that  of  the  clever,  unscrupulous  lawyer.^*'  The  return  from  this 
lengthy  digression  is  marked  by  a  dismissive  apology  (with  ixeu  ovv). 
" These  however, "  says  Socrates,  "are  digressions  from  which  we  must 
now  desist,  or  they  will  overflow  and  drown  the  original  argument; 
to  which,  if  you  please,  we  will  now  return"  (Theaet.  177bc).  A  care- 
ful resumptive  summary  of  the  argument  follows  (177c).  Another 
sHghter  instance  in  which  the  dismissal  takes  the  form  of  an  explicit 
apologetic  recognition  that  what  precedes  is  a  digressions^  is  found 
in  Rep.  571a-572b.  This  is  a  digression  of  the  supplemental  type.^^ 
The  transition  to  it  is  rather  abrupt.  Before  proceeding  with  the 
description  of  the  tyrannical  soul,  Socrates  brings  up  "a  previous 
question  which  remains  unanswered,  .  .  .  the  nature  and  number 
of  the  appetites."  He  himself  declares  that  until  this  subject  is 
adequately  treated,  "the  inquiry  will  always  be  confused."  The 
supplemental  character  of  the  digression  is  thus  explicitly  recognized. 
At  the  close  of  this  discussion  Socrates  remarks,  "In  saying  this  I 
have  been  running  into  a  digression;  but,"  he  continues,  resuming  the 
argument,  "the  point  which  I  desire  to  note  is  that  in  all  of  us,  even 
in  good  men,  there  is  a  lawless  wild-beast  nature,  which  peers  out  in 
sleep." 

More  often  the  dismissal  of  the  digression  is  not  explicit,  merely 
implied  by  a  resumptive  statement,  or  the  repetition,  with  some 
resumptive  particle,  of  the  point  under  consideration  before  the 
digression. s^  So  in  Laws  693c  the  Athenian  returns  from  an  illustra- 
tive^^  digression  (692d-693c)  on  the  Persian  Wars  with  the  remark, 
"Let  us  resume  the  argument  in  that  spirit,"  picking  up  the  idea  of 
the  legislator's  need  of  an  ideal  aim,  a  point  which  the  digression  has 
emphasized.  Again  in  Protag.  328a-329b,  Socrates'  remark  that  he 
has  "one  little  difficulty"  is  repeated,  with  i^Dv  8r},  at  the  end  of  the 

^o  For  further  examples  of  edifying  moral  or  religious  digressions  cf.  Phil. 
28c-30e;  Laws  803a  seq.;  Phaedo  89c-91c. 

'^  For  further  examples  of  apologetic  dismissal  cf.  Phil.  30e  and  Rep.  543c. 
For  a  full  description  of  the  latter  passage  see  p.  42. 

'-  Bks.  V-VII  of  the  Republic  form  a  lengthy  digression  which  supplements 
the  argument.     See  discussion  in  Chap.  I,  pp.  39  f. 

S3  Cf.  Theaet.  151d,  165e. 

'^  Further  examples  of  this  type  of  digression:  Theaet.  165a-e;  Laws  655ab; 
Rep.  466d-471a. 


LITERARY  ART  OF  TRANSITION  99 

ironical  digression  in  which  he  explains  his  confidence  in  Protagoras, 
and  serves  as  the  transition  to  renewed  discussion. 

Another  interesting  topic  which  should  be  at  least  touched  upon 
in  any  study  of  Plato's  literary  methods  of  transition  is  his  treatment 
of  transition  in  parodies.  The  myth  in  the  Protagoras,  the  speech  of 
Lysias  in  the  Phaedriis,  the  speech  of  Aspasia  in  the  Menexenus  and 
the  speeches  of  Aristophanes,  Agathon  and  the  rest  in  the  Symposium 
are  the  most  considerable  examples  of  parody  in  the  dialogues.  So 
cleverly  has  Plato  imitated  the  manner  of  these  other  writers  that 
there  have  not  been  lacking  critics  in  modern  times  as  well  as  in  antiq- 
uity to  maintain  that  the  passages  in  question  are  not  parody  at  all, 
but  the  authentic  work  of  the  authors  to  whom  they  are  ascribed  by 
Plato. ^^  But  the  fact  that,  aside  from  these  passages,  Plato  has 
shown  himself  able  completely  to  vary  his  style  at  will  establishes  his 
ability  to  write  parody;  and  it  certainly  seems  far  more  probable  that 
such  an  artist  would  exercise  his  own  creative  power  rather  than  be 
limited  by  dependence  on  other  writers.  However,  setting  aside  the 
question  of  Platonic  authorship,  it  is  interesiing  to  note  the  methods 
of  transition  used  in  some  of  these  passages,  as  they  illustrate  types 
of  style  quite  different  from  the  dramatic  description,  the  continuous 
dialectic  or  the  stichomythia  of  question  and  answer  which  make  up  a 
large  part  of  the  dialogues. 

The  myth  in  the  Protagoras  (320c  seq.)  is  an  example  of  simple 
narrative  style.  It  opens  with  a  narrative  7dp.  The  sentences  are 
short.  The  methods  of  connection  are  uniformly  simple;  narrative 
conjunctions,     such    as    eweLSr],    6tl,    otclv;     transitional    particles 

^^  This  view  finds  most  general  credence  in  the  case  of  the  speech  of  Lysias. 
Blass  [Attischc  Bercdsamkeit,  Leipzig,  1887,  Vol.  I,  pp.  423-430),  while  accepting 
the  Platonic  authorship  of  the  speeches  in  the  Symposium,  maintains  that  the 
resemblance  to  the  style  of  Lysias  in  the  speech  in  the  Phaedrus  is  too  perfect 
to  admit  of  its  being  parody.  He  lists  the  authorities  ancient  and  modern  on 
both  sides  of  the  question. 

Adam  in  his  edition  of  the  Protagoras  (pp.  xxi-xxii,  Cambridge,  1893) 
argues  against  the  Platonic  authorship  of  the  myth.  But  his  reasoning  is  defec- 
tive. Intent  to  caricature  is  not  the  only  adequate  motive  for  parody;  and  it  is 
unfair  to  base  any  arguments  upon  the  disputed  speech  in  Phaedrus  233  ff. 
Adam  cites  Zeller  {Archiv.  fiir  Geschichle  der  Philosophic,  V  2,  p.  175  £f.)  and 
Chiapelli  {ibid.  Ill,  p.  15  and  256  f.)  who  support  the  same  view.  The  ancient 
authorities  are  listed  by  Stallbaum  (Ed.  of  Protagoras,  Leipzig,  1882,  p.  77). 
For  the  other  view  see  Stewart  {Myihs  of  Plato,  London,  1905,  pp.  220-222),  and 
Grote,  (Plato,  Vol.  II,  London,  1888,  pp.  274-275). 


100  THE  ART  or  TRANSITION  IN  PLATO 

ixh-bk,  Kai,  yap,  ovv,  drj,  /xeu  ovv ;  deictic  pronouns  and  adverbs,  repeated 
words.  The  time  sequence  forms  the  chief  bond  of  connection 
throughout. 

The  speech  of  Agathon  (Symp.  194e-197e)  is  a  brilHant  rhetorical 
display  in  the  sophistic  style.  The  transitions  are  explicit.  Each 
subject  is  formally  announced  and  as  formally  dismissed.  The  speech 
opens  with  a  prothetic  statement  of  plan.  irpojTov  fxev  and  tTeLra 
introduce  the  two  topics  of  the  discourse;  first,  the  method  to  be 
adopted  in  the  praise  of  Eros;  second,  the  actual  encomium.  The 
rhetorical  balance  is  further  continued  through  the  contrast  of  the 
wrong  methods  of  previous  speakers  with  that  to  be  used  by  Agathon. 
The  summarizing  application  concluding  this  brief  discussion  of 
method  is  introduced  by  ourco  677  (195a).  Trpwrov  and  eTreira  again 
appear  in  enumeration.  A  transitional  ovv  introduces  the  first  point 
in  the  encomium;  Eros  is  the  most  blessed  of  the  gods  because  he  is 
the  fairest  and  best.  The  proofs  of  his  preeminent  beauty  are  dis- 
cussed first.  irpoJTov  p.tv  introduces  the  first  point,  his  youth.  When 
this  is  established,  advance  to  the  next  is  made  through  the  common 
dismissive-introductive  form  of  transition  with  ij.ev  ovv  and  be  (195c). 
A  dismissal  of  these  two  points  (with  p.tv  drj)  combined  with  the 
introductory  phrase  irpos  8e  tovtols  (196a)  marks  the  transition  to  the 
third.  Another  explicit  transition  of  the  formal  dismissive-introductive 
type  effects  the  advance  from  the  subject  of  the  beauty  of 
Eros  to  that  of  his  virtue.  This  theme  likewise  is  treated  with 
rhetorical  formahty.  The  four  virtures  are  considered  in  turn.  The 
following  phrases  mark  the  transitions;  to  nev  ixkyicTov  (196b)  intro- 
duces the  claim  that  Eros  is  just;  irpbs  bk  rfj  buaioavvQ  (xouppoavvqs 
7r\elaTT]s  jxerexeL  (196c)  marks  the  advance  to  temperance;  with  /cat  iirjv 
the  encomiast  proceeds  to  the  subject  of  courage.  These  three  are 
now  formally  dismissed  with  fxev  ovv  and  the  remaining  virtue,  wis- 
dom, is  presented  for  consideration  by  a  common  introductive  formu- 
la (196d).  Throughout  the  speech  the  more  minute  transitions  in 
the  discussion  of  the  various  points  are  also  explicit.  Proofs  are 
carefully  labelled  as  such  (195b,  d;  196a).  A  summarizing  ovtojs 
and  the  common  adverbial  phrase  pLera  tovto  mark  the  transition 
(197c)  to  the  final  topic,  Eros'  benefits  to  men.  The  eloquent  Gor- 
gian  conclusion  is  the  most  notable  parody  of  the  flamboyant  style 
and  displays  to  perfection  its  chief  features,  antithesis,  balance, 
alliteration,   assonance,   homoeoteleuton,   jingling  word-play,   exag- 


LITERARY  ART  OF  TRANSITION  101 

geration,  asyndeton.  For  its  unity  this  passage  depends  upon 
word-order  and  rhythm. 

The  much  debated  Menexenus^*^  is  another  and  even  more  striking 
instance  of  Plato's  parody^^  of  the  epideictic  style,  in  this  case  the 
k-Kirijufios.  Its  subject  matter  deals  with  the  regular  tottol  of  this 
class  of  literature. ^^  The  style  is  balanced  and  rhetorical  and  employs 
transitional  methods  similar  to  those  just  described.  For  example  in 
236d  note  the  transitional  use  of  the  favorite  rhetorical  antithesis 
between  word  and  deed  and  the  studied  balance  of  phrases.  There 
is  the  same  formal  statement  of  theme  and  summarizing  dismissal 
of  conclusions,  the  same  constant  use  of  rhetorical  figures  that  were 
noted  in  Symp.  194e-197e. 

The  much-disputed  speech  of  Lysias  in  the  Phaedrus  illustrates 
the  plain  rhetorical  manner.  Aside  from  the  continual  use  of  balance 
few  figures  of  style  appear.  The  methods  of  connection  are  simple, 
even  monotonous ;^^  a  few  particles,  used  over  and  over,  form  prac- 
tically the  entire  machinery  of  transition.  The  balance  with  nkv 
and  bk  occurs  repeatedly,  the  balance  dXXd — oh  eight  times  in  233  and 
234.  en  be  is  used  four  times  (231a,  b,  232a,  233d),  koI  jxkv  b-q  five 
times  (231d,  232b,  e,  233a,  d).  The  frequent  use  of  the  conjunction 
coo-re  should  also  be  noted. 

'^  Burgess,  Epideictic  Literature,  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1902,  p.  148, 
note  1,  cites  the  literature  on  the  genuineness  of  the  dialogue. 

"  That  the  Menexenus  is  avowedly  a  parody  seems  clear  from  the  con- 
clusion (249de)  where  Menexenus  plainly  hints  at  his  disbelief  in  Aspasia's  author- 
ship. 

'^  Burgess,  op.  cit.,  pp.  146-157,  analyzes  the  content  of  the  Menexenus  and 
compares  it  with  the  other  extant  examples  of  kTrLTa.<fWL. 

55  Blass  has  noted  this  (p.  430  note). 


APPENDIX 

Although  this  study  of  Plato's  methods  of  transition  is  by  no 
means  statistically  complete,  yet  the  amount  of  material  collected 
will  justify  a  few  general  conclusions  as  to  variations  in  usage  in 
earlier  and  later  dialogues.  Chronologically  the  Platonic  dialogues 
may  be  divided  into  three  main  groups.  The  minor  Socratic  dia- 
logues are  generally  regarded  as  early;  the  Theaetetus  and  Republic 
are  typical  of  the  middle  period ;  while  the  Laws,  Timaeus  and  difi&cult 
metaphysical  and  dialectical  dialogues  are  undoubtedly  late.^ 

In  the  later  dialogues  the  frame-work  is  obvious.  The  transitions 
are  usually  explicit.  Formal  detailed  statements  of  method,  pre- 
scribing the  course  to  be  followed  or  the  principles  which  are  to 
govern  the  discussion,  and  summarizing  resumes  are  naturally  char- 
acteristic of  these  difficult  dialogues.  The  frequent  occurrence  of 
these  types  of  transition  in  the  Laws  and  Philebus  has  been  noted. ^ 

In  the  dialogues  of  the  middle  period  the  bald  outhnes  of  the  plot 
are  disguised  under  a  wealth  of  imagery  and  dramatic  detail.  Transi- 
tional summaries  and  statements  of  plan  occur,  but  they  are  less 
prominent  and  are  often  combined  with  other  elements.^  The  more 
artistic  and  unusual  forms  of  transition  discussed  in  chapter  three 
occur  with  greatest  frequency  in  the  dialogues  of  the  middle  period. 

The  minor  dialogues  of  search  illustrate  most  clearly  the  pretence 
at  lack  of  plan  which  is  a  chracteristic  feature  of  Platonic  method. 
Transitional  references  to  the  course  of  the  argument  are  generally 
brief  and  simple;  if  at  all  lengthy  they  are  embelhshed  by  dramatic 

1  Minute  statistical  investigation  of  Plato's  style,  diction  and  use  of  particles 
have  contributed  materially  to  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  dating  the  dialogues. 
But  such  evidence,  however  valuable  for  confirming  the  general  classification  of  a 
dialogue  as  early,  middle  or  late,  must  not  be  regarded  as  alone  sufficient  to  date  a 
dialogue.  Cf.  Shorey,  Unity,  pp.  49  ff.  The  most  important  of  these  statistical 
studies  are — C.  Ritter,  Unlersuchungen,  Stuttgartt,  1888;  Campbell,  Introduction 
to  Edition  of  Sophist  and  PoHticus,  Oxford  Press,  1867;  Campbell,  Essays  I  and 
III  in  Vol.  II  of  Jowett  and  Campbell's  Republic,  Oxford  Press,  1894;  W.  Ditten- 
berger — ri  ixrjv;  {Hermes,  Vol.  XVI,  1881,  pp.  321-345);  Schanz — tQ  6vtl  and  ojtws 
(Hermes,  Vol.  XXI,  1886). 

2  Cf.  Chap.  II,  p.  56,  also  Chap.  I,  pp.  26,  47. 

3  Cf.  Theaet.  191a-c,  187d-e. 

102 


APPENDIX  103 

and  artistic  details.*  Conventional  transitional  formulas  and  phrases 
occur  in  great  numbers  in  all  the  dialogues.  They  are  indeed  essen- 
tial to  the  catechetical  form.  Statistical  study,  however,  reveals  the 
tendency  to  a  decided  increase  in  their  use  in  the  dialogues  of  the 
middle  period,  while  their  excessive  occurrence  in  the  later  dialogues 
contributes  largely  to  bring  about  that  greater  formality  and  arti- 
ficiality of  style  which  has  been  noted  by  scholars.^  The  transitional 
usage,  in  typical  dialogues,  of  forms  of  toIos  will  illustrate  this  point. 
In  the  Laches,  Lysis  and  Charmides,  which  are  presumably  early, 
there  are  only  three  instances  of  forms  of  ttoTos  in  transition,  once  in 
the  common  formula  to  irolov  61)  tovto  and  twice  in  oblique  cases, 
TTotoj  and  Toiav.  In  the  Theaetetus  the  number  of  cases  is  increased 
to  thirteen,  all  stereotyped  phrases  with  tolov  or  Tota.  But  in  the 
Philebus,  which  is  late,  ttoIov  and  xoTa  occur  in  transition  forty-three 
times.  Similar  statistics  might  be  gathered  on  the  transitional  usage 
of  TTcos,  Xeye  iJiovov,  and  other  stereotyped  transitional  phrases. 

*  Cf.  Laches  190c-d,  197e;  Lysis  213e. 
»  Campbell,  Republic,  Vol.  II,  pp.  60-6L 


INDEX  OF  REFERENCES  TO  THE  PLATONIC  DIALOGUES 

(Numbers  refer  to  pages  of  the  dissertation.    Mere  lists  of  passages  in 
foot-notes  are  not  included.) 

Charmldes,  6,  7,  8,  10,  13,  14,  16,  54,  74,  75,  86,  103. 

Cratylus,  4,  13,  54,  74,  76,  89. 

Crito,  8. 

Euthydemus,  11,  73. 

Euthj'phro,  6,  7,  13,  54,  59,  62,  85,  86,  88,  90,  91,  97. 

Gorgias,  9,  15,  17,  18,  54,  60,  74,  75,  76,  84,  88,  92,  93. 

Laches,  6,  7,  8,  14,  16,  17,  54,  56,  58,  59,  64,  66,  73,  78,  79,  80,  86,  103. 

Laws,  47-52,  55,  58,  60,  64,  75,  80,  83,  86,  89,  92,  94,  98,  102. 

Lysis,  5,  13,  16,  72,  103. 

Menexenus,  101. 

Meno,  5,  13,  18,  19,  55,  60,  61,  63,  76,  80,  84,  85,  90,  91,  93. 

Parmenides,  5,  13. 

Phaedo,  6,  11,  15,  16,  19-22,  73,  81,  85,  98. 

Phaedrus,  9,  15,  18,  21,  56,  71,  74,  79,  89,  93,  97,  101. 

Philebus,  5,  26-33,  58,  59,  63,  69,  74,  75,  76,  83,  88,  91,  95-97,  102,  103. 

PoHticus,  5,  13,  74,  83. 

Protagoras,  6,  10,  11,  14,  17,  54,  55,  56,  57,  58,  62,  63,  64,  65,  75,  86,  90,  91,  92,  98,  99. 

Republic,  12,  15,  21,  33-47,  56,  57,  58,  62,  63,  72,  73,  74,  75,  76,  77,  78,  79,  80,  81,  82, 

84,  85,  87,  88,  90,  91,  93,  94,  98,  102. 
Sophist,  4,  13,  74. 
Spurious  Dialogues,  5. 

Symposium,  10,  12,  14,  21,  71,  76,  77,  78,  79,  84,  100. 
Theaetetus,  12,  13,  21,  22-26,  54,  55,  57,  60,  62,  64,  69,  74,  77,  78,  79,  82,  83,  85,  86,  88, 

89,  90,  91,  92,  97,  98,  102,  103. 
Timaeus,  102. 


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